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ABSTRACT
Wilderness Handrails: The Evolution of Search and Rescue 
in Yosemite National Park
by
Christopher Edward Johnson
Dr. Andrew Kirk, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The evolution of seareh and reseue in Yosemite after World War II highlighted the 
ways in whieh park users and administrators negotiated the contentious discourses of 
teehnology, tourism, and wilderness in the modem national parks movement. The 
establishment of a teehnologieally sophistieated seareh and rescue force provided free by 
the federal government blurred the lines between preservation and use in national park 
policy by allowing administrators to resist development and support wilderness while still 
providing a safe environment for recreation. The co-evolution of rock climbing and 
rescue also illuminated the resulting tensions between individual freedom, social 
responsibility, and class in environmental culture. Drawing from incident reports, 
administrative correspondence, and climbing literature, this thesis demonstrates that the 
professionalization of search and rescue enabled the Park Service to accommodate 
visitors seeking to both preserve nature and consume it through rock climbing and other 
wilderness activities in the nation’s premier national park.
Ill
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INTRODUCTION
Let them take risks, for Godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt, stranded, drowned, eaten by 
bears, buried alive under avalanches -  that is the right and privilege of any free American.
Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, 1968
Today rescue in America is pragmatic. It is a classic American expression of the denial of 
death by means of technology and motion.
Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note” in Wilderness Search and Rescue, 1980
October storms are frequent catalysts of search and rescue (SAR) missions in 
Yosemite National Park. Though not uncommon and typically less severe than similar 
meteorological events in other major mountain ranges around the world, these first 
storms of the winter season can be devastating to unaware visitors in Yosemite’s more 
than 700,000 acres of undeveloped terrain beyond, and high above, the relative safety and 
security of the urbanized Valley. SAR specialist and expert rock climber Lincoln Else 
recalled spending the first two weeks of October 2004 hiking along the Valley rim in a t- 
shirt and shorts, “sweating in the hot sun.” Just days later, on the morning of the 
nineteenth after two straight nights of freezing rain and snow, he found himself breaking 
trail through knee-deep snow drifts in blizzard conditions, marking trees with bright pink 
“flags” so that a support crew of thirty SAR experts could follow with climbing ropes, 
medical supplies, and other tools of rescue. Their destination: the rim of El Capitan, one 
of the park’s premier tourist sights and the most famous rock climbing wall in the world. 
The storm continued for two days as Else and Yosemite’s team of professional rescuers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
struggled to carry out one of the most technically difficult, dangerous, and ultimately 
tragic SAR operations in the park’s recent history.*
When the storm hit on the seventeenth, four parties including seven total climbers 
became trapped on four different routes high on El Capitan’s 3,000 foot vertical face. 
After enduring three days of fifty mile-per-hour winds and rain mixed with snow, five 
climbers survived to be pulled from the rock by the park’s crack SAR team while two 
Japanese climbers perished from hypothermia and prolonged exposure only 600 feet 
short of the summit. Though experienced and well-stocked for the five-day climb of the 
“Nose” route on El Capitan, Ryoichi Yamamoto and Moriko Ryugo did not anticipate the 
dire straights an October storm could bring. After two days of huddling against the cold 
on the same tiny ledge, the pair jettisoned much of their gear in a last ditch effort to make 
the summit during a lull in the storm. Unfortunately, good weather lasted only an hour, 
and on the night of the nineteenth, the climbers died hanging in slings, wrapped together 
under a flimsy nylon tarp. “Parties can steel themselves to the misery and boredom of 
riding out a storm on the wall,” explained Ed Visnovski in his analysis of the climbers’ 
actions, “but the physical and mental debilitation of hypothermia is a slippery slope that 
is hard to prepare for and harder to resist.”  ^ Requiring 110 rescuers, thousands of feet of 
climbing rope, a contract helicopter, and more than $110,000 of the park’s emergency 
appropriation funds, the rescue of the surviving climbers and the recovery of the bodies
' Lincoln Else, “Flagging,” in Friends o f  YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescues, 10-19-04 to 10-22-04.” 
http://w'ww.friendsofvosar.org/rescues/niissions/10-19-04 ElseFlagging.html (accessed July 23, 2007).
 ^Ed Visnovske, “Double Climber Fatality on the Nose,” in Friends of YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescue, 
10-19-04 to 10-22-04.” http://www.ffiendsofVosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04 Nose Fatalities.html 
(accessed July 23,2007).
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of Yamamoto and Ryugo underscored the vital importance of search and rescue to the 
administration of Yosemite National Park.^
By 2004, Yosemite’s elite SAR team had amassed nearly forty years experience 
carrying out some of the most improbable climbing rescues ever performed. In fact, the 
dramatic rescue and body recovery from El Capitan in October of 2004 shared an eerie 
connection with another SAR incident in exactly the same location twenty years earlier, 
almost to the day. On the night of October 15,1984, an unseasonable winter storm 
inundated the Yosemite region, stranding five climbers in three parties on the granite 
flanks of El Capitan. After three days of battling poor visibility, freezing temperatures, 
and violent winds, rescuers managed to save the lives of three of the five climbers. The 
other two, Keiso Sadamoto and Kenji Yatsuhashi of Hiroshima, Japan, lost their lives to 
hypothermia in a vain attempt to climb through the storm.'*
Such stories are reminders of the power of nature, yet they are perhaps even more 
valuable for what they reveal about culture and the ways in which Americans, and other 
visitors from around the world, have known nature through recreation in Yosemite and 
the national parks. The striking and oddly unsettling parallels between these two 
incidents on El Capitan suggest more than cosmic coincidence; they also illustrate in high 
relief the persistent administrative challenges arising from the transformation of rock 
climbing and other wilderness-oriented activities into mainstream recreational pursuits in
 ^Friends o f YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescues, 10-19-04 to 10-22-04.” 
http://www.tfiendsofvosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04.html (accessed on July 23, 2007); for additional 
accounts o f this rescue and recovery see Daniel Duane, “Six Nights on the Dark Tower,” National 
Geographic Adventure 7 (February, 2005); and Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., 
O jf the Wall: Death in Yosemite (Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2007), 336-339.
Michael Mayer, “Case Incident Record,” October 18, 1984, YOSE SAR files, 1984.; also see 
Ghiglieri and Farabee, DeatA in Yosemite, 331-332.
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Yosemite and other national parks in the second half of the twentieth century. As park 
goers in this period created new ways to experience nature through recreation in 
America’s iconic landscapes, search and rescue became routine, serving as a marker of 
profound changes in environmental culture.
Sociologist Joseph Sax, in his 1980 study of recreation in the national parks.
Mountains without Handrails, asked how a minority of “preservationists” could justify 
their demands that the National Park Service (NFS) prioritize rock climbing, backpacking, 
ski mountaineering, and other wilderness-oriented activities which, by the level of risk, 
technical skill, and physicality involved, effectively excluded the majority of visitors 
seeking only “an experience that will provide the essential qualities of a resort vacation.”  ^
Sax made no mention of the function of visitor protection in justifying this recreational 
hierarchy. Yet the NFS’s institutionalization of search and rescue in Yosemite in the 
decades following World War II represented a significant devotion of human and 
financial resources towards privileging the park’s most active visitors, specifically those 
seeking a wilderness experience sans “handrails.”
Even with serious budget concerns, annual increases in accidents, and objections from 
taxpayers, rescuers, and some wilderness advocates, the promise of free rescue remained 
embedded in Yosemite’s visitor protection apparatus. Established in 1970, Yosemite 
Search and Rescue or YOSAR - a technologically sophisticated, professional 
organization composed of park rangers, expert rock climbers, medical technicians, and 
helicopter support teams - provided a psychic safety net for even the most inexperienced 
visitors wishing to encounter the park through rock climbing, backpacking, cross-country
 ^Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks (Ann Arbor: The 
University o f Michigan Press, 1980), 2 ,95.
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skiing, or other forms of recreation consistent with what Sax called “the preservationist 
tradition in the national parks movement.”  ^ As a tool for the NFS to accommodate the 
changing recreational expectations of park goers in the age of environmentalism, YOSAR 
became the “handrails” of Yosemite’s wilderness.
For most tourists in Yosemite since the 1970s, YOSAR’s “wilderness handrails” 
functioned as far more acceptable safeguards than the roads, hotels, metal railings, and 
other explicit “handrails” that Sax feared would pervade the parks and spoil the 
interaction with wild nature central to what he and millions of park lovers perceived as an 
appropriate wilderness experience. For many outdoor enthusiasts, YOSAR’s use of 
helicopters, rigging systems, high powered spotlights, and other conspicuous tools of 
rescue seemed an intangible sideshow, existing as a reactive safeguard to be effected in 
the off-chance that an emergency cut short their wilderness fantasy. YOSAR’s technical 
sophistication - though viewed by some preservationists as running counter to the 
technological skepticism of the wilderness ideal - enabled the individualized recreational 
experience sought by the park’s most active visitors to remain functionally self-sufficient 
without becoming unjustifiably dangerous. In an urban industrial/ post-industrial society 
in which few visitors to the national parks possessed the skills to extricate themselves 
from life-or-death scenarios in a wilderness setting, a technologically proficient SAR 
apparatus became not only an acceptable presence in the outdoors but a vital requirement 
of the much sought-after wilderness experience.
The wilderness handrails of SAR occupied what Leo Marx called a “middle 
landscape” in America’s ongoing reconciliation of technology and nature since the start
* Ibid., 42.
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of the industrial age. In Marx’s analysis, Americans created a new understanding of their 
relationship to nature as the “machine” of industrial technology crept into the idealized 
“garden” of the pre-industrial landscape. While Marx’s pastoral nature differed from the 
notion of a recreational wilderness that gained currency in twentieth century 
environmental thought, the process of redefining the human place in nature through 
technology remained central to both constructions. Outdoor enthusiasts from the early 
twentieth through to the twenty first century have continually modified the technological 
imperative described by Marx in order to define the limits of authenticity in the 
wilderness experiences. Despite the anti-technology bias of the wilderness ideal, for 
consumers of outdoor recreation, this search for authenticity has not always required a 
tangible nature unaffected by human agency, but more often has involved locating an 
appropriate role for technology in providing safe access to the landscapes defined as 
wilderness in environmental discourse.^ The history of search and rescue in the national 
parks reveals how park enthusiasts in the second half of the twentieth century constructed 
new rationales for the inclusion of technology and consumer desire into a wilderness 
ideal that did not explicitly contain a place for either.
As environmental historians have long argued, the wilderness movement and its 
outgrowth, environmentalism, emerged as critiques of the nation’s religious zeal for the 
technological domination of nature in the industrial age.* Preservationists from John
’ Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden:Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964, 23, 71,113-115, 139-144; For these intersections between technology, 
consumer-oriented recreation, and wilderness in the twentieth century consider the essays in Liza Nicholas 
with Elaine M. Bapis and Thomas J. Harvey, eds.. Imagining the Big Open: Nature, Identity, and Play in 
the New West (Salt Lake City: University o f  Utah Press, 2003); Also see James Morton Turner, “From 
Woodcraft to ‘Leave no Trace:’ Wilderness, Consumerism, and Environmentalism in Twentieth Century 
America,” Environmental History 7, no. 3 (2002): 462-484.
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Muir to Aide Leopold to Edward Abbey presented wilderness as an ideal state of nature 
existing apart from the technological imperatives and commercialism infiltrating urban 
industrial society. Yet by dividing the physical world into sacred wilderness and profane 
civilization, these “prophets” of environmental thinking constructed a rhetorical dualism 
that did not necessarily reflect the practices and expectations of modem Americans. 
Richard White deconstructs this dualism by positing a third path in which Americans 
schooled in the rationality of the enlightenment cut through the romantic critique of 
industrialism to discover a place for technological innovation in environmental discourse. 
White traces this line of thinking from Thomas Jefferson to Ralph Waldo Emerson and 
finally to social critic Lewis Mumford who viewed great projects such as the Grand 
Coulee Dam on the Columbia River as opportunities for Americans to develop functional 
relationships to the natural world.^ Andrew Kirk goes a step further by explaining the 
significance of Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogue in shaping environmentalism in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. Kirk demonstrates that discussions of alternative technology
® Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 3, 7, 91-96, 109-112; Stephen R. Fox, John Muir and His Legacy: 
The American Conservation Movement (Boston: Little Brown, 1981); Robert Gottleib, Forcing the Spring: 
The Transformation o f the American Environmental Movement (Washington: Island Press, 1993), 34-41; 
Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 7955-1985 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); From an environmentalist perspective see, Philip 
Shabecof, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), 111-128; and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology (New York: 
Alfred K. Knopf, 1971); For technology in American culture see especially David E. Nye, American 
Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); Carl Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology: The 
Path Between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1994); David F. Noble, 
America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise o f  Corporate Capitalism (New York: Alfred K. 
Knopf, 1977); and Noble, The Religion o f  Technology: The Divinity o f  Man and the Spirit o f  Invention 
(New York: Random House, 1997).
’ Richard White, “Tempered Dreams” in Inventing fo r  the Environment, Arthur Molella and Joyce 
Bedi, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 3-11; For Lewis Mumford and the Grand Coulee Dam see White, 
The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 55-56.
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and human ingenuity in mediating relationships to nature pervaded environmental 
thinking well into the late twentieth century.***
The changing role of technology in shaping human interactions with nature has 
occupied center stage in the co-evolution of recreation and rescue in Yosemite and other 
nature tourism destinations around the world. YOSAR’s wilderness handrails enabled 
park lovers to experience the freedom of unencumbered risk that Edward Abbey and 
other wilderness luminaries valued in the national park experience while mitigating 
through technology the very real possibility of serious injury or death this “right and 
privilege of any free American” could bring.* * The history of SAR in Yosemite 
illustrates how this interplay between technology, tourism, and wilderness influenced the 
National Park Service’s efforts to preserve nature as a recreational resource in the 
national parks in the decades following World War II.
A definition of wilderness that moves beyond the traditional analysis of the 1964 
Wilderness Act as the culmination of preservationist thought is vital to understanding the 
evolution of SAR in Yosemite.*^ Yet, as perhaps the most complicated and fiercely 
debated concept in recent environmental history, wilderness defies easy categorization.
Andrew Kirk, "Machines o f  Loving Grace: Appropriate Technology, Environment, and the 
Counterculture" in Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture o f  the 1960s and 1970s, Michael Doyle 
and Peter Braunstein, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 353-378; Kirk, “Appropriating Technology: The 
Whole Earth Catalogue and Counterculture Environmental Politics,” Environmental History 6 (July 2001): 
374-394; For further reading on the role o f technology in recent environmental politics and culture see 
Braden R, Allenby, Reconstructing Earth: Technology and Environment in the Age o f  Humans 
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2005); For an overview o f literature see Jeffrey K. Stein and Joel A. Tarr, 
“At the Intersection o f Histories: Technology and the Environment,” Technology and Culture, Volume 39, 
Number 4 (October 1998), 601-640.
'' Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 55-
56.
For the Wilderness Act as a starting point for analysis o f wilderness as an important theme in 
environmental culture and politics see James Morton Turner, The Promise o f  Wilderness: A History o f  
Environmental Politics, 1964-1994 (PhD. diss.: Princeton University, 2004), 1-3.
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As the aesthetic conservation of John Muir evolved into the broad-based 
environmentalism of the late twentieth century, the wilderness idea signified an idealized 
escape from the stresses of technological modernity; a reiteration of lost frontier 
masculinity; a roadless, “untrammeled” nature lacking signs of human agency; an 
ecologically sound “vignette of primitive America;” and finally, an elitist social 
constmction that arguably devalued environments appearing less “natural.” '  ^ Central to 
all of these interpretations has been the notion that an area designated as wilderness, 
whether politically or culturally, harbored a desirable recreational experience for 
privileged individuals in an urban industrial/ post-industrial consumer society. While 
preservationists often maintained a distinction between what Wallace Stegner called the 
“spiritual refreshment” of an engagement with wilderness and “recreation” as an 
exploitative consumer-oriented activity, NFS administrators typically saw no such clear 
separation. From an administrative point of view, the “wilderness experience” was one 
form of recreation along what Director George Hartzog described in 1966 as a “spectrum 
of use from the developed areas.. .to the wilderness threshold.. .and beyond to the 
wilderness.”*"* From the perspective of SAR operators, and for the purposes of this thesis, 
wilderness can best be understood as a malleable, hierarchical, and often ambivalent 
consumer ideal defined in recreational terms.
For the meaning o f wilderness in American history see especially Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness 
and the American Mind, 4* edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Max Oelschlaeger, The 
Idea o f  Wilderness from Prehistory to the Age o f  Ecology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Paul 
Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or. 
Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, Cronon, ed. (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 69-90; and Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson, eds.. The 
Great New Wilderness Debate (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 1998).
George Hartzog, “National Park Wilderness Planning Procedures,” August 8, 1966, Yosemite 
National Park Central Files, Wilderness Planning L3423-L48,1955-1976.
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This ambivalence has not been a contradiction in values, nor has it represented the 
selling out of an altruistic regard for nature since wilderness has always been contingent 
to changes in the culture and politics of modernity. The wilderness idea emerged in mid­
nineteenth century thought as a product of the very same romantic critique of industrial 
age materialism that historian Colin Campbell identifies as the root impulse of modem 
consumer culture. As it gained cache over time, the wilderness ideal became indicative 
of what Campbell calls a “hedonistic” consumer response to modernity in which “the 
individual’s interest is primarily focused on the meanings and images which can be 
imputed to [a] product” rather than on its (in this case nature’s) elusive objective 
qualities.*^ In other words, the self-actualizing sensation of wilderness trumped the idea 
of wilderness itself, enabling Americans to continually reinvent their relationship to 
nature. From Henry David Thoreau’s terror-filled ascent of Mount Katahdin in 1846 to 
Edward Abbey’s critique of “industrial tourism” in the 1960s to the emergence of 
Gortex-garbed “Bobos” (Bourgeois Bohemians) in the 1990s, the wilderness experience 
has always been a driving force in the commoditization and politicization of nature.*^
For this reason, wilderness advocacy has never tmly succeeded in divorcing nature from 
culture in environmental thought, but has instead brought nature into the folds of modem
Colin Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o f  Modern Consumption (Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), 2-3, 7,203.
For Thoreau see Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 84-95; Abbey, Desert Solitaire, 45-59.; 
For Abbey’s influence on the culture and politics o f wilderness recreation see Jared Farmer, Glen Canyon 
Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1999), 
xxv; For “Bobos” see David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They got There 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 211-215; For the way in which critiques o f consumerism, 
including the counterculture and environmentalism, actually became the driving forces in consumer culture 
see Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter, Nation o f  Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 2-5, 286-318; Also see Thomas Frank, The Conquest o f  Cool: Business 
Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise o f  Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997).
10
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culture and politics. This reconciliation of wilderness, technology, and consumerism 
forms a crucial yet unexplored aspect of national park history.
Environmental historians have typically framed their analysis of Yosemite and the 
national parks with a critique of the so-called “dual mandate” of the National Park 
Service to “provide for the enjoyment” of the parks “by such a means as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”*^  A number of historians, most 
notably Alfred Runte and Richard Sellers, contend that this ambiguous directive - spelled 
out by the United States Congress in the 1916 Organic Act - had, by the 1960s, become 
hopelessly contradictory and out of touch with the objectives of modem, science-based 
environmentalism. A suitable standard of ecological integrity, these authors assert, could 
not be preserved for future generations if the NFS remained committed to eaming profits 
and accommodating mass-tourism in the present.** While offering a valuable critique of 
the modem NFS from a natural resource perspective, this activist argument overstates the 
preservation/ use dichotomy in national park policy and obscures the gradient of 
appropriate recreation that Joseph Sax and a number of recent historians have recognized 
as the primary concem of NFS administrators at both the national and local levels since 
the beginning of the national parks movement.*^
Cited in Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1997), 104.
See especially Runte, The National Parks, 1-2, 104; Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness 
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1990), 1-2; and Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the 
National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 4-5.
Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, 12-19, 103; Also see Richard Grusin, Culture, Technology, and 
the Creation o f  America’s National Y axVs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xiv, 17-18,43- 
44; David Louter, Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s National Parks 
(Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 2006), 7-10; Theodore Caiion, National Park, City Playground: 
Mount Rainier in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 4, 174-176; Hal
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Indeed, the emergence of ecology-based natural resource protection in the 1960s and 
1970s, while altering the scientifie basis for conservation in the national parks, did little 
to change Americans’ fiindamental understanding of the parks as places where wild 
nature eould be enjoyed in relative safety through recreation. As Hal Rothman argues, 
national parks have never in their history been “vehicles for preservation;” instead, the 
NFS has functioned as a political institution charged with negotiating the eomplex web of 
narratives that conneet, rather than divide, nature and culture in environmental 
discourse.^** Far more complex than a simple conflict between preserving nature and 
aceommodating use, national park management in the twentieth century involved a 
highly contested political process in which the NFS negotiated numerous eonceptions of 
what nature in a national park should look like, how it should be experienced, and who 
should have aecess to it. The ecological perspective advanced by Runte and Sellars 
comprised only one aspect of this dialogue and eould never truly be separated from 
recreational discourses. Seareh and rescue, as a pragmatic response to these debates, 
blurred the lines between preservation and use in NFS policy by offering an 
administrative means to reconcile the contentious discourses of recreation, technology, 
and wilderness in the national parks movement.
Seareh and rescue serves as a lens through which to trace broad shifts in attitudes 
towards nature and appropriate reereation in Ameriean culture. Following the federal 
government’s 1864 decision to grant the Yosemite Valley to the state of California “for 
public use, resort, and recreation,” only a small number of visitors could make the
K. Rothman, The New Urban Park: Golden Gate National Recreation Area and Civic Environmentalism 
(Lawrence: The University Press o f Kansas, 2004), ix, 76-98.
Quoted in “Interview: Hal K. Rothman,” Environmental History 12 (January 2007): 23; Also see 
Rothman, The New Urban Park, ix.
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arduous journey to the “Incomparable Valley.” Moreover, with the exception of a few 
extraordinary individuals including the enigmatic John Muir whose romantic depictions 
of “saimtering” in the mountains of California inspired Congress to designate Yosemite 
as a national park in 1890, early visitors typically had neither the inclination nor the skills 
to venture beyond the meandering trails, scenic viewpoints, and rustic lodges lining the 
Valley f loo r . Thos e  that did travel into the baekcountry, including members of the 
Sierra Club, a hiking and conservation elub organized by Muir and a eohort of influential 
San Francisco businessmen in 1892, were usually adequately self-reliant to handle safety 
coneems on their own. As such, serious accidents requiring park administrators to carry 
out complex search and rescue operations remained few and far between. The limited 
numbers of rescues that early guardians and park rangers did carry out were typieally 
regarded as selfless acts of heroism that reflected the frontier masculinity and 
nationalistic virtue associated with Western nature tourism.
As the park became aecessible to a larger démographie in subsequent decades, 
administrators could no longer sustain their impeceable safety record. Formalized 
emergency response policies became necessary to accommodate rapidly changing 
patterns of recreation in Yosemite and other parks. From the creation of the National 
Park Service in 1916 as the agency responsible for administering the parks, through to the 
outdoor recreation boom of the late 1950s, visitation rose consistently as Steven Mather, 
Horace Albright, and other first generation NFS directors initiated expansive road 
construction projects and other accommodative policies to attract a larger national park 
eonstituency and meet a growing demand for outdoor recreation among the nation’s
Stanford E. Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University o f  Utah Press, 
1991), 31-41.
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expanding and increasingly mobile middle class?^ Rangers charged with responding to 
accidents were ill-prepared to handle the diversity of complex and dangerous 
predieaments that inexperieneed or careless visitors encountered in Yosemite’s vast 
baekcountry, and on its precipitous granite cliffs. The park’s fledgling visitor protection 
division, in order to act on its authority to “aide and assist visitors to the national 
parks...in emergencies,” became increasingly reliant on wartime innovations in SAR 
technologies, the ad-hoe efforts of a few exceptionally skilled rangers, and occasional 
assistance from a Sierra Club volunteer reseue force.^^
By the late 1960s, as the environmental movement exploded into a mainstream 
cultural phenomenon, a spike in accidents related to increasingly popular forms of 
wilderness recreation including backpacking, ski-mountaineering, and especially rock 
climbing, demanded a level of vigilanee, organization, and technological competency 
unprecedented in the NFS’s long history of protecting visitors. In this period of diverse 
environmental concerns and increasingly democratized recreation, the Sierra Club could 
no longer maintain its primacy as the overseer of safety standards in roek climbing and 
other wilderness activities in Yosemite. At the same time, the emergence of the 
wilderness experience as a requirement of what Samuel Hayes and Hal Rothman call 
“quality-of-life environmentalism” motivated legions of newly affluent middle class 
consumers to flock to Yosemite and other iconic wilderness destinations in search of
^ John Ise, Our National Park Policy, reprint edition (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 185-569; Ronald 
A. Foresta, America’s National Parks and their Keepers (Washington D.C.: Resourees for the Future, 
1984), 9-57; Robert Shankland, Steve Mather o f  the National Parks, third edition (New York: Alfred K. 
Knopf, 1970), 211-224; Horace M. Albright and Marian Albright Schenk, Creating the National Park 
Service: The Missing Years (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1999), 276-277.
^  Cited in Mike Gautier, et al.. Report to Congress: Analysis o f  Cost Recovery fo r  High Altitude 
Rescues on Mt. McKinley, Denali National Park and Preserve, Alaska (Washington D C.; National Park 
Service, 2001), 2.
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solitude, physical exertion, and the opportunity to come in contact with wild nature?"* 
The formalization of YOSAR, culminating in the 1970 decision to employ a cohort of 
independent rock climbers to supplement the limited capabilities of the ranger force, 
represented a concerted effort by administrators to accommodate rather than regulate this 
new generation of visitors seeking an individualized encounter with wilderness in the 
crown jewel of America’s national park system.
While the majority of SAR operations in Yosemite involved lost or injured hikers, 
developments in the culture of technical rock climbing in the decades following World 
War II brought about the most significant changes in the park’s visitor protection policy. 
From modest beginnings as a pet project of David Brower, Richard Leonard, and other 
up-and-coming Sierra Club leaders in the 1930s, rock climbing became a fundamental 
component of the cultural geography of recreation in postwar Yosemite. Beginning in 
the late 1950s, Camp 4, a sprawling encampment of ragged tents and communal picnic 
tables situated under the sunny north wall of the Valley, served as the semi-permanent 
home for a cohort of self-styled “climbing bums” who, as Steve Roper explained, “took 
the word ‘impossible’ out of the American rock climbing v o c a b u l a r y . T h e  original 
“denizens of Camp 4” including Warren Harding, Royal Robbins, Chuck Pratt, Layton 
Kor, Yvon Chouinard, Steve Roper, and others devised sets of new techniques, 
equipment, and philosophies that transformed Yosemite into the most important locus of 
modem rock climbing in the world by the mid-1960s.^^
Rothman, Saving the Planet, 4, 7,134-138; Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence', Also see Nash, 
Wilderness and the American Mind, 316-342.
12.
Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f  a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994),
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Camp 4 produced not only the world’s best climbers, but also some of the most 
innovative minds in modem business. By the 1970s, Yvon Chouinard, Tom Frost, Royal 
Robbins, and several other prominent climbers had moved on to successful careers as 
gear manufacturers and retailers in the growing specialty outdoor recreation industry. 
These entrepreneurial climbing bums modeled their corporate philosophies after a 
hegemonic, experience-based wildemess aesthetic constmcted high on Yosemite’s 
distinctive granite walls. The “enabling technologies” climbers developed, manufactured, 
and marketed to the public served to both expand the possibilities of their sport and 
protect the physical features of the climbing landscape against an inevitable wave of 
outdoor enthusiasts seeking to experience nature in national parks and other public 
l ands . Though  they had facilitated this transition of climbing into a mainstream activity, 
Chouinard, Frost, and others also resisted the influx of “thousands of average Joes” that 
seemed to compromise the spirit of adventure that the climbers of the so-called “golden 
age of Yosemite rock climbing” had enjoyed in previous decades.^* Through their 
connections to the commercial marketplace, and their promotion of an ethic Chouinard 
called “clean climbing,” Camp 4 climbers sought to instill climbing culture with a regard 
for the impact of their sport on the environment. Through their advertising. Camp 4
^  For Yosemite rock climbing and Camp 4, in addition to Roper, also see Chris Jones, Climbing in 
North America (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1975); Galen Rowell, ed.. The Vertical World o f  Yosemite 
(Berkeley: Wildemess Press, 1979); Roper, ed.. Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f  
Yosemite Rock Climbing (Stanford: Stanford University Libraries, 2003); Andrew Kirk and Charles Palmer, 
“When Nature Becomes Culture: The National Register and Yosemite's Camp 4, a Case Study,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly 37 (Winter, 2006): 497-506.
David Louter, “Remarks for the Camp 4 National Register Ceremony, Yosemite National Park, May 
17, 2003.” Unpublished manuscript; For Louter, the automobile was the enabling technology that allowed 
the majority o f tourists to access the nation’s parks. He considers pitons and expansion bolts the primary 
“enabling technologies” for rock climbers. For a history o f technology in climbing see John Middendorf, 
“The Mechanical Advantage,” Ascent (1999). http://www.bigwalls.net/climb/mechadv/index.html 
(accessed on July 24,2007).
^  Yvon Chouinard, “Coonyard Mouths O îî,” Ascent 1, no. 6 (June 1972): 51.
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climbers popularized strict standards of equipment use and risk that established rock 
climbing as an appropriate wildemess experience.
Still, neophyte climbers did not always adhere to safety standards as uniformly as elite 
climbers and park administrators hoped. As climbing became a mainstream activity in 
the 1970s and 1980s, a corresponding spike in accidents produced serious apprehension 
among over-burdened and under-funded NFS administrators. SAR evacuations from the 
massive glacier-polished granite walls of Yosemite demanded not only high levels 
technical competency, specialized planning, and considerable physical talent; they also 
posed greater risks to rescuers than any other search, rescue, or recovery scenarios facing 
the park’s ranger force in this period. Concem for the safety of visitors and rangers 
contributed to a fragile consensus between NFS administrators and the Camp 4 
counterculture over the position of rock climbing as a legitimate use of the park. The 
resulting dialogue exemplified a process within late twentieth century environmental 
culture of negotiating limits on the infusion of technology and consumer desire into the 
wildemess ideal. Since most accidents could be attributed to the inexperience or poor 
judgment of visitors engaging in activities for which they were ill-prepared, climbers and 
administrators had reason to debate placing limits on who should and who should not be 
allowed access to the wildemess experience in Yosemite. Search and rescue became the 
most tangible administrative issue by which climbers, environmentalists, and the NFS 
could negotiate the strict class hierarchies and technological imperatives embedded in the 
culture of wildemess recreation in the national parks.
Through this period, the NFS used its long-standing obligation to provide for the 
safety of visitors as an administrative tool to support the recreational preferences of an
17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
increasingly individualistic and environmentally conscious park-going public. With the 
establishment of YOSAR, park officials could allow for, and actively encourage, next- 
generation outdoor enthusiasts to not only view “untrammeled” nature in the parks 
through their windshields, a practice historian David Louter identifies as a perennially 
popular means to experience wilderness in the parks, but also to leave their cars behind 
and engage physically with the dramatic and, at times, hazardous environments beyond 
the road-head.^^ Faced with a choice of either limiting access to appease an increasingly 
adversarial wilderness lobby or expanding the park’s tourism infrastructure to facilitate 
greater access, administrators chose a middle route: limit development and prioritize 
wilderness recreation without explicitly excluding the majority of visitors or 
unreasonably compromising their safety. The presence of a professional SAR service 
provided free of charge by the federal government enabled visitors, even those unfamiliar 
with wilderness-oriented activities, to explore Yosemite’s vast network of hiking trails, 
cross country ski tours, and rock climbing routes with the psychic assurance that a park 
helicopter or a team of expert climbers and medical technicians would be called in on a 
moment’s notice if an accident occurred.
However, as park officials and many outdoor enthusiasts soon discovered, the 
boundaries separating an invigorating wilderness experience from serious injury or even 
death were often all too easy to cross. Even under the watchful eye of YOSAR, the 
number of accidents and mishaps related to wilderness recreation in Yosemite rose
^  For wilderness as a place “untrammeled by man,” as defined by Howard Zahniser o f the Wilderness 
Society and included in the 1964 Wilderness Act, see Mark Harvey, Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser 
and the Path to the Wilderness Act (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006), 202-203; Also see 
Louter, Windshield Wilderness, 4, 6-7, 105-109.
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alarmingly from the 1970s through the late 1990s when visitation finally leveled off and 
NFS administrators streamlined safety procedures. In this period, thousands of 
backpackers became lost, injured, or killed in remote locales; countless hikers fell on 
steep trails, collapsed from exhaustion, or suffered medical emergencies ranging from 
heart attacks to epileptic seizures to morning sickness far from the medical clinic and 
other urban facilities in the Valley. Swimmers, rafters, and fishermen frequently found 
themselves overwhelmed by powerful currents or swept over waterfalls; ski mountaineers 
routinely suffered frostbite, hypothermia, and high altitude pulmonary edema in the 
park’s backcountry; and most characteristic of Yosemite, rock climbers in ever increasing 
numbers became stranded, incapacitated, or fatally injured in improbable locations high 
on the park’s imposing granite walls.^ *^
By the 1980s, “rescues so ghastly, no Hollywood ‘Latex and Catsup’ movie could 
duplicate the sheer horror of the experience” had become commonplace in Yosemite.^’ 
Not only had traumatic accidents become epidemic, the high cost of numerous annual 
searches, rescues, and body recoveries began to strain the park’s already limited 
emergency appropriations. With costs exceeding $100 thousand annually by 1974 and 
more than $400 thousand only a decade later, the question of who should pay for rescues 
motivated administrators, rescuers, and national park constituencies to critically examine 
NFS policies which arguably encouraged inexperienced and ill-prepared visitors to
A number o f excellent cautionary works detail the innumerable deaths and rescues occurring in 
Yosemite and other parks over the years. Ghiglieri and Farabee, O jf the Wall: Death in Yosemite.', Farabee, 
Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National Parks, revised edition (Lanham: Taylor 
Trade Publishing, 2005); Bob Madgic, Shattered Air: A True Account o f  Catastrophe and Courage on 
Yosemite’s H alf Doras. (Short Hills; Burford Books, 2005); For comparisons with other parks see Ghiglieri, 
Over the Edge: Death in Grand Canyon (Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2001); and Lee Whittlesey, Death in 
Yellowstone: Accidents and Foolhardiness in the First National Park (Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1995).
Russ Walling, “Death Valley Days,” Rock and Ice, 46 (November and December, 1991): 48.
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engage in dangerous activities. Discussions over the high cost of rescue underseored the 
elitist class distinctions underlying the culture of wilderness recreation and highlighted 
the tensions between nature, technology, and consumerism shaping both cultural and 
administrative definitions of wilderness in the national parks.
Ultimately, the skyrocketing costs of visitor protection could not outweigh the 
immediaey of the life-or-death seenarios facing YOSAR on almost a daily basis. Nor 
could the NFS significantly change safety policies without inviting legal problems and a 
serious public relations nightmare. As these debates continued through the 1980s and 
1990s, the rangers, medies, rock climbers, helicopter pilots, law enforcement offieials, 
and military personnel involved with YOSAR saved thousands of lives, performing at a 
level of technical competency and organizational skill unmatched by any wilderness 
search and rescue network in the United States and arguably around the world. The 
techniques that rescuers in Yosemite developed, especially those for evaeuating stranded 
rock climbers fi"om high on the Valley’s distinctive cliffs, became the industry standards 
for mountain rescue operations worldwide. For better or worse, YOSAR became the 
mechanism by which NFS administrators could accommodate the changing preferences, 
however reckless, of a new generation of outdoor enthusiasts seeking to both preserve 
wild nature and consume it through recreation in Yosemite and in other wilderness 
destinations in the national park system.
Yosemite’s sophisticated visitor protection infrastructure derived fi'om a long history 
of accidents, mishaps, tragedies, and triumphs occurring since the earliest days of the 
park. Chapter One follows the progression of search and rescue fi'om a non-specific 
obligation of early administrators into a systematie but still fragmented funetion of
20
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Yosemite’s ranger force in the immediate postwar years. Chapter Two demonstrates that 
even with vast improvements in SAR capabilities in the 1950s and a system-wide 
overhaul of rescue procedures in 1959, the park’s protection division struggled to keep 
pace with the rising popularity, cultural imperatives, and evolving teehnological 
sophistication of rock climbing activities. Chapter Three details the maturation of a 
“SAR culture” in Yosemite following administrators’ controversial decision to establish 
the “rescue site” in Camp 4 where a cadre of highly skilled climbing bums could reside 
for free and receive on-call wages as the park’s first internal rescue force. Lastly, 
Chapter Four discusses the cultural context in which recent debates over legal liability 
and the high cost of rescue emerged and explores the implications of the National Park 
Service’s decision to support free SAR as a eritical element of the park’s management 
philosophy to this day. The evolution of search and rescue, as detailed in these chapters, 
illustrates a characteristic struggle within the modem NFS to maintain a safe visitor 
experience that functioned within budget constraints while still satisfying the 
expectations of the numerous diverse constituencies vying for access to the wilderness 
experienee in America’s most revered national park.
Today, YOSAR responds to between 150 and 250 ineidents each year, making it 
among the busiest emergency call centers in the national park system. Operators can 
mobilize a search party of rangers, medical respondents, on-call volunteers, and even 
trained bloodhounds on a moment’s notice to locate a lost hiker or assist in the 
evacuation of an accident victim. Rangers can send into the field a team of skilled roek 
climbers from Camp 4 to reach an injured elimber or a hiker stranded on an inaccessible 
cliff face. Helieopters can be dispatched within minutes to eomb the backcountry for lost
21
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backpackers, locate a plane crash, or pluck stranded big wall climbers from high on the 
3,000 foot face of El Capitan. Certified scuba divers and river runners are frequently 
called upon to search the rivers and lakes of the park for hikers, fishermen, and boaters 
who eapsize or are swept into treacherous waterways. In winter, snowmobile operators 
can motor into the backeountry to reach cross-country skiers or snowshoers trapped in 
bad weather. YOSAR has also established a number of accident prevention measures 
specific to Yosemite’s hazards. Park officials routinely eommunieate warnings to 
participants in wilderness-oriented activities through ranger-led education programs, 
Internet sites, signs posted near dangerous areas, backcountry permit processes, and 
contributions to the American Alpine Club’s annual publication o ïAccidents in North 
American Mountaineering. As a pragmatic means to enable a standard of safety in the 
forms of recreation that park officials, environmentalists, and the visiting public have 
historically considered appropriate in a national park setting, YOSAR continues to 
function as Yosemite’s wilderness handrails.
As this history shows, from a cultural and an administrative perspective, Yosemite 
and other national parks could be both symbols of elemental nature to be held inviolate 
for future generations and recreational spaces in which a tempered construction of 
wilderness could be experienced first hand. The parks funetioned not as cordoned off 
remnants of pure, unspoiled nature, but as sites of individual self-diseovery where middle 
class Americans, emboldened by affluenee and outfitted with specialized recreational 
technologies, could supplement their lifestyles of leisure by acting out a fantasy of 
strenuous engagement with a simulacrum of uncorrupted nature.^^ Differing from both
Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Shiela Faria Glazer. (Ann Arbor: 
University o f  Michigan Press, 1994); Baurillard explains “simulacra” as a copy o f an original that does not
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the rigidly class-based “tourism of hegemony” in tum-of-the-century nature appreciation, 
and the ecologieally-informed eonstruction of wilderness embedded in the 1964 
Wilderness Act, this consumer-driven wilderness ideal had its own logie, its own 
technological hierarchies, and its own standards of risk which officials in Yosemite 
aecommodated through the maintenance of a professional search and rescue apparatus.^^ 
The history of YOSAR offers a means to trace the complex route by which postwar 
environmental culture operated in dialogue with the National Park Serviee to isolate and 
define the boundaries of a safe and accessible yet still fundamentally self-sufficient 
wilderness experienee in the nation’s parks.
exist. Though he does not use this term, William Cronon applies Baudrillard’s model in his eritique of  
wilderness as a cultural construction. See Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness,” 69-70.
For “tourism o f hegemony” see Hal K. Rothman, D evil’s Bargains: Tourism in the American West 
(Lawrenee: University Press o f Kansas, 1998), 111-112; For the Wilderness Act see espeeially Nash, 
Wilderness and the American Mind, 225-226; and Harvey, Wilderness Forever, 3-6, 240-244.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ORIGINS OF VISITOR PROTECTION 
The history of rescue extends back as long as humans have encountered mishap, trial, 
and tragedy in perilous locales. From the good Samaritans of the Old Testament to Helen 
of Troy to the tenth century monk Saint Bernard whose hardy dogs were for generations 
dispatched from their Alpine hospice to locate travelers trapped in hazardous weather, 
search and rescue tales have long been fixtures in Western tradition. '^^ Romantics steeped 
in these heroic narratives considered rescue a selfless act of duty, a masculine obligation 
to put one’s own security in jeopardy for the sake of an often anonymous other. In 
Western Europe through the nineteenth century, cultural perceptions of rescue evolved 
contingent to the exploits of Edward Whymper, Jeanne Antoine Carrel, and other 
“gentlemen mountaineers” who willingly distanced themselves from the possibility of 
rescue through their audacious explorations of the highest unclimbed peaks in the Alps. 
As a corollary to the risk and self-reliance implicit in Victorian-era alpinism, selfless acts 
of rescue attained as valorous a stature in the popular imagination as even the most daring 
mountaineering accomplishments. Rescue became, in Kenneth Andrasko’s words, “a 
heroic adventure against predestination and a victory for the advancing idea of rugged
Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 14, 15.
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individualism.”^^  Rescuers, as Alpine climbing historian Charles Gos explained in 1948, 
were “obscure men [always men] who, completely scornful of danger, obey only their 
consciences in attempting to rescue parties in distress.”^^
As Alpine climbing grew in popularity through the nineteenth century, search and 
rescue evolved into an organized function of the numerous mountaineering clubs and 
guide services cropping up throughout Western Europe. In 1823, the King of Sardinia, 
who in this period ruled over the Chamonix region in the French Alps, established the 
Sydicat des Guides de Chamonix, charging his expert mountain guides with safeguarding 
their clients and other mountain travelers. Yosemite rescue specialist Tim Setnicka later 
recorded this decree as among the earliest “delineation[s] of professional and moral 
obligations of rescuers toward all those in danger.”^^  In 1896, the Austrian Alpine 
Association established the first volunteer rescue service in the eastern Alps with the 
belief that “it could not encourage the sport of alpinism without preparing, in advance, for 
alpine misfortunes.” *^ Though founded on such pragmatic grounds, organized search and 
rescue retained its heroic connotations as it developed into a necessary duty of 
administrators assigned to the newly created national parks of the American West in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Yosemite Guardian Galen Clark, by responding to a father’s plea to find his son, 
performed the first documented successful search and rescue mission in the park’s history.
Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note,” in Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, iii.
^  Charles Gos, Alpine Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948), 3.
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 16.
Hans Kinzl, “Forward to the Second German Language Edition” in Wastl Mariner, Mountain Rescue 
Techniques, first English language edition (Innsbruck: Oesterreichischer Alpenverein, 1963), 5.
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On July 12,1880, after a full-day search on horseback involving several volunteers, Clark 
located twelve year old Don E. Tripp lying unconscious on the porch of the abandoned 
Wharton house on the banks of the Merced River. The previous afternoon, one mile 
north of Inspiration Point, Tripp had disembarked from the freight carriage he and his 
father had been traveling on and decided to hike on foot to the Valley. He became 
confused at a crossroad, venturing off the path and down a hillside where he mistakenly 
thought he would find the correct route. The boy then lost his footing and slid down a 
steep slope which he could not ascend. He headed towards the Merced River below but 
stumbled down several more bluffs, falling unconscious each time. Finally making his 
way to the river, Tripp spent an uncomfortable night on a sand bar. The next morning he 
crawled to the Wharton building where he remained until Clark discovered him “in a 
most pitiable state, being very thirsty, cut and bruised covered with sand.” The Yosemite 
Tourist declared the ordeal a “remarkable escape” while Tripp’s caretakers at the 
Stoneman Lodge commented “the young fellow is very gritty and we hope to soon see 
him out.”^^  For Guardian Clark and the generation of superintendents and chief rangers 
following in his footsteps, this noble act of protecting travelers in Yosemite remained less 
an aspect of their jobs than an unwritten duty that affirmed the frontier individualism 
their personas were to represent to the public.
The evolution of search and rescue in Yosemite and the national parks paralleled 
changing patterns of tourism in the American West beginning in the late nineteenth 
century. Set aside as sanctuaries of monumental scenery to rival the cultural treasures of 
Europe, the great parks of the West became iconic sources of national pride for the
“The Lost Boy Found. The Terrible Experience o f Don E. Tripp,” Yosemite Tourist 1, no. 12 (July 
18, 1880); 2.
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entrepreneurs, managers, attorneys, and other elites benefiting from the economic 
reorganization of society in the industrial age. Excursions to Yosemite, Yellowstone, and 
the Grand Canyon - first by carriage, then by rail, and finally by automobile - offered 
intellectual stimulation and psychic regeneration in a natural setting for the touring elite. 
Through the Progressive Era, the national parks affirmed and legitimated the narrative of 
confrontation with a wilderness frontier that tum-of-the-century historian Frederick 
Jackson Turner identified as the process by which Americans forged their particular 
democratic traditions. Dispossessed of Native Americans and largely inaccessible to 
workers in distant cities (though middle class professionals in nearby western cities 
comprised a significant percentage of early visitors), the parks presented scenic nature as 
a vision of frontier democracy and a refuge from the class strife and ethnic conflicts that 
Progressive elites viewed as plaguing urban-industrial society."^ *^
Despite the hardy frontier imagery national parks were to project, few visitors to 
Yosemite in the early years were willing or able to explore beyond the genteel 
accommodations and scenic viewpoints promoted by park concessionaires and 
administrators."^’ Those that did seek recreation in the high mountains beyond the Valley 
floor - including the hikers and mountaineers of the Sierra Club - were generally self- 
reliant in their ability to deal with emergencies. As such, early park administrators faced
Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation o f  America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition 
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1997); Margaret Shaffer, See America First: Tourism and National 
Identity (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); Hal K. Rothman, D evil’s Bargains: 
Tourism in the American West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Mark David Spence, 
Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making o f  the National Parks (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
Stanford E. Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University o f  Utah Press, 
1991), 31-48.
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very few complex search and rescue seenarios. Given the relative infrequency of 
accidents in Yosemite and the perception of rescue as a transcendent act of individual 
valor, specific search and rescue procedures remained virtually absent from training 
manuals or job descriptions for rangers even after the creation of the National Park 
Service in 1916. Ansel Hall’s 1921 Handbook o f Yosemite National f  arA: mentioned 
only a nebulous duty on the part of rangers to “inform, assist, and instruct the park 
visitor” in order to “g/ve to the public not merely what they pay for, but everything within 
p o w e r . I n  the period leading up to and immediately following the transfer of 
management responsibilities from the United States Cavalry to the National Park Service 
in 1916, the active maintenance of visitor safety remained little more than an infrequent, 
anomalous responsibility of the park’s ranger force.
As such, most successful searches, rescues, and recoveries in the early years were 
achieved through the vigilance and ingenuity of individuals rather than through any 
formalized planning apparatus. In 1915, for example. Park Superintendent George V.
Bell engineered a homemade “rescue harness” which proved useful in a number of 
incidents “caused by tourists leaving trails in trying to make short cuts or in climbing 
about the face of cliffs.”'’^  Celebrating the larger-than-life heroism of rescue rangers, 
Horace Albright and Frank Taylor described Yosemite’s first chief ranger, Forrest A. 
Towsley, as “a giant in stature and a man of great courage who lowered himself dozens 
of times down precipitous cliffs hand over hand to tie a lost hiker securely so that the
W.B. Lewis, “Administration of Yosemite National Park,” in Handbook o f  Yosemite National Park, 
Ansel F. Hall, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), 92.; and Stephen T. Mather, “Ideals and Policy 
of The National Park Service,” in Hall, Handbook o f  Yosemite, 86.
From the Annual Report to the Department o f  the Interior, 1915, quoted in Charles R. “Butch” 
Farabee, Jr., Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National Parks, revised edition 
(Lanham: First Taylor Trade Publishing, 2005), 48, 49.
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rangers above could drag him to safety.”"’"’ Even with such phenomenal individual 
exertions, as visitation increased and tourists ventured farther from the security of the 
Valley’s accommodations, accounts of persons being lost, injured, or killed appeared 
with greater frequency in the superintendent’s monthly reports. Relegated to a section 
titled “other areas of interest,” however, descriptions of mishaps, deaths, and heroic 
rescue efforts through the 1920s functioned as sensationalist fodder for newspapers as 
much as for educational or preventative purposes.
While drawing attention to the rugged, frontier-like experience of a trip to Yosemite, 
publicity generated by accidents and rescues also revealed shortcomings in the park’s 
visitor protection capabilities. A case in point occurred on the night of April 7, 1928 
when Edna Wilbur, daughter of Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur, and her 
companion Ona Ring, lost their way while descending the Ledge Trail, a treacherous 
shortcut from Glacier Point to the Valley floor that claimed several lives before being 
closed in 1954."’^  Responding to reports from campers in Camp Curry that cries for help 
could be heard echoing off the cliffs below Glacier Point, rangers John Bingaman and 
William Reymann, accompanied by three volunteers, started up the trail at 9:30 p.m. 
finding “the going very difficult because of patches of snow on the trail.” The search 
party eventually located faint footprints and skid marks in the snow leading off the path 
to a precarious ledge where the young women “were stranded.. .above a sheer drop of
Horace M. Albright and Frank J. Taylor, Oh, Ranger! National Park Service Centennial Edition 
(Riverside: Chatham Press, 1972), 20.
Despite being closed to the general public, the Ledge Trail has continued to see foot traffic largely 
due to the novelty o f  navigating a long overgrown, unmaintained shortcut to and from the valley rim. 
Frequent accidents and deaths continue to occur on this dangerous system o f ledges and steep boulder- 
choked gullies. See for example, Pablo Lopez, “Bodies o f Yosemite Hikers are Recovered,” Fresno Bee 
(July 9, 1998); In this incident, two young men fell to their deaths while trying to descend the trail late in 
the evening.
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200 feet.” With Reymann stationed above, Bingaman lowered himself hand over hand 
down one hundred feet of rope to the ledge, a risky endeavor considering the icy 
conditions, the darkness, and the dubious integrity of the hemp ropes used at the time. 
Despite these dangers, the rescue proceeded smoothly. After securing the rope,
Bingaman and Reymann pulled the girls to safety, finding them “cold, frightened, 
scratched and bruised but not seriously hurt.”"’^
The daring rescue generated newspaper articles and commendations for Yosemite and 
its rangers from California to Washington D.C., largely due to the notoriety of Edna 
Wilbur’s father. The operation, though ultimately a success, also forced park officials to 
take a closer look at the procedures, techniques, and qualifications, or lack thereof, in 
place to deal with increasingly frequent search and rescue scenarios. Even as Stephen 
Mather and Horace Albright showered praise on rangers Bingaman and Reymann in 
public, the directors’ behind-the-scenes discussions revealed an undercurrent of concern 
over the ability of rangers to consistently perform such harrowing rescues as increases in 
visitation made medical emergencies and accidents, though predominantly minor, an 
almost daily occurrence through the busy summer months. A few days after the rescue of 
Wilbur and Ring, Acting Superintendent E.P. Leavitt wrote to Mather to convince him of 
the need to enforce the mandatory retirement of rangers at the age of sixty two. In 
correspondence to the Civil Service Commission in Washington, Leavitt and Mather
E.P. Leavitt, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for April, 1928,” May 9, 1928, 8, Yosemite National 
Park Library; Also see John Bingaman’s somewhat glorified account in John W. Bingaman, Guardians o f  
the Yosemite: A Story o f  the First Rangers (Palm Desert, Desert Printers, 1961), 31, 32; and Farabee, Death, 
Daring, and Disaster, 86.
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stressed that “only men of youth, experience, and ability are qualified to participate in 
such strenuous and dangerous work as this is.”"’^
Through the 1930s, problems of recruiting, training, and paying a sufficient ranger 
force became increasingly apparent. In 1934, a Los Angles Times reporter elaimed that 
hasty efforts to fill holes in the ranger force were “bringing into the service a lot of young 
Democrats who may be deserving but who are totally inexperienced in the ways of the 
woods, instead of forest-wise men who have heretofore been appointed to such posts.” 
Many new reeruits, the author remarked, hailed from “eastern cities” and would “be a 
burden to the regular force, which will have to look after them as well as the public.”"** 
The article referenced an embarrassing ineident occurring a few months earlier in which a 
“tenderfoot ranger,” William Corless Jr. from Kansas City, Missouri, wandered lost for 
more than two and a half days in the rugged eountry near Tenaya Canyon. A search party 
of forty park rangers, local law enforcement personnel, and volunteers spent more than 
two days combing the area, finally loeating Corless safe but “hungry and exhausted... 
having been without food or warm clothing.”"*^
While shortages of qualified rangers posed real problems for the park’s visitor 
proteetion capabilities, park officials in the 1930s worried less about a diminishing 
supply of frontier hardened, “forest-wise men” than the administrative implications of 
rising participation in a set of new, potentially dangerous forms of recreation. Largely
Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 86, 87: In a notable accident occurring in July of  
the same year, a hiker, Richard Ham from Burlingame California, fell to his death in nearly the same 
location on the Ledge Trail from which the two girls had been rescued only four months earlier. See E.P. 
Leavitt, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1928,” August 9, 1928, 9.
^  Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 123.
C.G. Thompson, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for June, 1934,” July 4, 1934, 14, Yosemite 
National Park Library.
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the exclusive provinee of the Sierra Club until after World War II, backpacking or 
“knapsacking,” cross-country skiing, and especially rock climbing, while opening up new 
ways to enjoy the Sierra wilderness in and around Yosemite, also created a long list of 
real and hypothetical accident scenarios for which the park’s fledgling search and rescue 
infrastructure simply would not be capable of responding to/**
As visitation to the national parks and other public lands increased through the 
interwar years, leaders of the nascent wilderness movement began to challenge the idea 
of nature-as-democratic-scenery informing the management philosophy of the NFS and 
other federal land management agencies. As historian Paul Sutter argues, the founding 
members of the Wilderness Society constructed the modem idea of wilderness in 
opposition to an abmpt rise in tourism in the 1920s and the continuing expansion of 
resort-style accommodations in public lands. Founders Robert Marshall, Aldo Leopold, 
Robert Sterling Yard, and Benton MacKaye railed most adamantly against the rampant 
construction of roads and the intrusion of automobiles into previously inaccessible areas 
of undisturbed nature. The land managers, foresters, and lobbyists of the early 
Wilderness Society conceived of wilderness as a condition of the landscape characterized 
not principally by its monumental scenery or necessarily by its ecological integrity, but 
by its “roadlessness.” Wilderness was a place where automobiles, buildings, and other 
signs of human ageney were either non-existent or imperceptible; an area in Leopold’s 
words, “big enough to absorb a two weeks pack trip, and kept devoid of roads, artificial 
trails, cottages, or other works of man.” ’^
Michael Cohen, History o f  the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988),
77-82.
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Members of the Sierra Club and other hiking clubs cropping up across the nation at 
this time furthered eontributed to the formulation of this recreationally-informed 
wilderness ethic. The thousands of hikers, elimbers, and cross-country skiers joining 
outdoor clubs in the 1920s and 1930s did not reject recreation altogether, but instead 
formed a eritique of mass-recreation. While the Wilderness Society delineated eategories 
of inappropriate activities in wilderness, a cohort of young Sierra Club leaders including 
David Brower, Richard Leonard, and Bestor Robinson defined the spécifié recreational 
behaviors and facilitating technologies appropriate to the wilderness experienee. The 
club’s annual “High Trip,” a month-long trek into the High Sierra backcountry, typically 
involving more than two hundred elub members and over fifty mules, served as a testing 
ground for a number of new wilderness-oriented activities including technical rock 
climbing, ski-mountaineering, and backcountry camping that formulated a gradient of 
appropriate recreation in subsequent wilderness discourse. The Sierra Club’s strenuous 
and often dangerous recreational preferences had significant implications not only for the 
maturation of search and rescue in Yosemite, but also for the expansion of the modem 
wildemess movement in the postwar years. These new activities provided an 
appropriately self-sufficient and physically challenging recreational altemative to what 
conservationists had begun to deery as the transformation of the parks into sanitized 
playgrounds for an automobile-bound publie.^^
Paul Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modem Wilderness 
Movement (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2002), 9-10, 70.
Christopher E. Johnson, “Bom With Steel Spoons in their Mouths: Sierra Club High Trippers and 
Wildemess Use, 1930-1941,” Clio 14 (2004): 89-110.
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A young David Brower, who in the postwar years would cement his plaee in the 
modem wildemess movement by his leadership in the fight to block the Eeho Park Dam 
in Dinosaur National Monument, forged his perceptions of nature and appropriate 
recreation through his High Trip experienees in the 1930s. Brower emerged as one of the 
most avid proponents of rock climbing and independent backcountry hiking, or 
“knapsacking,” in the interwar Sierra Club. In 1935, Brower expressed the wildemess 
ethic of knapsacking in his first article for the annual Sierra Club Bulletin. In “Far From 
the Madding Mules: A Knapsacker’s Retrospect,” Brower artieulated the values of time 
spent with minimal belongings far from established trails and the eonstant interaetion 
with mules and people that had heretofore characterized the High Trip. Summing up the 
benefits of this wildemess experience, he wrote: “Who, once having enjoyed it, does not 
long for the deep satisfaetion of beholding a panorama from a vantage-point, access to 
whieh has cost something in effort and training; of knowing that here is a frontier still; of 
being aloof, and yet in elose communion; of being awed by the great, but remaining 
proud of the success of the organized effort of the small?”^^  In subsequent years, Brower 
and a young eohort of “high trippers” innovated teehniques and a number of improvised 
technologies that vastly improved the safety and practicality of extended, independent 
excursions into vast undeveloped mountain terrain.
Despite an almost obsessive emphasis on safety among the High Trip leadership in 
this period, aeeidents remained a possibility. On July 30, 1934, Florence Hendra, a 
participant on that summer’s outing, slipped on wet granite along the shore of remote 
Benton Lake in the Yosemite high country. Superintendent Thompson, in his report for
David Brower, “Far From the Maddening Mules: A Knapsacker’s Retrospect,” Sierra Club Bulletin 
{SCB) 20 (February, 1935): 72.
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that month, reported that Hendra “fell about 25 feet into the water, first striking her head 
on a rock” before drowning minutes later. A group of Sierra Club members, assisted by a 
ranger who had been stationed nearby, pulled Hendra from the lake and arranged for the 
body to be repatriated to her family in San Francisco.^"* While complex rescue operations 
requiring the NFS to take a leading role remained rare, the expanding opportunities for 
wildemess recreation in Yosemite and the High Sierra suggested a need to rethink the 
park’s informal management of search and rescue.
One year and a day before Hendra’s accident, Walter A. Starr, Jr., known by 
acquaintances as Peter, set out to map the final sections of the recently completed John 
Muir Trail that extended 250 miles from Mount Whitney to Yosemite. He never retumed. 
On August 30, 1933, after the largest search conducted to date in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains, Norman Clyde - the “old man of the mountains” who completed more first 
ascents in the High Sierra than anyone to this day - located Starr’s broken body on a 
ledge on mgged Michael Minaret just outside the southeastem boundary of Yosemite 
National Park. The search for Peter Starr required hundreds of searchers, countless 
airplane passes over the high mountains, and a series of extended forays into the remote 
Ritter Range by fi-iends, family, and Sierra Club volunteers. After zeroing in on the steep 
Minarets just south of the 13,000 foot Mount Ritter by piecing together Starr’s entries in 
the summit registers of nearby peaks, Clyde managed to trace a path to Michael Minaret 
where he “intemed [Starr’s body] in a great caim of granite.”^^  Before his accident, Starr
C.G. Thompson, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1934,” August 5, 1934, 16, Yosemite
For a thoroughly researched account o f the search for Peter Starr see William Alsup, Missing in the
National Park Library.
ughly
Minarets: The Search fo r  Walter A. Starr, Jr. (El Portal: The Yosemite Association, 2001).; Quote from
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had been close to finishing his compilation of notes describing the John Muir Trail and its 
innumerable side excursions. The Sierra Club posthumously published Starr’s Guide to 
the John Muir Trail in 1934. The work became the authoritative guide to the High Sierra 
region for generations of wildemess enthusiasts (most far less experienced than Starr) 
who sought to climb and hike in the beautifully mgged, yet deceptively hazardous. High 
Sierra environment that had claimed Starr’s life.^^
Though cognizant of the new challenges posed by participation in these emerging 
forms of wildemess recreation, park officials remained slow to enact changes to the 
park’s visitor protection inffastmcture. Administrators instead relied on the exclusive 
expertise of the Sierra Club to maintain safety standards. In an often repeated but telling 
example of the ill-preparedness of park authorities, San Francisco bay area attomey 
Richard Leonard, the leading figure in the development of the Sierra Club’s Rock 
Climbing Section, recalled Chief Ranger Forrest Towsley’s disconcertingly casual 
response to a concemed visitor who dashed into ranger headquarters in September of 
1933 to report that two people were “stuck on the face of Washington Column.” The 
men in question tumed out to be a team of Sierra Club climbers attempting the first of a 
number of forays into modem technical rock climbing on Yosemite’s challenging granite 
walls. Grinning at the bewildered tourist, Towsley, who had been informed of the details 
of the climb, responded “Hell, that’s Dick Leonard and Bestor Robinson, and if they can’t 
get themselves down, nobody can get them down!” ’^
Glen Dawson, “Recollections” in Norman Clyde, Norman Clyde: Close Ups o f  the High Sierra (Bishop, 
California: Spotted Dog Press, 1997), 24.
^  Walter A. Starr Jr., Guide to the John Muir Trail and the High Sierra Region (San Francisco: Sierra 
Club, 1934); Alsup, Missing in the Minarets, 126.
Richard Leonard to John E. Williamson, November 5, 1984, YOSAR office files.
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With Towsley’s offhanded admission of the park’s lack of rescue capabilities, so 
began a working relationship between expert wildemess users and NFS administrators 
that continues to this day. Through the 1930s, park officials often called on Sierra Club 
members to advise rangers of appropriate safety procedures and recommend possible 
accident prevention measures. Leonard remembered being asked whether a cross­
country skier and snowshoer could reasonably expect to make the twenty five mile, five 
thousand foot elevation gain trek from the Valley to Tuolumne Meadows “in midwinter 
without winter mountaineering equipment.” Leonard advised park officials that the 
attempt would be impractical and exceptionally dangerous; he then recommended a far 
easier course to the Ostrander Lake ski hut only nine miles from the Valley. The club 
also volunteered Jules Eichom, the veteran of a number of ground-breaking first ascents 
in Yosemite Valley and the High Sierra, to advise rangers of the proper techniques and 
technologies a rock climber should have knowledge of before they could safely ascend 
technical climbing routes in the Valley.^* At a 1939 conference with National Park 
Service officials from around the country, Leonard recommended that parks with 
extensive climbing potential “require registration with the park before a climb, but with 
the understanding that no prohibition would result.”^^  Such cooperative efforts between 
rangers and rock climbers became the hallmark of search and rescue operations in 
Yosemite in the decades following World War II.
During the war, nationwide gas-rationing and travel restrictions caused visitation to 
Yosemite and other parks to plummet to numbers not seen since the early 1920s. This
Ibid.
Ibid.
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lull proved to be a quiet before the storm. In the decade following the Japanese surrender 
in August of 1945, the National Park Service struggled to accommodate a sudden, 
unprecedented influx of tourists. Liberated from fifteen years of depression and war, 
millions of middle class Americans - a majority of whom from California and the 
growing cities of the urban West - took to the highways to enjoy their newfound financial 
security and leisure time in the nation’s great parks. ^
In no other national park were the pressures of skyrocketing visitation more sharply 
felt than in Yosemite. In 1944, the park reported less than 120,000 visits. One year later, 
the number doubled to more than 250,000, only to spike again to 641,767 by 1946. 
Visitation continued its meteoric rise over the next decade, exceeding the one million 
mark by 1954. Roads, lodgings, campgrounds, trails, and concessions not upgraded since 
the New Deal proved woefully inadequate to accommodate the abrupt surge in tourism. 
With Congress sluggish in designating much needed appropriations to the parks, 
conditions rapidly deteriorated, prompting Bernard DeVoto, in his plea to “close the 
parks,” to declare: “The priceless heritage which the Service must safeguard for the 
United States is beginning to go to hell.” *^
Rapid increases in visitation and changing patterns of recreation also overwhelmed 
the park’s visitor protection capabilities. In this period of rising public interest in outdoor 
recreation, Yosemite became not only an iconic destination for auto-touring, family 
camping, fishing, skiing, and hiking; it also emerged as a globally significant site for the
“  John Ise, Our National Park Policy, reprint edition (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 455-459; Ronald 
A. Foresta, America’s National Parks and their Keepers (Washington D.C. : Resources for the Future, 
1984), 49-50; Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition (Lincoln: University 
o f Nebraska Press, 1997), 171-173.
Visitation numbers from Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 123; Quote from Bernard DeVoto, “Let’s 
Close the National Parks,” H arper’s Magazine (October 1953): 49-52.
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development of modem technical rock climbing. A small cohort of Sierra Club climbers 
gathering in Yosemite in the late 1940s and early 1950s devised new techniques and 
technologies that enabled groundbreaking first ascents of the Valley’s smooth granite 
cracks and intimidating “big walls.”^^  Innovations in rock climbing techniques produced 
serious apprehension among park rangers who remained ill-prepared to respond to 
complex climbing-related aeeidents. Relying on wartime improvements in SAR 
technologies, the expertise of local Sierra Club climbers, and the advice of the American 
Alpine Club’s mountaineering safety committee, administrators and rangers pieced 
together a set of mdimentary visitor protection measures that laid the groundwork for the 
professionalization of search and rescue in the 1960s and 1970s.
World War II, in the words of former Yosemite rescue ranger Charles “Butch” 
Farabee, “was the best thing ever to happen to search and rescue.” *^ Farabee rightly 
attributes the postwar modernization of search and rescue in the national parks to war­
time innovations in helicopter capabilities, communication technologies, and especially 
to the diverse array of outdoor equipment developed for the U.S. Army’s elite mountain 
forces. Activated in November 1941, the C* Battalion, 87* Infantry Mountain Regiment, 
later re-commissioned as the 10* Mountain Division, brought together the most 
accomplished skiers, rock climbers, and mountaineers in the nation, including a number 
of Yosemite park rangers and Sierra Club rock climbers. Funded by massive federal war 
subsidies, these outdoorsmen-tumed-soldiers innovated a host of new outdoor equipment
Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f  a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994), 
41, Roper defines “big-wall climbing” as “a multiday effort involving direct aid on a large and steep rock 
wall.”
^ Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 139.
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including aluminum frame backpacks, dehydrated foods, lighter water resistant tents, 
eiderdown sleeping bags, portable butane stoves, waterproof nylon jackets, laminated 
skis, and quick release bindings, all designed to improve the safety and efficiency of 
cross-country travel in remote, mountainous areas.^
The Army also began mass-producing improved versions of pitons, carabiners, ice 
axes, crampons, and other previously imported European climbing devices. Sierra Club 
leader and expert rock climber Richard Leonard, as an officer in the Quartermaster Corps, 
oversaw the testing and development of perhaps the most significant of these 
technological breakthroughs: the nylon climbing rope. Engineered from thick chords 
used to drive sawmills, these durable, shock absorbent 7/16 inch diameter ropes could 
withstand over one hundred and fifty test falls (the older hemp ropes failed after about a 
dozen).^^ Such advances in outdoor equipment provided the technological foundations 
for the postwar recreation boom; and, in combination with helicopters and improved 
radio communication technology, also functioned as the technical infrastructure through 
which administrators and rangers in Yosemite hoped to provide for the safety of a rising 
tide of visitors seeking to engage physically with the roadless terrain beyond the 
congestion of the increasingly urban Valley. Technological innovation, in this respect, 
guided late twentieth century Americans’ understanding of wildemess as state of nature 
to be experienced through commercial recreation.^^
“  Ibid., 140.
Chris Jones, Climbing in North America, second edition (Seattle: The Mountaineers), 170.
For this propensity to know nature through leisure rather than through work or other means, see 
Richard White, “Are You an Environmentalist or do You Work for a Living?” in Uncommon Ground: 
Toward Reinventing Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 171-185.
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The end of the war and the accompanying economic recovery unleashed a record- 
breaking flood of tourists on Yosemite, inundating the park’s protection division and 
creating a pressing need for more formalized management of search and rescue 
operations. In the month of September 1945, beginning less than two weeks after atomic 
bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, approximately 60,000 visitors poured 
through the park’s entrances, breaking an all-time record for that month and shattering 
the previous September’s numbers by more than five hundred percent.^^ This trend 
continued over the ensuing years, straining the park’s accommodation infrastructure and 
severely testing the capacity of the shorthanded ranger force to respond to increasing 
numbers of emergencies. In the month of July 1948 alone. Superintendent Carl P. 
Russell reported receiving at least sixty one “messages of more or less urgency” from 
visitors and park personnel concemed about lost or overdue hikers. Even with forty six 
seasonal rangers and twenty one full-time rangers on staff, a more than fifty percent 
increase from prewar numbers, Russell worried about the park’s ability to prioritize 
ranger duties: “Such requests are numerous and daily, requiring immediate attention, and 
are time and personnel consuming,” he wrote.^*
While most emergency scenarios in Yosemite involved lost or injured hikers, rock 
climbing prompted the most significant changes in the park’s visitor protection 
infi-astmcture. The increasing commercial availability of technical mountaineering gear 
in the affluent postwar years fueled the rising popularity of climbing and other
Frank A. Kittredge, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for September, 1945,” October 1, 1945, 3, 
Yosemite National Park Library.
Carl P. Russell, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1948,” August 10, 1948, 6, 7, Yosemite 
National Park Library.
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mountaineering activities in the nation’s parks. Indeed, almost immediately following 
the war, much of the equipment developed for the 10* Mountain Division began 
appearing on the shelves of Army surplus stores and sporting goods retailers around the 
country, enabling a new generation of outdoor enthusiasts to partake independently in 
rock climbing and mountaineering. The Yosemite Valley, with its towering monoliths 
and flawless glacier-polished granite, attracted the most ambitious of these hopeful 
climbers. Comprised predominantly of California-based Sierra Club members, the small 
contingent of serious rock climbers gathering in Yosemite in the immediate postwar years 
made innovations in techniques and equipment that according to historian David Louter 
“literally took the sport to new heights.”^^
Considered to be the “father of modem rock climbing,” John Salathe, an eccentric 
Swiss-bom blacksmith who became enamored with climbing after participating in a 
Sierra Club outing in 1946, forged his own pitons specifically for the Valley’s smooth 
granite and innovated a number of new “aid climbing” techniques in which the climber 
directly ascended pitons, bolts, or other gear placed in the rock. For some, aid climbing 
contradicted a long-standing European mountaineering ethic which held that the rope 
should only be used as protection in case of fall, not as an aid in upward movement. Yet 
Salathe’s extraordinary endurance and skill in equipment use demonstrated to most 
climbers that aid techniques, properly applied, could open up whole new possibilities in 
big wall climbing without compromising the standards of physicality and self-reliance 
demanded by the sport’s most stringent aesthetes. On September 3, 1947, Salathe and 
Anton “Ax” Nelson completed a remarkable five day ascent of the much coveted Lost
^ David Louter, “Application for the Placement of Camp 4 on the National Register o f Historic 
Places,” October 15,2001. Camp 4 Nomination Documents, Yosemite National Park Library.
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Arrow Spire, a striking tower of granite jutting one hundred feet from Yosemite Point 
just east of Yosemite Falls. Regarded as the first true big wall climb, Salathe’s 
achievement ushered in the “golden age of Yosemite rock climbing,” which for the park’s 
ranger force meant a new age of apprehension.^'*
Carl Russell’s concern in the summer of 1948 over the preparedness of the ranger 
force stemmed in part from a climbing accident from the previous July which seemed to 
many a prelude of challenges to come. On July 12, experienced Sierra Club climber A1 
Baxter lost his handhold on a difficult pitch on Higher Cathedral Spire. The force of the 
fall pulled a piton from the wall and Baxter plunged sixty feet before slamming into the 
rock and shattering both of his ankles. With the aid of his companions and a climber who 
had witnessed the accident from the nearby Lower Cathedral Spire, Baxter managed to 
make three rappels down to the talus six hundred feet below. A party of thirteen rangers, 
accompanied by Superintendent Frank Kittredge, arrived on the scene to meet the injured 
climber. While descending the talus with Baxter strapped to an improvised stretcher, a 
member of the rescue party dislodged a five hundred pound boulder which careened off 
two rescuers breaking Ranger Byrne Packard’s ankle and leaving Assistant Chief Ranger 
Homer Robinson badly cut and bruised. Though Baxter recovered - and later headed a 
Sierra Club volunteer rescue force - the hastily contrived rescue effort anticipated the 
challenges of responding to climbing mishaps and incorporating new technologies into 
the park’s fragmented rescue apparatus.’*
Roper, Camp 4,A\.
Frank A. Kittredge, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1947,” August 1, 1947, 6, Yosemite 
National Park Library; For a more detailed account see A1 Baxter, “Broken Legs on the Higher Spire,” in 
Steve Roper, ed.. Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f  Yosemite Climbing (Stanford: Stanford 
University Libraries, 2003), 29-31.
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Later that same year, the Safety Committee of the American Alpine Club (AAC) 
published the first edition of Mountaineering Safety, a guide offering expert analysis of 
the various climbing accidents occurring each year in the United States and Canada.”  
William P. House, direetor of the newly established safety committee, described the 
publication as a means “to investigate climbing accidents and to formulate a program of 
prevention for the future.” In subsequent years, the annual accident report became the 
premier repository for safety standards in “new world” rock climbing and 
mountaineering.’  ^ In the 1948 issue, editors prepared a detailed analysis of A1 Baxter’s 
accident, pointing to his reliance on “old pitons” left by previous climbers and his lack of 
caution in continuing to ascend difficult terrain without placing protection as the 
immediate causes. “A leader is not justified in continuing if the difficulty is so great that 
he cannot place pitons for safety,” the report concluded.’ *^ The AAC offered such 
explanations as preemptive, educational tools to promote self-reliance in elimbing and 
limit the need for a sophisticated rescue apparatus.
Mountaineering Safety also served to assert a class hierarchy in an increasingly 
democratized climbing culture. Established in 1902 by American linguist and alpinist 
Charles Ernest Fay, the American Alpine Club functioned as the North Ameriean 
equivalent to the gentrified mountaineering clubs operating in Britain and Western 
Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. Through the early twentieth century, AAC 
leaders embraced a masculine ethie of technological restraint and self-reliance in
Safety Committee o f the American Alpine Club (AAC), Mountaineering Safety (New York: The 
American Alpine Club, 1948), 18; After several name changes, in 1968 the AAC finally settled on 
Accidents in North American Mountaineering as the appropriate name for the annual report.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 8.
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climbing which they gleaned from the genteel tradition in Victorian alpinism.’  ^ In the 
post-World War II years, many club members, a tight-knit contingent of elite 
mountaineers primarily from East Coast cities, began to worry that the impending 
democratization of their sport - and its loealized development in the West - eould threaten 
the integrity of the club’s “established Alpine tradition.” This class anxiety manifested 
into an all out effort to communieate and maintain safety standards in rock climbing and 
other mountaineering aetivities. As the editors of Mountaineering Safety explained, 
“Previously, many Americans had received valuable indoctrination at climbing centers 
abroad from guides and from accomplished amateurs. The great distanees in Ameriea 
have hindered the effective growth of a coordinated alpine tradition on this side of the 
Atlantie. And now ‘budding extremism,’ in some sections, if not controlled, could 
influence adversely the ‘eonservative’ doetrines of our sport. While maintaining good 
relations with the Sierra Club in California, the Mazamas in Oregon, the Mountaineers in 
Washington State, the Roeky Mountain Alpine Club in Colorado, and other Western 
mountaineering clubs, AAC leaders viewed the postwar recreation boom as a threat to 
gentlemanly virtue in North American climbing.
The AAC safety eommittee meticulously detailed the mistakes of aeeident vietims in 
order to dramatize the tragie consequenees of inexperience and overeonfidence among 
the “occasional rash and impetuous climber.” Aimed at the independent American 
climber who felt that regulations and organized mountaineering elubs “restricted his 
freedom,” the publication would, according to its authors, “succeed in fostering national
Jones, Climbing in North America, 55-57.
Safety Committee o f AAC, Mountaineering Safety, 18.
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respect for high places, wider understanding of established techniques, and a saner 
philosophical approach to the benefits whieh aecrue to those who would know the 
mountains.” The solution, the AAC’s safety eommittee proposed, was not to restrict 
climbing, but to implement “a system of persuasive but friendly adviee by authorities.”
In the national parks, the AAC suggested that administrators eould require registration for 
diffieult aseents in order to advise prospective climbers of the dangers involved without 
aetively prohibiting elimbing activities. Independent climbers seeking the personalized 
risk of a difficult ascent would therefore “be induced to register for their own protection 
without feeling required to do so by edict.””
Even as administrators in Yosemite embraced these suggestions, aeeidents related to 
climbing or rock scrambling continued to occupy a significant portion of the AAC’s 
annual report. In Mareh of 1949, two teenagers fell nearly three hundred feet to their 
deaths from the cliffs near Lower Yosemite Falls. The pair had been roped together and 
had been carrying a piton hammer and few pieces of equipment. However, as the editors 
coneluded, “So far as can be learned, the boys never had any organized training at all.” 
The accident not only indieated the need for a registration process, for AAC leaders it 
also exposed “the urgent need for efforts by organized climbing groups to pass 
information and proper mountaineering attitudes to the younger generation.” In 
November of that year, a soldier from a nearby air base fell to his death in nearly the 
same loeation after a loose block gave way beneath his feet. He had not informed rangers 
of his intentions and had been carrying no climbing equipment.’^
”  Ibid., 18-19.
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In 1952, the AAC reported five similar ineidents in whieh park rangers were 
fortunately able to save the lives of the vietims. One rock scrambler fell thirty feet from a 
sloping ledge more than 1,000 feet above the Valley floor. He bounced off a ledge and 
tumbled another twenty five feet into a live oak tree “which prevented him from falling to 
eertain death.” The editors’ analysis of these incidents emphasized the persistent 
administrative ehallenges of aeeommodating visitors seeking to participate in roek 
elimbing and other potentially dangerous activities in Yosemite. Exuding the AAC’s 
discomfort with the intersections between romantic individualism and class in a 
democratizing climbing culture, the authors wrote:
One is impressed by the number of diffieult and dangerous reseue operations whieh the 
rangers in Yosemite Park are required to earry out as a result of the actions of unwary 
and sometimes irresponsible visitors. To the extent that organized mountaineering 
clubs can reach potential elimbers and combat the false aspeets of drama and heroics 
which “Hollywood” and the popular press so often impart to mountaineering, the 
number of ineidents of this kind ean perhaps be lessened. It is recognized that the 
immediate aeeessibility of steep eliffs and the great number of visitors in Yosemite 
National Park will ereate a eontinuing problem there and in similar locales.’^
The AAC’s contributions to accident prevention motivated the Sierra Club to assist the 
NPS in prioritizing safety proeedures in Yosemite. Riehard Leonard organized a “safety 
eommittee” in 1949 and began forwarding incident reports and aeeident analyses from 
Yosemite to the AAC’s editorial board. Leonard also provided park offieials with lists of 
elimbers qualified to lead diffieult aseents.*** Sueh arrangements positioned visitor
Safety Committee o f the AAC, Safety and the Climber (New York: The American Alpine Club, 
1950), 2.
™ Safety Committee o f the AAC, Accidents in American Mountaineering (New York: The American 
Alpine Club, 1952), 12-13.
“ ibid., 18.
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protection as a vital administrative tool by which park officials could accommodate rock 
climbing and other risk-oriented activities.
While serious climbing accidents remained relatively infrequent in Yosemite, 
especially considering the more than one million tourists visiting the park annually by the 
mid-1950s, the 849 rock climbers registering with park rangers for ascents in 1954 alone 
confirmed the need for additional precautionary measures.** The most proaetive of these 
early attempts at managing climbing safety in the park involved the implementation of a 
voluntary registration process, as suggested by Richard Leonard in 1939 and again by the 
AAC in 1948, in which rock climbers were to notify park officials of their objective, the 
date of the climb, and their qualifications to lead the attempt. Rangers advertised this 
process as a means to keep track of climbing activities and individual climbers so that a 
rescue force could be assembled at a moment’s notice if the need arose. However, the 
registration process also revealed a growing anxiety among park officials over their 
inability to respond adequately to climbing-related accidents in the park. The program, 
according to one ranger, served “not only to proteet climbers, but also to protect rangers, 
as there were relatively few who were really qualified to do much in the way of reseue at 
that time, and some unwilling and relatively unskilled rangers were pressed into service 
when a climbing accident occurred.”*’
Park authorities had neither the resources nor the will to enforce climbing prohibitions, 
especially since the influential Sierra Club remained the primary backer of climbing
United States Department o f the Interior, “Summary o f Annual Mountaineering Reports from Areas 
Administered by the National Park Service, 1955,” June 12, 1956, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain 
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
^  Wayne Merry to Gary Colliver, March 19, 1993, YOSAR office files.
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activities in the park. Concerned more with maintaining safety in the park than 
advancing a preservationist ideology, NPS administrators nevertheless voiced objections 
to especially bold or dangerous proposals. Climbers responded to these perceived slights 
with indignation. In 1954, experienced Sierra Club climber Jerry Gallwas - who later 
accompanied Royal Robbins in the first ascent of the northwest face of Half Dome - 
submitted a request to climb John Salathe’s route on Lost Arrow in the spring of that year. 
Superintendent John Preston protested that “not only is the Lost Arrow climb a dangerous 
one, but is considered something of a show or a stunt.” Preston cited a number of 
concerns including the “precarious” weather of that time of year and the fact that “right 
now our protection forces are at a low ebb, and we would be in no position to undertake a 
major rescue operation.”*’ Gallwas, with obvious frustration, responded: “the desire to 
make that particular climb has been with me for five years, and I find it rather difficult to 
banish the thought from my mind.”*'* Richard Leonard, the president of the Sierra Club 
at the time, also wrote to Superintendent Preston in defense of Gallwas. While 
supportive of the climber registration process, Leonard overtly challenged the 
superintendent’s authority to restrict climbing activities in the park. Restating the AAC’s 
primary argument in Mountaineering Safety, and prescient of disagreements between 
rock climbers and administrators to come, Leonard wrote “it is our feeling that.. .rules 
and restrictions do little to increase safety.”*’
John C. Preston to Jerry Gallwas, April 9, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.
^  Jerry Gallwas to John C. Preston, April 12, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.
Richard Leonard to John C. Preston, May 25, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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To maintain amicable relations between Sierra Club climbers and the Park Service, 
and to mitigate obvious deficiencies in the park’s ability to respond to climbing accidents, 
Leonard proposed a direct line of communication between park officials and a group of 
thirty San Francisco Bay area club members qualified to perform rescues. Since October 
of 1953, this volunteer rescue force “had collected equipment, practiced raising and 
lowering stranded or unconscious persons from exposed spots on cliffs, and developed a 
list of contact people, possible participants, and contact procedures.” Leonard suggested 
that when needed, these individuals could be dispatched from the bay area on a moment’s 
notice and could reach “the valley about as quickly as climbers can be called in from 
various scattered points about the valley itself.”*^  Soon after, club members Hervey 
Voge and A1 Baxter (the same A1 Baxter that had been rescued fi'om Cathedral Spire 
seven years earlier), submitted an official offer on behalf of the Sierra Club Mountain 
Rescue Service to provide rescue services in Yosemite. Clearly outlining the limits of 
this commitment, the proposal read:
Members of the Mountain Rescue Service are volunteers. It is not their intention to 
assume public responsibility, but simply to offer their aid to public agencies in rescues 
fi'om steep cliffs when normal means available to the agencies do not suffice for 
rescue... The Rescue Service is a last recourse. Members of this service are highly 
skilled climbers, and they should only be called out for rescue work on very 
precipitous rock, ice, or snow.*’
Through the 1950s, rangers and climbers trained through the Sierra Club’s rescue 
program devised a number of innovative strategies for lowering and raising injured rock
“  Ibid.
Hervey Voge and A.W. Baxter, Jr., “Sierra Club Mountain Rescue Service,” undated, Yosemite 
Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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climbers from the vertical landscapes of the Valley. This ability to perform complex 
climbing rescues distinguished Yosemite’s rescue force from similar volunteer networks 
being organized at the same time by mountaineering clubs in the Pacific Northwest and 
the Colorado Rockies.** In Yosemite, the first major rescue requiring technical climbing 
skills occurred on May 28, 1955 when Sierra Club climber Helen Von Rykervorsel fell 
ninety feet before being stopped by the rope three hundred feet above the talus on 
Washington Column; she suffered “two broken legs and a broken arm and possible head 
injuries” in the fall. Two rangers ascended ropes to join the remaining party of three 
Sierra Club climbers, all of whom had been trained in rescue procedures. The makeshift 
team then hauled up a “stokes litter,” a rigid stretcher developed during the war for 
evacuating casualties, in which Rykervorsel was carefully lain. Belayed from above and 
guided with ropes by rangers below, two climbers accompanied the litter, maintaining it 
“in a horizontal position due to the extensive nature of the victim’s injuries.” Perhaps 
understating the technical complexity of the process, Superintendent Preston described 
the four hour effort as “a rather difficult rescue.”**
Such operations demonstrated clear advancements in the technical efficiency and 
experience of the park’s rescue personnel. Occasional training programs in rope-work 
had improved the response capabilities of the ranger force while new climbing and 
emergency medical technologies had allowed for more complex rescues. Of these new 
technologies, helicopters became the most significant tool of rescue for future
For a brief outline of other mountain rescue teams in this period see Farabee, Death, Daring, and 
Disaster, 139-145
^ John C. Preston, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for May, 1955,” June 13, 1955, Yosemite 
National Park Library, Preston’s report also included several pictures of the rescue taking place.
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
administrators. Used sporadically for medical evacuations in Yosemite since the late 
1940s, helicopters promised a myriad of possibilities.
Yet early air rescue techniques and technologies were often dangerously inadequate. 
In responding to a stranded hiker in the summer of 1949, rescuers had to disassemble a 
tiny Hiller 360 helicopter and drive it by flatbed truck to White Wolf campground on the 
Tioga Road near Tuolumne Meadows. Crews then hastily rebuilt the helicopter and 
dispatched the pilot to locate a twelve year old boy who had been lying injured near the 
isolated Benton Lake for the past five days. After locating the boy, placing him in the 
chopper, and dumping fuel in order to lift off in the thin air at 10,000 feet, the pilot 
promptly got lost. Rescue crews, spotting the helicopter flying aimlessly in the wrong 
direction, lit a small brush fire to signal the pilot who was finally able to land the craft, 
literally on fumes. Helicopter capabilities improved dramatically following the 
implementation of the National Search and Rescue Plan in 1956. The plan mandated that 
military and other federal agencies perform civilian rescues when needed. In subsequent 
decades, arrangements with Army and Navy helicopter units proved critical to the park’s 
protection division. By the late 1950s, helicopters had become integral components of 
search and rescue in Yosemite and other parks.***
For the Park Service, by the mid-1950s, cooperative search and rescue efforts 
involving Sierra Club volunteers, local law enforcement, helicopter pilots, and 
occasionally personnel from nearby military installations, had seemed to alleviate many 
of the safety concerns brought on by heavy visitation and the increasing presence of rock 
climbers in the park. The Sierra Club’s “qualified leader” program, a policy in which
^  Yarshee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 181-182, 185-186, 191.
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prospective climbers had to demonstrate thorough, working knowledge of belay 
techniques, rappelling, and piton use before leading climbs in Yosemite, allowed rangers 
to readily judge the capabilities of parties registering for rock climbs in the Valley.** In 
addition, the AAC’s annual accident report encouraged administrators to communicate 
safe mountaineering practices to new climbers in order to limit the need for rescue. 
Despite some isolated incidents involving unregistered or inexperienced climbers, and a 
few clashes between Sierra Club qualified leaders and overcautious administrators, the 
voluntary registration program worked surprisingly well through the early 1950s. Most 
rock climbers in the park took safety seriously and felt that by keeping rangers informed 
of their activities, NPS authorities would remain supportive of rock climbing as an 
appropriate recreational use of the park.
As such, administrators expressed no pressing need to make significant adjustments to 
the long-standing structure of the park’s protection division. Through the 1950s, search 
and rescue remained a secondary duty of rangers, classified under a job category of 
“other functions.” The 1952 management plan, for example, placed search and rescue 
last on a long list of ranger duties behind fee collection, supervision of picnicking, 
information services, insect control, campground maintenance, patrolling for illegal 
hunters, removing bears fi'om campgrounds, traffic control, and fish stocking among a 
number of other routine assignments. Park administrators regarded rescue as an ad hoc 
operation “to be taken care of by rangers assigned to specific duties who let their regular 
jobs go for the period of emergency.”*’ Though the chief ranger oversaw emergency
David Brower, ed.. The Sierra Club: A Handbook (San Francisco: San Francisco, 1960), 95.
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operations and a few rangers had received training in rock climbing techniques, there 
were no full-time search and rescue specialists on staff, nor did the protection division 
have a clearly outlined set of procedures in place to deal with accidents. Additionally, 
the Sierra Club rescue service, which the park increasingly relied on to perform 
backcountry searches and climbing rescues, remained a volunteer force with no legal 
responsibility to the park or its visitors. Remarkably, this informal search and rescue 
arrangement sufficed through the 1950s with few serious mishaps. However, by the late 
1950s, as a new generation of rock climbers set their sights on the still largely untouched 
big walls of Yosemite, park officials recognized that formalized regulatory policies, 
better trained personnel, and more advanced rescue technologies would be necessary to 
accommodate a spectrum of new accident possibilities.
^ National Park Service, “Master Plan Development Outline: Park Operation Prospectus,” March, 
1952, 10-12, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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CHAPTER 2
ROCK CLIMBING AND RESCUE 
The rich history of rock climbing and rescue in Yosemite receives only passing 
mention in traditional histories of the national parks. This neglect has persisted in part 
because the manner in which climbing and rescue became cemented in popular and 
administrative imaginations of the park complicated the preservation/ use dichotomy that 
historians have relied upon to explain the transformation of national park management in 
the age of environmentalism. Fortunately, rock climbers have compiled their own 
narrative of this formative period in the development of their sport. Steve Roper, 
Yosemite’s resident historian, characterized the “golden age of Yosemite rock climbing” 
between 1947 and 1971 by emphasizing a persistent dialogue around the picnic tables of 
Camp 4 over the social, technological, and environmental imperatives constituting 
appropriate “style” in the rock climbing experience.*’ Symbolized by an ideological 
conflict between Royal Robbins, the stringent proponent of technological restraint, and 
Warren Harding, the enigmatic former race car driver who climbed because, as he wrote, 
“I truly enjoyed busting my ass trying to somehow get up something,” the style debate
Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f  a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994),
13.
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illustrated the changing recreational preferences of park-goers as Americans began to 
embrace the tenets of wilderness preservation.*'*
While admittedly over-stated, the debate between Royal Robbins and Warren 
Harding nevertheless underscored the tense interaction between nature, technology, 
individual freedom, consumerism, and risk in popular environmental discourse through 
this period. For Park Service officials, the emergence of rock climbing as a popular 
activity in the 1950s and 1960s created a profound sense of anxiety over their ability to 
ensure the safety of visitors and the park rangers charged with rescuing them. The 
manner in which NPS administrators and rock climbers negotiated this very real 
apprehension blurred the lines between culture and nature in the modem national parks 
movement. The co-evolution of rock climbing as a recreational constmction of nature in 
Yosemite, and rescue as an administrative means to accommodate that construction, 
reflected the complex web of cultural hierarchies shaping national park management 
philosophies in the second half of the twentieth century.
Warren Harding’s highly publicized ascent of the three thousand foot “Nose” of El 
Capitan set in motion the gradual formalization of Yosemite’s search and rescue 
apparatus. Requiring forty seven days spread out between July of 1957 and November of 
1958, the climb demonstrated that the highest, blankest walls in the Valley could be 
scaled with deliberate applications of boldness, stamina, and technology. Observed by 
thousands of tourists from El Capitan Meadows, the climb also generated an emotionally 
charged debate in the press. A number of observers railed against the ascent, 
commenting that Harding’s unprecedented reliance on expansion bolts and fixed ropes
Warren Harding, “Reflections o f a Broken Down Climber,” Ascent 1, no. 5 (July 1971): 35.
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
constituted nothing more than a “feat of engineering.” Citing these concerns, acting 
director of the NPS, E.T. Scoyen questioned whether rock climbing could remain an 
appropriate form of recreation. Writing to the Sierra Club, Scoyen indicated that the 
climb and its accompanying media frenzy “exerted a strong negative influence on the 
normal use of the park by visitors and on the normal park atmosphere.”*’ One observer 
even claimed that upon seeing the climbers scaling the famous landmark “the great 
view.. .had been impaired.. .forever.”*^  Notwithstanding the emotional intensity of these 
reactions, for the NPS, the debate over the Nose revolved around matters of safety; both 
for climbers and, more importantly, for rangers charged with rescuing anyone unlucky 
enough to become injured or stranded high on the wall.
Though the El Capitan climbers were markedly overcautious in their slow progress up 
the face, accidents remained a distinct possibility.*’ In September of 1957, Mark Powell, 
the most accomplished climber other than Harding participating in the early stages of the 
ascent, fell in a moment of inattention from an easy climb on the Royal Arches, 
shattering his ankle and effectively ending his career as an elite Yosemite rock climber. 
On the Nose climb itself, the climbers narrowly averted a series of close calls. In one 
instance, a fixed hemp rope Wally Reed had been ascending suddenly snapped (early on 
Harding had fixed hemp ropes instead of nylon for cost effectiveness). Luckily when the 
line broke Reed had been only a few feet above a ledge and merely tumbled backwards
E.T. Scoyen to Thomas Kendall, March 27, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.Yosemite National Park Archives.
E.T. Scoyen to George Whitmore, April 2, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.
Wayne Merry even suggested that Chief Ranger Oscar Sedergren, who Merry described as “a crusty 
old bastard,” actually encouraged the controversial fixing o f  ropes “as there was no one capable o f coming 
to help.” Wayne Merry to Gary Colliver, March 19, 1993, YOSAR office files.
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onto it. Soon after, while leading a difficult pitch, Harding dislodged a huge boulder 
which miraculously caught in a crack just above his belayer.
In addition, the “appalling exposure” of the upper pitches and long hours spent 
hanging in space in belay loops instilled a profound psychosis in the more inexperieneed 
climbers. On November 8, 1958, only a few hundred feet below the rim, twenty one year 
old Rich Calderwood suddenly decided to retreat, making the long rappels down to the 
Valley and hastily returning to his home in Fresno after he “found himself sobbing 
uncontrollably, for no reason he could fathom, maybe other than missing work, missing 
classes, and missing his pregnant wife.”** Later Calderwood admitted that while sorting 
gear unroped on the wide Camp VI ledge he had become distracted for a moment and 
nearly stumbled over the edge from which he would have plummeted more than 2,500 
feet straight down to the forest floor. If any such accidents were to happen in plain view 
of hundreds of tourists and media representatives, as park officials worried, how would 
the ranger force respond? In a letter to Superintendent John Preston, Richard Leonard 
suggested that rangers would have to attempt a rescue or recovery, “for public opinion 
will always force the administrative agency to do its best.”**
With such concerns in mind. Superintendent Preston began laying out plans for the 
first official management strategy for climbing and rescue procedures in Yosemite. On 
November 20, 1958, less than week after Harding’s team had reached the summit of El 
Capitan, Preston issued a statement of the park’s position on rock climbing. Though 
remaining ambivalent toward the future of technical rock climbing as a safe, manageable
^ Roper, Camp 4, 79.
^  Richard Leonard to John C. Preston, October 3,1957, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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form of recreation in the park, the superintendent voiced many of the arguments Richard 
Leonard and other representatives of the growing constituency of Yosemite climbers had 
been suggesting for some time. Setting the tone for future discussions over climbing and 
rescue in the park, Preston wrote:
We feel we should recognize rock climbing as one of the many ways people can find 
recreation and pleasure in our National Parks. Because of the risk involved we do not 
believe we should encourage climbing but we do not believe we can stop it unless we 
set up special regulations to do so and we doubt that such regulations would be 
enforceable. On the other hand, well organized climbs by qualified climbers are 
actually desirable as we can call on such people for help in rescue cases where we do 
not have enough trained men for the job. As a rule, we have very little difficulty with 
well qualified climbers; it is the inexperienced and ill-equipped persons who get into 
trouble and require rescue operations which sometimes lead to unfavorable publicity 
for the National Parks.*****
Partly a demand for climbing regulations, partly a means to appease the influential “rock 
climbing fraternity,” and most importantly, a plea for the establishment of a workable 
plan to ensure the safety of an inevitable wave of recreational climbers (and to avoid 
“unfavorable publicity”), Preston’s statement set the stage for a series of debates between 
independent climbers, the Sierra Club, and Park Service officials over the implications of 
accommodating climbing activities in the park.
In December 1958, Park Service Director Conrad Wirth, through a series of ill- 
advised comments to the press, drove a wedge into a developing rift between climbers 
and park officials that Preston had hoped to smooth over with his earlier statement. In 
response to persistent questioning from reporters, Wirth, who had “not had too much 
experience with rock climbers” declared that “trick climbing,” which he defined as
John C. Preston to Regional Director, November 20,1958, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain 
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48. For the Sierra Club’s critique o f the expansion o f the Tioga Road see 
Michael Cohen, History o f  the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books), 140-142.
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“driving iron pitons or bolts into a mountain,” would be banned in Yosemite.**** Wirth’s 
declaration sparked a firestorm of protest from climbers pointing out that the proposed 
ban amounted to an outright prohibition of the sport since rock climbing, especially as 
practiced in Yosemite, depended on such devices. Harding called the proposed ban 
“ridiculous” and argued that pitons and bolts in no way degraded the scenic qualities of 
the rock.**” Rich Calderwood responded to Wirth’s accusations by attacking the 
director’s support for the ongoing expansion of the Tioga Road along the granite shores 
of Tenaya Lake: “We don’t believe a few bits of iron which can hardly be seen even with 
binoculars deface the wilderness as much as blasting out entire seetions of rare glacier 
polished granite in making new roads,” he told reporters, echoing critiques of Ansel 
Adams and an increasingly confrontational Sierra Club.**”
In his response. Superintendent Preston complicated his earlier declaration of support 
for climbing by distinguishing the ascent of El Capitan from other “normal mountain 
elimbing expeditions.” Instead, he asserted, the Nose constituted “nothing more or less 
than a ‘stunt’ climb which.. .cannot be considered a legitimate form of recreation.”***'* 
George Whitmore, a Sierra Club climber partieipating in the final days of the climb, fired 
back in an angry letter directed at Wirth and Preston: “Your implication that ‘tricks’ and 
‘stunts’ were used in a camival-like spectaele again indicates a complete disregard for the 
truth,” he wrote. “If you had taken the trouble to inquire.. .you would have found that we
Scoyen to Whitmore, April 2, 1959.
102 , ‘Harding Labels Trick Climbing Charge as Ridiculous,” The Merced Sun-Star (January 27, 1959).
Quoting Richard Calderwood in “Park Service May Ban Climbing Aids.” undated newspaper 
article, Yosemite National Park Library.
John C. Preston to Regional Director, January 23, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain 
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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used standard climbing techniques which have been commonly accepted and practiced in 
Europe and this country for years.”***’ In a letter to Wirth, Thomas Kendall of the Sierra 
Club’s Rock Climbing Section also chimed in on behalf of the El Capitan climbers and 
rock climbing in general; A look at the record will show that those who have contributed 
the most to preserve our wilderness areas have been guilty of this type of “stunting” -  
from John Muir on up. It is axiomatic that those who know the mountains most 
intimately want most to preserve them as they are. Rock climbing is a way of achieving 
this intimacy. It is much, much more than a “stunt.”* **^
Such invocations of Yosemite’s mountaineering tradition proved influential in 
guiding rock climbing management policies in subsequent years. In fact, NPS officials 
generally agreed with Kendall in spite of Wirth’s earlier comments and Preston’s vague 
assessment of the El Capitan climb. The anxiety expressed by Wirth, Preston, Scoyen, 
and others stemmed more from anticipated administrative difficulties related to visitor 
safety than from a conflicting preservationist ideology. Conceptually, rock climbing 
remained a “wholly proper use of the park,” as Scoyen insisted.***’ In practice, however, 
climbing had become problematic both for its spectacle in the eyes of less active visitors 
and more importantly for the challenges it posed for an understaffed, technologically 
deficient, and otherwise ill-prepared internal rescue apparatus. The unprecedented scale 
of the El Capitan climb, the intense publicity it generated, and the potential disasters it
George Whitmore to Conrad Wirth, March 16, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
Thomas T. Kendall to Comad Wirth, March 10, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
E.T. Scoyen to Thomas Kendall, March 27, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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held for both climbers and rescuers presented a very real dilemma for NPS officials 
struggling to manage the repercussions of rock climbing as a popular recreational pursuit 
in the park. The strained ambiguity of Preston’s distinction between a “normal” rock 
climb as opposed to a “stunt” reflected this apprehension and presaged the gradual 
institutionalization of visitor protection in Yosemite.
In lieu of the El Capitan controversy, National Park Service officials met with 
representatives of the Department of the Interior in Washington to devise a system-wide 
policy for managing climbing activities and implementing safety procedures in national 
parks. Soliciting advice from the superintendents of major parks and prominent 
mountaineering organizations including the Sierra Club and the American Alpine Club, 
the Park Service sought to “bring the use of National Parks by mountain climbers in 
consonance with basic park principles.” While supporting climbing as “an entirely 
proper and appropriate use of areas within the National Park System,” the management 
plan also empowered administrators to compel climbers “through persuasion and mutual 
understanding” to behave in manner consistent with “the service’s responsibilities for the 
protection of human life, the protection of natural, esthetic, and scientific values and the 
protection of the rights and privileges of others in their normal use of these areas.”'***
This meant that climbers and park officials were to work together to ensure that climbing 
would remain a safe, manageable form of recreation that did not detract from the scenic 
qualities of Yosemite or compromise the experience of other visitors. The plan seemed 
consistent with Richard Leonard’s contention that “the freedom of the individual to enjoy 
the area in his own way without harming [the] park or others should be carefully
United States Department o f the Interior (DOI) and the National Park Service (NPS), “National 
Park Service Mountaineering Policy and Guidelines,” October 15, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain 
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
preserved.”'*** Yet the policy proved easier said than done since it chafed with a web of 
recreational hierarchies that an increasingly diverse set of park users had been 
constructing since the earliest days of the park.
Many Sierra Club rock climbers, hoping to protect their long-standing claim to 
recreation in Yosemite, remained skeptical of the plan. Climbers worried that the policy 
would result in arbitrary regulations and closures enacted by park authorities with no 
demonstrable knowledge of the abilities of individual climbers and little familiarity with 
advances in modem climbing techniques. Michael Laughlin, chairman of the 
Qualifications Committee of the Sierra Club Rock Climbing Section, argued that the 
mountaineering and rescue policy would have a “measurable effect in weakening the 
puposefulness of the qualified leader program both for the Sierra Club and the Park 
Service.” Building on arguments previously made by the AAC and Richard Leonard, 
Laughlin stressed that safety concerns would not be assuaged by restricting climbing. 
Instead, he suggested that “climbing activity is sufficient to warrant the presence in the 
Valley of a fulltime climbing ranger, one who climbs actively himself and who is 
personally familiar with the routes and the climbers.”"** Laughlin and other Sierra Club 
leaders understood that assuaging safety concerns would give NPS officials confidence to 
support the club’s claims to recreation in the park.
Laughlin made a number of other recommendations that underpinned later search and 
rescue policies including the need for a “trained and equipped rescue personnel,”
Richard Leonard to John C. Preston, October 3,1957, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
Michael Loughlin to Ehner Fladmark, April 23, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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although as he rightly pointed out, “personnel would more likely be employed in rescuing 
a stranded hiker than a climber.” Anticipating financial roadblocks to establishing an 
internal rescue apparatus in Yosemite, Laughlin suggested that “if budgetary 
considerations do not permit this, then perhaps the climbers and climbing organizations 
could be of assistance in convincing the holders of the purse strings that money is needed 
for this purpose.”" '  NPS officials expressed a measure of agreement with these 
proposals, though most still viewed discretionary authority to monitor climbing as a 
necessary step towards assuming responsibility for “the direction and control of rescue 
efforts to assist mountaineers who are in serious difficulties.”" ’ The tension between 
climbers’ desire for individual freedom in the national park experience and the NPS’s 
efforts to determine the boundaries of this fi’eedom characterized subsequent discussions 
of social responsibility and safety in climbing.
In Yosemite, officials influenced by close ties to the Sierra Club continued to 
advocate relaxed restrictions on climbing. As such, the management plan functioned less 
as a regulatory policy than as a set of guidelines for developing the park’s visitor 
protection infrastructure. In effect, the plan codified many of the safety precautions 
suggested earlier by Richard Leonard and the Sierra Club and already informally 
practiced by the park’s ranger force. For instance, the plan specified a continuation of the 
voluntary registration process, recommending that “insofar as it is possible to do so, 
rangers who are experienced and competent in mountain climbing and who are 
acquainted with local conditions and climbing techniques will be assigned to registration
Ibid.
DOI and NPS, “National Park Service Mountaineering Policy and Guidelines,” October 15,1959.
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centers.” The plan also expressed a need for the “employment of a sufficient number of 
Service personnel who are experienced mountaineers to cope with the normal rescue 
requirements of the park.” Rescue personnel would be required to receive annual 
training in the most up-to-date rock climbing and rescue techniques. In addition, the plan 
called for “the development and maintenance of advance plans and agreements with 
nearby mountaineering organizations which would provide assistance when rescue 
operations exceed the limitations of the Service’s resources.” With a thinly veiled 
reference to Harding’s El Capitan climb, the authors suggested that “there are certain 
types of ascents which require special considerations.” In these still rather vaguely 
defined situations, the climbing party would be responsible for providing a qualified, 
self-sufficient rescue party to remain on-call if needed."’ Ultimately, the plan’s 
significance lay in its plain expression of the apprehensions and inadequacies facing 
Yosemite’s visitor protection division in continuing to accommodate rather than directly 
regulate mountaineering and rock climbing activities.
Mounting concerns over the dangers of rock climbing and the problems of responding 
to climbing accidents were soon realized. On March 19, 1960, seventeen year old high 
school student Irving Smith fell into the “prehistorically dark and damp” Lost Arrow 
Chimney, becoming the first experienced climber to die on a big wall climb in the 
Yosemite Valley. Rappelling unseen by his climbing partners above. Smith uttered a 
“brief howl” before the rope went slack and the “unmistakable sounds of a body tumbling 
deeper into the nearly vertical gully” echoed from below."'*
Ibid.
Roper, Camp 4 , 110.; Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 243.
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The following day, using a telescope from the Valley floor, ranger and expert climber 
Wayne Merry located Smith’s body crumpled on a chockstone about six hundred feet 
below where he had fallen. Soliciting the cooperation of Warren Harding, Merry 
proposed to make a series of long exposed rappels to retrieve the body but the chief 
ranger at the time prohibited the attempt arguing that recovery from such an 
“inaccessible” spot would be too dangerous. The boy’s father even suggested, rather 
morbidly, that leaving the body to decay in this dark chasm which Steve Roper 
considered “one of the most sinister places in the valley” was perhaps “the way Irving 
would have wanted it.”" ’ Frustrated and ready to “damn near quit the force,” Merry 
regarded the chief ranger’s prohibition as “a vote of no confidence.”"^ More than a 
personal slight to the experienced Merry, who had been Harding’s most reliable 
companion in the final days of the El Capitan climb, the chief ranger’s decision to leave 
the body exposed the lingering inadequacies of a ranger force supposedly responsible for 
the safety of all visitors, even those taking it upon themselves to risk life and limb on 
progressively more difficult rock climbs.
The pressures rock climbing brought to bear on the park’s protection division 
followed from the transformation of Camp 4 from a quiet, non-descript campground in 
the early 1950s into the cultural hub of modem rock climbing by the 1960s. Tucked 
under the sunny north wall of the Valley across the Merced from the Sentinel Rock 
monolith, the inconspicuous campground became the spiritual home for Yosemite rock 
climbers and a significant locus for the co-evolution of modem rock climbing and
Roper, Camp 4, 111.
Merry to Coliver, March 19, 1993.
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professional rescue in the national parks. In the spring of 1957, Mark Powell, before his 
accident on Royal Arches, discovered he could subsist for long periods of time with little 
money camped among the boulders and sparse pines of Camp 4. A select group of self- 
proclaimed “climbing bums” quickly followed suit, carving a semi-primitive existence 
out of this newly co-opted rock climbers’ base camp.
Comprised predominantly of white male college dropouts and other disaffected 
middle class youths, the contingent of elite rock climbers inhabiting Camp 4 through the 
1960s included such soon-to-be rock climbing luminaries as Royal Robbins, Warren 
Harding, Chuck Pratt, Yvon Chouinard, Steve Roper, and Layton Kor. Invoking a range 
of literature from Henry David Thoreau to Jack Kerouac to the heroic alpinists of the 
Victorian era to the original mountaineer/ preservationist John Muir, Yosemite’s 
climbing bums fashioned themselves as rebels pitted against mass consumer culture and 
the “softening influence” of modem technological society. For these self-styled 
bohemians, life in Camp 4 affirmed an elemental individualism in a society populated by 
what social critic William Whyte labeled “organization men.” Climbing invigorated a 
direct connection to the natural world that the postwar economic boom seemed to have 
buried under endless rows of reproducible suburbs, television sets, and automobiles. As 
Yvon Chouinard later reminisced, “We were like wild species living on the edge of an 
ecosystem -  adaptable, resilient, and tough.”" ’
As semi-permanent residents of the park engaged in an activity they considered to be 
transcendent of mere “tourism,” climbing bums maintained a dismissive attitude towards 
other visitors. Often appearing dirty, long haired, and bearded, climbers loitered around
Yvon Choiunard, Let My People Go Surfing: The Education o f  a Reluctant Businessman (New 
York; Penguin Press, 2005), 18.
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the Mountain Room Bar at the Yosemite Lodge, scrounged for leftovers in the cafeteria, 
and held noisy wine-soaked parties in Camp 4 long into the night. Through the 1960s, 
these behaviors created frequent headaches for concessionaires, law enforcement officials, 
patrolling rangers, and especially for non-climbing campers who set up their tents in 
Camp 4 unaware that they had “penetrated into a magic circle” where, according to 
climber Doug Robinson, “they stand undazedly at the focus of a force-field of tradition 
and emotion.”*'* Camp 4 had become not only a gathering point for climbers but also a 
spiritual home where culture and nature intersected to form new conceptions of 
Yosemite’s value in a modem consumer society.
Mueh like other “bum” subeultures forming around surfing and skiing, the climbing 
bum lifestyle was by no means outside the realm of consumer culture."^ The strenuous 
physicality of climbing - and daily life in Camp 4 - reflected a conscious choice on the 
part of climbers to embrace a socially divergent, but ultimately reformist method of 
consumption that emphasized a conscious physical engagement with the natural world 
over the passive aeeeptance of modem convenience. Sleeping in tents and subsisting on 
whatever food they eould scrounge from the National Park Service’s tourist infrastmcture, 
elimbers in the “sprawling al-fresco slum” of Camp 4 reveled in denying themselves the 
comforts of modem mechanized living.'^" This practice of inconspicuous consumption 
allowed rock climbers to act out what environmental writer Bill McKibben deseribes as
Robinson, “Camp 4,” in Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f  Yosemite Climbing, 
Steve Roper, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Libraries, 2003), 182.
For ski bums see Annie Gilbert Coleman, Ski Style: Sport and Culture in the Rockies (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2004); For surf bums see Drew Kampion, Stoked! A History o f  Surf Culture 
(Salt Lake City: G. Smith, 2003).
Jim Bridwell, Climbing Adventures: A Climber’s Passion (Merriville: ICS Books, 1992).
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“turning [inconvenience] into a pleasurable commodity.”’^ ’ Rather than scripting their 
lifestyle in terms of the accumulation of material goods - the trait of modem consumption 
they most adamantly rejected - climbers sought to build a relationship to the vertical 
landscapes of Yosemite by resisting the urge to conspicuously consume, or more 
precisely, by consuming a limited selection of specialized items that isolated their desired 
interaction with the climbing environment. Interestingly, these efforts to divorce 
climbing culture from mass-culture would propel rock climbing into the mainstream 
commercial marketplace in the coming years.
Residing for extended periods of time in the Valley also allowed climbers to 
significantly improve their physical capabilities to ascend more difficult - and more 
dangerous - routes. Mike Borgoff, a regular in Yosemite but an admittedly timid climber, 
deemed the Camp 4 crowd “salamanders” referring to their seemingly inhuman ability to 
scamper up the slick cracks of the Valley. Beginning in the early 1960s, “free climbing” 
or the practice of moving upward by hand and foot using only the existing features of the 
rock gradually took precedence over aid climbing in the minds of many climbers as the 
purest form of ascent. When not putting up bold new free climbing routes on the Valley 
walls. Camp 4’s resident climbing bums practiced challenging gymnastic moves on the 
numerous boulders dotting the campground. These “boulder problems,” Borgoff wrote, 
were “calculated to assure a visiting climber’s complete psychological annihilation before 
he ties onto a rope.” For climbers deeply engaged in this elitist atmosphere, ever more
Bill McKibben, “Consuming Nature,” in Roger Rosenblatt, ed.. Consuming Desires: Consumption, 
Culture, and the Pursuit o f  Happiness (Washington D C.: Island Press, 1999), 92.
For an analysis o f this tendency for the critique o f mass-culture to drive diversification in the 
consumer marketplace see Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter, Nation o f  Rebels: Why Counterculture 
Became Consumer Culture (New York: Harper Business, 2004), 102-103.
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difficult ascents and the pursuit of risk became “a way of life - generously spiked with 
brutal competition.”'^  ^ This competitive mood heightened over the course of the 1960s, 
creating a complex set of new safety concerns for park officials. In the wake of the 
“impossible” technical achievements of Harding’s El Capitan climb and Royal Robbins’s 
equally significant ascent of the northwest face of Half Dome a year earlier, ambitious 
climbers, their bodies honed on the practice boulders of Camp 4, discovered that “huge, 
unclimbed ‘impossible’ walls lay in all directions.”' '^'
Fresh ambitions required specialized technologies which climbers largely 
manufactured themselves specifically for the unique qualities of the Yosemite granite. 
The Valley’s steep, glacier-polished walls presented technical and psychological 
challenges unlike any other climbing environment in the United States or Europe. 
Consistently vertical or overhanging and nearly absent of ledges, the big walls instilled a 
terrifying sense of exposure, sending many overconfident visitors back to their tents in 
Camp 4 to “complain about the heat or the bears or somesuch.” '^  ^ Compared to the 
highly featured limestone of the European Alps where teehnical rock climbing had first 
developed, Yosemite’s polished granite lacked convenient handholds and boasted few 
climbable contours. Vertical cracks existed but were rarely continuous, typically 
shooting upward for hundreds of feet only to disappear into holdless swaths of blank 
granite. On the big walls such as El Capitan and Half Dome, this discontinuous 
topography required numerous pendulum traverses in which climbers, at times facing
Michael W. BorghofF, “O f Salamanders and Bongbongs,” Summit 8 (June 1962): 12-15. 
Roper, Camp 4, 80.
Borghoff, “O f Salamanders and Bongbongs,” 14.
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thousands of feet of air beneath their feet, made long looping runs across blank spaces to 
reach parallel crack systems. These traverses often made retreat, and more significantly, 
rescue, either uncommonly difficult or impossible.
Yosemite’s cracks also tended to be too wide, too small, or too shallow for secure 
piton placements. With Salathe’s homemade steel pitons becoming a rarity in the late 
1950s, other climbers began forging their own imitations. Chuck Wilts, Jerry Gallwas, 
William “Dolt” Fuerer, Dick Long, Ed Leeper, and others manufactured a number of 
pitons of various sizes to fit the unaccommodating cracks of the Valley. Prior to the El 
Capitan climb, Frank Tarver hammered out a set of ultra-wide pitons from the legs of a 
cast iron stove he had pulled from a scrap yard in 1956. These “stoveleg pitons” attained 
legendary status in the Camp 4 climbing circle after proving essential on a particularly 
problematic pitch on the Nose. Most significantly, Yvon Chouinard and Tom Frost, 
through their garage-operated Chouinard Equipment Ine., (which later gave rise to the 
Patagonia Corporation), designed, manufactured, and marketed a number of new 
chromemoly pitons that became vital to the subsequent development of rock climbing in 
Yosemite and ultimately other destinations around the world. Chouinard’s postage-stamp 
sized RURP (Realized Ultimate Reality Pitons) and Frost’s wide angle bong-bong, 
named for its distinctive echo when being pounded into cracks, enabled climbers to 
ascend increasingly difficult routes which would have previously been impossible 
without rock-defacing permanent expansion bolts.
In the wake of Harding’s El Capitan climb, expansion bolts, fixed ropes, and other 
technologies which arguably “guaranteed success” on a climb, fell increasingly out of
Roper, Camp 4, 95-109; and Chouinard, Let My People Go Surfing, 17.
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favor among the stringent aesthetes inhabiting Camp 4. Co-opting a Spartan 
technological imperative practiced by British rock climbers and Alpine mountaineers in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Royal Robbins, T.M. Herbert, Yvon 
Chouinard, and others criticized Warren Harding’s tendencies to choose routes requiring 
numerous permanent expansion bolts. Climbing should be conducted as an aesthetic 
adventure in a natural setting, they argued, with as little technological assistance as 
possible. This delineation of appropriate “style” in the application of technology meant 
that new routes in Yosemite were to be completed in single continuous pushes from the 
ground up using gear that enhanced rather than insulated the climbers’ direct muscular 
engagement with the rock. New technologies such as RURPs, bong-bongs, skyhooks, 
haul hags, and the jumar, a devise Royal Robbins modified to significantly ease the 
difficulties of ascending ropes and hauling up supplies, while in effect making climbing 
easier, also made the most difficult routes possible without resorting to “insulating 
technologies,” namely permanent expansion bolts and fixed ropes. The intended function 
of this technological hierarchy was to force climbers to encounter the climbing 
environment in accordance with its natural features. Stylistically inclined climbers in 
Yosemite did not utilize technology “for its own sake,” but rather for the purpose of 
isolating a strenuous experience in a natural setting and an individualized confrontation 
with risk. This delineation of appropriate style allowed Yosemite climbers to associate 
their sport with the notion of an appropriate “wilderness experience” gaining currency in 
popular environmental discourse at this time.'^’
John Middendorf, “Mechanical Advantage,” (1999). 
http://www.bigwalls.net/climb/mechadv/index.html (accessed on July 24, 2007); for further analysis o f this 
type of technical imperative in wilderness recreation see Joseph Sax’s discussion o f technology in fly
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Changes in the technological sophistication, physical capabilities, and cultural 
imperatives of climbers in Yosemite had worrisome implications for park officials 
seeking to manage this increasingly emboldened class of park visitor. In 1961, the park 
recorded almost two thousand registrations for climbs, a more than two hundred percent 
increase from 1953. Out of approximately two dozen aeeidents in the park requiring 
ranger response in 1961, nine either involved rock climbing or required “mountaineering 
techniques for evacuations.” Most of these incidents resulted from inexperienced and 
often unregistered park visitors attempting to scale cliffs for which they were unprepared. 
For example, on July 22, four Explorer Scouts had to be pulled from the exposed ledges 
east of Lower Yosemite Falls, even though earlier they and their scout leader “were given 
some advice concerning unauthorized elimbing and staying on marked trails.” In another 
instance, an unregistered solo climber had to be guided off a “very precarious position” 
on Tenaya Peak in a dangerous night rescue.'^*
The Sierra Club, now involved in a nationwide movement to preserve wilderness 
extending well beyond its traditional focus on Yosemite and the Sierras, expressed 
concern that these unaffiliated climbers had rendered the registration process and the 
club’s qualified leader program inadequate in maintaining safety standards. Carl Weisner 
of the club’s rock climbing committee wrote to Chief Ranger Fladmark, “We climbers of 
the Sierra Club are.. .quite coneemed with the technical competency of some of the 
newer free lance climbers. We do not wish to see this fine sport deteriorate because of a
fishing, hunting. And backpacking in Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the 
National Parks (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 1980), 27-32.
John C. Preston, “Annual Mountaineering Report, 6A3,” January 9, 1963, Yosemite Central Files, 
Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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few delinquents, and certainly do not want any aecidents.” '^  ^ Fladmark responded with 
assurances that the park would “continue to screen elimbers as carefully as possible.” 
Highlighting the park’s continued reliance on the judgment of the club to patrol the 
boundaries of rock climbing in the park, the Chief Ranger wrote to Weisner, “We are 
pleased to know of your willingness to take action to discipline incompetent climbers 
who do not follow good mountaineering praetices.”'^ '* This exchange demonstrated the 
park’s dependence on the Sierra Club while also illuminating the club’s growing anxiety 
that it could loose its grasp on the cultural development and technological evolution of 
rock climbing and other reereational activities in the park.
Despite the presence of this user group that administrators and Sierra Club offieials 
regarded as “free lance and very disreputable roek climbers,” aeeidents involving even 
the most highly skilled climbers occurred with surprising frequency. On July 29, 1961, 
experienced Sierra Club rock climber Roger Ulrich suffered severe injuries after a bad 
fall on Higher Cathedral Spire. The difficult rescue involved a number of park personnel 
and a private contracted helicopter to fly resellers to the scene and evacuate the injured 
Ulrich. A few weeks later, Steve Roper, a noted Camp 4 climbing bum and a Sierra Club 
qualified leader, slipped and fell on a patch of ice at the base of an unregistered climb on 
Half Dome while “trying to emulate my alpine heroes, Hermann Buhl and Gaston 
Rebuffat,” as he later recalled.'^* Roper slid almost six hundred feet down a steep, ice-
Carl S. Weisner to Elmer Fladmark, August 29,1961, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
Elmer Fladmark to Carl Weisner, August 31, 1961, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
Steve Roper, “A Lost Time Found: Glen Denny’s Photos o f  Yosemite’s Golden Age,” in Glen 
Denny, Yosemite in the Sixties (Ventura: Patagonia and T. Adler Books, 2007), 29.
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covered slope, suffering “deep bruises and abrasions and contusions of the kidneys.” 
Superintendent Preston reported that Roper and his partner “had inadequate equipment 
and both admitted using very poor judgment.” '^ ^
Though the pair was able to return to the Valley without a rescue, the accident 
indicated that experience, knowledge, and affiliation with the Sierra Club did not negate 
the need for a more sophisticated rescue apparatus. In response to such concerns, Preston 
delegated responsibility for coordinating SAR operations to the district rangers, writing: 
“This is done in view of the wide divergence of visitor use, terrain, and other conditions 
that exist between the various districts.” Preston emphasized annual rescue training 
programs and the need to invest in additional rescue and climbing equipment; yet his 
delegation of rescue duties lacked specific instructions for coordinating communications 
between the various parties within and without the NPS involved in rescues, and as a 
result, only further de-centralized operations.
Changes in the park’s rescue priorities in the 1960s occurred in the context of the 
unprecedented boom in outdoor recreation in the nation’s parks. In 1962, the Outdoor 
Recreation Resources Review Commission, an investigative body convened during 
Dwight Eisenhower’s administration, released Outdoor Recreation for America. The 
report highlighted the profound significance of leisure and outdoor activities in postwar, 
middle class American culture. In the wake of World War II, an “eager Nation,” the 
commission argued, had developed millions of acres of open space into subdivisions, 
highways, and industrial sites while “the resources for outdoor recreation -  shoreline.
Preston, “1961 Annual Mountaineering Report,” Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.
Ibid.
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green acres, open space, and unpolluted waters -  diminished in the face of demands for 
more of everything else.”'^‘' The report found that as incomes rose and automobile travel 
became more accessible between 1951 and 1959, trips to recreation areas skyrocketed 
143 percent while visits to the national parks rose 86 percent. The commission 
concluded that not only were more recreation areas needed, but the nation’s diverse 
socio-economic population required a similarly diverse set of options for recreation. The 
report proposed categorizing recreation zones into six “classes” from open spaces in 
urban areas to reserves of monumental scenery and finally to “primitive areas” in which 
signs of human intervention were minimized.
These recommendations reflected the Park Service’s rethinking of its strained 
recreation facilities during the same period. This renewed emphasis on the increasingly 
diverse recreational demands being placed on the parks was embodied in Mission 66, a 
plan to revitalize the tourist infrastructure of the parks by the NPS’s fiftieth anniversary 
in 1966. Advanced by NPS Director Conrad Wirth, who many feared would sacrifice 
opportunities for primitive recreation to accommodate less-active travelers. Mission 66 
was intended to bring the parks “up to a consistently high standard of preservation, 
staffing and physical development.”'^  ^ The Sierra Club, embroiled its bid to stop the 
proposed Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur Monument, while tentatively supportive of the
Outdoor Recreation Resources and Review Commission (ORRRC), Outdoor Recreation for  
America (Washington D C.: Outdoor Recreation Resources and Review Commission, 1962), 1; For the 
importance o f this argument in the burgeoning environmental movement see Stewart L. Udall, The Quiet 
Crisis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). Udall echoes the argument o f the ORRRC in is 
landmark critique o f the effects o f unrestrained development and progress on the environment.
ORRC, Outdoor Recreation fo r  America, 30, 97.
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plan’s goals early on, rapidly discarded its historic alliance with the Park Service in an 
effort to protect the parks, and Yosemite in particular, from over-development. Ansel 
Adams argued that the NPS should focus on accommodating only those visitors to 
Yosemite “who specifically seek its intrinsic values.” '^  ^ Yet the process of determining 
who possessed the physical and intellectual traits necessary to enjoy nature in Yosemite - 
and what that nature was to look like - remained an elusive goal for both the Sierra Club 
and the Park Service in subsequent years.
Heated debates between the NPS and the newly radicalized Sierra Club over Mission 
66 gave rock climbing, even with its potential hazards and unaffiliated practitioners, the 
appearance of an appropriately physical means to encounter the wilderness, or primitive, 
qualities of the park. While locked in disagreement over road expansions, development 
plans, natural resource management, and the influx of mass-recreation in the parks, both 
the Sierra Club and the NPS remained at least passively supportive of climbing as an 
acceptable activity consistent with the goals of the national park system. A report of the 
1961 Mountaineering and Rescue Conference held in Rocky Mountain National Park 
reiterated the service’s stance on climbing: “It was concluded that our objective must be 
to control, guide and direct the activity by a positive approach rather than to regulate 
against it.” '^ * Rock climbing seemed especially appropriate when viewed in contrast to 
popular, but intensely criticized, resort-style activities such as auto-touring, golf, and 
stays in the luxurious Ahwanee hotel. Efforts to formalize Yosemite’s search and rescue
137 Quoted in Cohen, The History o f  the Sierra Club, 140.
138 ,Department o f the Interior, “Report on Mountaineering and Rescue Conference, Rocky Mountain 
National Park, March 26-29, 1961,” April 19,1962, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957- 
1969, L3423-L48.
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capabilities, while in many respects a reactive countermeasure to rock climbing, also 
functioned as a distinctly proactive sign of support for the growing constituency engaged 
in this particularly dangerous use of the park.
On April 19, 1962, in an incident suggestive of the complex rescue scenarios to come 
if the park maintained an accommodating stance on climbing. Camp 4 regulars Glen 
Denny and John Weichard became stranded in a snow storm after descending from the 
Lost Arrow tip into the notch separating the spire from Yosemite Point (the same 
cavernous slot where Irving Smith had plummeted to his death two years earlier).
Preston, in his monthly report indicated that Denny and Weichard “knew in advance that 
a storm was expected” yet proceeded with the climb nonetheless. Dispatched after calls 
for help could be heard from the cliff face. Ranger Wayne Merry and George Whitmore, 
of the Sierra Club volunteer rescue force, reached Yosemite Point late that night finding 
that while descending, the climbers’ ropes had become “frozen to the cliff.” Merry 
lowered himself into the notch by rappel “entirely in darkness,” joining the stranded 
climbers at 1:30 a.m. The next morning, Whitmore and a force of rangers raised Denny, 
Weichard, and Merry to the Valley rim using a manual winch constructed from two free 
standing pulleys wound with steel cable which the rangers had hauled up the Yosemite 
Falls trail in the early morning hours.
Another incident in September of the following year further exemplified the life and 
death challenges facing the park’s maturing rescue infrastructure. That afternoon, novice 
climber Edward Hsu, belayed by his even less experienced fourteen year old brother, fell
John C. Preston, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for April 1962,” May 9, 1962, 5, Yosemite 
National Park Library; While such devices had been employed by volunteer rescue forces in the Alps since 
the 1940s, this was the first time a rescue force in Yosemite had used a winch to enact a climbing rescue in 
the Valley.
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ninety feet onto a sloping ledge on Cathedral Peak in the high country southeast of 
Tuolomne Meadows. Wayne Merry and ranger John Ward responded to the accident, 
requesting the services of a private contract helicopter. In his account of the rescue 
operation. Merry reealled the delicate handling skills of the chopper pilot: “it was really 
stretching the altitude limits... but he managed it -  [the pilot] put a skid down on the 
edge, and one at a time we cautiously slithered out, eyeballing the drop on either side... I 
remember glancing up at the pilot.. .and I still remember his face -  pale, absolute 
concentration, big beads of sweat on his forehead.” After landing on the precipice, the 
rescue team found Hsu “unconscious and very critical” while his younger brother sat 
paralyzed with fear on a ledge “still belaying the motionless body.” After immobilizing 
the critically injured climber and raising him to the hovering chopper. Merry and Ward 
“managed to secure the basket to the skid tray without dropping it or falling off in the 
process.” The efforts to save Hsu’s life proved futile as Merry later recalled: “I have 
always thought afterward of many ways each operation could have been done better -  but 
this one remains in my mind the only one that was almost picture-perfect. We did 
everything we could - but the patient still died.”'""*
These incidents demonstrated the extent of the National Park Service’s willingness to 
accommodate rock climbing activities despite the delicate margin of error involved. Due 
in part to improved technical capabilities, access to helicopters, and the employment of 
rangers with significant climbing experience, park officials continued to regard climbing 
as a manageable form of recreation in the park. Yet administrators increasingly faced the 
alarming reality that rock climbing in Yosemite had become even more heavily infused
Merry’s account quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 255.
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with risk than in the previous decade. By the mid-1960s, climbers had begun to shun the 
use of fixed ropes and expedition style rock climbs in favor of less conspicuous ascents 
involving only two or three climbers and a minimum selection of gear. In terms of style, 
even inexperienced climbers began emulating breakthrough climbs such as Royal 
Robbins’s ascent of the Salathe Wall on El Capitan in which he, Tom Frost, and Chuck 
Pratt cast off their fixed ropes at the nine hundred foot level making retreat or rescue 
from the remaining two thousand feet all but impossible. Yvon Chouinard credited the 
safety standards making such risks feasible to “the American’s love of safety and security 
and his innate fear of death, which have caused revolutionary innovations in belaying and 
equipment.”'^' Yet the increased security made possible by technical advancements only 
encouraged climbers to take greater risks.
This balancing act with risk gave the most accomplished climbers a fatalistic attitude 
towards the possibility of death. Steve Roper, in an effort to “break the tension” upon 
finding Irving Smith’s desiceated remains in the Lost Arrow Chimney in 1961, shouted to 
his belayer below, “Goddamn it! His parka doesn’t fit me!”'"'^  Jim Bridwell recalled his 
mixed emotions after being asked to carry out the body of Jim Baldwin, a regular Camp 4 
climber that had been killed in a sudden fall from Washington Column in 1965: “From 
the tense faces and reddened eyes of the climbers around me as we lifted him arose a 
sense of deep, abiding brotherhood. Afterward. ..I determined to never let my awareness 
lapse and always remain self-reliant.”'"'^  In his characteristically philosophical tone.
Yvon Chouinard, “Modem Yosemite Climbing,” American Alpine Journal 13, no. 2, issue 37 
(1963): 320.
Roper, Camp 4, 111.
Jim Bridwell, “Bird’s Eye View,” Alpinist 18 (2007).
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Royal Robbins described his thoughts regarding the possibility of “inevitable death” on 
the first ascent of the terrifying North Ameriean Wall on El Capitan in 1965: “Mankind is 
truly insignificant,” he wrote. “Man’s fate...is to have to swallow these truths and still 
live on. If one could only find meaning to make these hard truths of insignificance and 
omnipresent death acceptable. Where to find this meaning? Again the search.. .and we 
climb on.”’"'"' Such attitudes reflected evolving coneeptions of risk and reereation in the 
burgeoning wilderness movement.
Though not immediately applicable to the national parks, the landmark Wilderness 
Act, passed by the United States Congress in 1964, threatened to undermine the National 
Park Service’s long standing autonomy in promoting what it considered to be appropriate 
recreation in its holdings. Incorporating a more sophisticated ecological perspective with 
the older critique of meehanized recreation, Harold Zanhiser of the Wilderness Soeiety, 
the primary drafter of the legislation, argued that eertain tracts of public land, including 
portions of the national parks, were to be preserved as wilderness “untrammeled by man” 
with no roads or other obvious signs of mechanization to mar the natural processes 
shaping the l a n d s c a p e . F o r  the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and other 
increasingly radiealized proponents of “the new eonservation,” this punitive level of 
protection would prevent the Park Service from accommodating forms of mass-recreation 
that eould corrupt both ecological integrity and the psychic effect of an appropriately 
self-reliant engagement with wild nature in as yet undeveloped portions of the parks. The 
act added fuel to a long standing discussion between preservationists, park-goers, and the
Robbins, “Tbe Nortb American Wall,” American Alpine Journal 14, no. 2, issue 39 (1965): 338.
Mark Harvey, Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser and the Path to the Wilderness Act (Seattle: 
University o f Washington Press, 2006), 202-203.
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NPS over the behaviors, technologies, and philosophies constituting an appropriately 
“primitive” form of recreation in wilderness areas.
For many outdoor enthusiasts, roek elimbing fit the model of “primitive recreation” 
newly codified in the Wilderness Act. In subsequent years, through climbing periodicals, 
advertisements for equipment, and guidebooks, elite climbers in Yosemite perpetuated a 
romantic narrative of rock climbing as a transcendent pursuit of calculated risk and an 
opportunity to eome in eloser contact with the “untrammeled” nature that Zahniser had 
refereneed in the Wilderness Act. Yvon Chouinard, for example, in a 1965 article for the 
American Alpine Journal, celebrated his eight day first ascent with T.M. Herbert of the 
Muir Wall on El Capitan as an embodiment of the self-reliant adventure that modem, 
wilderness-oriented climbing techniques enabled:
The new philosophy of climbing is characterized by small expeditions going to remote 
areas and trying new and extremely difficult routes with a minimum of equipment, no 
support parties nor fixed ropes to the ground; living for days and weeks at a time on the 
climb and leaving no signs of their presence behind. This purer form of climbing takes 
more of a eomplete effort, more personal adjustment, and involves more risk, but being 
more idealistie, the rewards are greater.
Chouinard compared this emerging “Yosemite style” to the wanderings of John Muir 
who “used to roam the Sierra for weeks, eating only bread and whatever he could pick off 
the land, sleeping under boulders in only his old army overcoat, and rejoicing with the 
summer storms.” Chouinard further eanonized Muir as a model wilderness elimber who 
“chose to accept nature without trying force himself onto the mountains but rather to live
Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, 1-3, 103.; Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American 
Mind, 4* edition (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2001), 317; Stephen R. Fox, John Muir and His 
Legacy: The American Conservation Movement (Qosiom Little Brown, 1981).
147 Chouinard, “Muir Wall -  El Capitan,” American Alpine Journal 15, no. 1, issue 35 (1961): 46.
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with them, to adjust himself to the rigors of this sort of life.”'"'* For Chouinard and other 
elite climbers engaged in this scripting of history and space in Yosemite, the Valley 
served as a historic point of origin for the technical, philosophical, and environmental 
imperatives in modem rock climbing.
Due in no small part to the commercial activities and literary output of Camp 4 
climbers, by the mid-1960s rock climbing had transformed into a far more democratized 
activity than it had been through the 1950s. With the expanding availability of 
equipment, mountaineering schools, and guidebooks, rock climbing could be pursued not 
only by those initiated into Camp 4’s “elite brotherhood” but also by vacationing 
climbers from other parts of the United States and Europe, as well as neophyte climbers, 
like Edward Hsu, who sought to experience the park in new intimate ways. Climbers in 
Camp 4 became increasingly anxious about their ability to maintain control over these 
changing recreational preferences. In response, Chouinard, Robbins, Roper, and other 
elite climbers deliberately stepped up their involvement in the commercialism driving the 
popularity of climbing. Climbers used their connections to the dynamic commercial 
marketplace to communicate the technological imperative and cultural hierarchies 
embedded in Yosemite climbing to new participants. This did not necessarily represent a 
contradiction in their critique of consumer culture but was instead entirely consistent with 
the evolution of consumer capitalism into the primary framework by which postwar
Ibid.
149 Chouinard, “Modem Yosemite Climbing,” 327.
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Americans communicated cultural and political hierarchies, notions of “the good life,” 
and even standards of environmental responsibility.
Indeed, for these entrepreneurial climbing bums, the growing industry surrounding 
rock climbing and other wilderness activities seemed to provide the most reliable channel 
for communicating standards of appropriate recreation to a disconnected cohort of 
neophyte outdoor enthusiasts. Through advertising and guidebooks, climbers sought to 
establish elass distinctions within climbing culture based on physical skill, technological 
restraint, and an environmental sensibility.'^' Steve Roper’s 1964 Climber’s Guide to the 
Yosemite Valley, for example, with its “inevitable red cover,” included descriptions and 
detailed maps, or “topos,” of more than two hundred climbing routes in the Valley, 
providing an essential tool for those unfamiliar with Yosemite climbing to be initiated 
into its unique chal l enges .Whi le  the guidebook ultimately facilitated an increase in 
climbing activities in the park, Roper made a concerted effort in his introduction to assert 
the cultural hegemony embedded in Yosemite climbing, stressing the strict technological 
standards and humility demanded of visiting climbers:
For the politics and culture of postwar consumption sec Lizabcth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: 
The Politics o f  Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Gary S. Cross, 
An All Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modem America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 200).
Pierre Bourdieu, Richard Nice Translator, Distinction: A Social Critique o f  the Judgment o f  Taste 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 2, 11-12, Bourdieu argues that through “taste” in the 
acquisition o f consumer goods and experiences, a person establishes “distinction” which then serves as an 
indication o f their class. This model accurately captures the dynamic relationship between Camp 4 culture 
and consumer culture in this period.
Quote regarding Roper’s guidebook from Doug Robinson, “Camp 4,” in Ordeal by Piton, Roper, 
ed., 183; For the effect o f guidebooks and the lack o f clear philosophical consensus in the development o f  
climbing as a popular recreational pursuit in the valley see Joseph Taylor III., “Mapping Adventure: A 
Historical Geography o f Yosemite Climbing 'LmdscaçQS," Journal o f  Historical Geography 32 (January 
2006): 190-219.
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Many climbers from out of state have left the Valley with no desire to return. There 
are several reasons for this, and occasionally it is the fault of the outsider himself. No 
matter who he is or how good he is in his own area, if he arrives in Yosemite with even 
a faint trace of arrogance, he is in for an unpleasant time: not only will he not gain the 
respect of the Valley climbers, but it is unlikely he will ever fulfill his ambitious 
climbing schedule.
The romanticism and blatant elitism expounded by entrepreneurial climbing bums 
influenced the standards of practice in rock climbing as it transformed into a mainstream 
recreational activity in the late 1960s.
Elite climbers’ attempts to police the boundaries of the sport also engendered a level 
of competition and hubris in Valley climbing that contributed in no small part to the 
dramatic rise in climbing accidents in the late 1960s. While responses to these accidents 
remained the responsibility of the park’s visitor protection division, independent climbers 
played an increasingly important role in assisting with the more technically demanding 
rescues. Through rescue, climbers forged an unlikely working relationship with the often 
antagonistic ranger force. The first major cooperative effort involving park rangers and 
climbers occurred in June of 1965 when Berkeley “weekender” Pete Spoecker broke his 
leg on a fall from the north face of Sentinel Rock. A relatively easy “warm-up” for elite 
big wall climbers in 1965, the route had been the hardest climb in the United States when 
John Salathe and Alan Steck made the first ascent in 1950.'^ "* Though straightforward in 
comparison to the several new routes on El Capitan, the Sentinel climb remained a 
significant ordeal for less experienced climbers. Lacking sufficient technical knowledge 
or manpower to perform a rescue from this imposing monolith, park rangers recruited
Roper, “Bolts, Publicity, and Sloth,” in Ordeal by Piton, Roper, ed., 120.
For a first-hand description o f the original 1950 ascent see Allen P. Steck, “Ordeal by Piton,” Sierra 
Club Bulletin 36 (May 1951): 1-5.
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four climbers from Camp 4 to secure the victim before they could raise him by winch 
from the face. The effort demonstrated, according to Steve Roper, “that Camp 4 bums 
were good for something.” More importantly, the success of this rescue smoothed over, 
at least temporarily, the tense relationship that had been developing between park 
officials and the Valley’s vagrant climbing community.
A series of events in 1968 solidified cooperative rescue as the linchpin holding 
rangers and climbers in consensus over the continued viability of rock climbing as an 
appropriate, largely unregulated activity within park boundaries. On October 14, a fierce 
snowstorm overwhelmed expert climbers Chuck Pratt and Chris Fredericks high on the 
Dihedral Wall, a difficult route ascending the nearly ledgeless west face of El Capitan. 
From the ground, twenty year old Jim Madsen, an “impulsive fellow” who had arrived on 
the Valley scene two years earlier, determined that the pair was likely suffering from 
hypothermia and in desperate need of rescue. A park helicopter shuttled Madsen, a team 
of Camp 4 climbers, and several rangers to the summit in the early morning hours of the 
fifteenth. With a pack loaded with rescue equipment, Madsen rappelled over the edge 
and out of sight - the last time anyone saw him alive. In the moments that followed, the 
horrified rescue team heard Madsen shout an expletive as he rappelled off the end of the 
rope, plummeting 2,500 feet to his death. Pratt and Fredericks later reported hearing 
“something big whistle past” as they hung in slings huddled against the cold. Finding 
traces of blood on the wall as they made their way to the summit when the weather 
cleared, the climbers hoped it had been a deer or other large mammal that had fallen but
Roper, Camp 4 ,203.
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soon found Madsen’s broken glasses on a ledge, confirming their worst suspicions. 
Ranger Pete Thompson, the park’s first “rescue specialist,” later recalled that “Jim’s 
passing served one enormous purpose... It pushed rescue safety in Yosemite to the 
forefront where it is firmly established.”’^ ^
Madsen’s death, the first fatality on a climbing rescue in the park, alerted climbers 
and park officials to the possibility that despite advanced technologies and increased 
safety standards, the atmosphere of risk permeating the culture of Yosemite rock 
climbing and the ad hoc organization of rescue procedures could lead to horrific tragedies 
involving even the best climbers and rescuers. Within the ranger force, such 
apprehensions had been brewing beneath the surface for some time. In fact, the very day 
before Madsen’s rescue team choppered to the summit of El Capitan, Ranger Steven 
Hickman, the most experienced rescuer in the ranger force, had issued the park’s first 
ever draft plan for organizing a centralized internal visitor protection apparatus. In his 
introductory statement, Hickman expressed concern that search and rescue lacked any 
consistent set of guidelines which volunteer rescuers, rock climbers, and incoming 
rangers could follow. “It is my experience.. .that too often the ‘plan’ for handling such 
priority visitor protection activities has existed only in someone’s head and when they 
transfer out, this knowledge goes with them. It then falls upon the next man to essentially 
start from scratch, benefiting only from his own mistakes and experiences.” '^ * Less than 
twenty-four hours after Hickman handed his memo to the Valley District Ranger, Madsen
156 Ibid., 202-203.; Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 271-272.
1 5 7 ,Pete Thompson to Helen Madsen, July 10, 1973, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1970- 
1975, L3423-L48.Yosemite National Park Archives.
Steven D. Hickman to District Ranger, October 14, 1968, YOSAR office files.
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fell to his death in the midst of an ill-planned and hastily contrived rescue effort, proving 
the ranger’s warning to be strangely prophetic.
Critiquing administrators’ apathy towards centralized rescue, Hickman framed his 
plan with the assertion that “the saving or safe-guarding of human life takes precedence 
over all other Park activities.” The first step towards accomplishing this goal, in 
Hickman’s view, was to clearly delegate responsibility for SAR operations among the 
most capable park personnel. Building on the recommendations in the 1959 NPS 
Mountaineering Policy, he wrote: “The most essential element of planning is a 
recognition of the need for qualified personnel... A team of strong, experienced, and 
well-trained mountaineers is the backbone of any rescue plan, and without these men, no 
plan will succeed.” Establishing a clear management structure for SAR operations, 
Hickman placed the Chief Ranger at the top of the chain of command as “the man in 
charge of the Protection Division.. .responsible to the Superintendent for all Visitor 
Protection activities.” He also designated the Assistant Chief Ranger as the immediate 
supervisor of the various District Rangers who would be responsible for overseeing 
operations within their respective zones of the park.'^^
Hickman stressed that a set of new job duties within the protection division would be 
necessary to formalize rescue procedures. The “Search and Rescue Officer” would 
“supervise the activities of the technical search and rescue team,” maintain rescue 
equipment caches around the park, organize training sessions, issue incident reports, and 
establish communications with outside rescue forces. In addition, the “Field Operation 
Leader” would be in charge of delegating duties as each rescue scenario demanded.
“Mountain Search and Rescue Operations, A Handbook for Protection Personnel,” quoted in 
Hickman, “Search and Rescue Plan, Yosemite National Park,” 1968, YOSAR office files.
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Hickman stressed that this person “must be capable of making sound judgments based on 
experience and a thorough working knowledge of both rock climbing and search and 
rescue techniques and equipment.” A trained rescue team would also be available at all 
times for response to emergencies. The “Primary Team Members,” which Hickman 
envisioned as being composed of rangers, helicopter operators, and fire control forces, 
would “function as the basic operational unit under technically adverse conditions and 
must be capable of carrying a rescue attempt to any extreme necessary if a life is at 
stake.” A “Support Team” consisting of a least six “men” (though women ultimately 
played a significant role) would “provide logistical support and non-technical assistance 
to the primary team.” Hickman also called for the maintenance of open channels of 
communication with members of the Mountain Rescue Association, a newly formed 
nationwide support network of professional and volunteer rescue teams that Yosemite’s 
fledgling rescue force had yet to join.'^°
Up until this point, with the exception of brief references in the Superintendent’s 
Monthly Reports and scattered reports in the press, very little documentation of search 
and rescue operations had been preserved for future reference. To remedy this 
“information” problem, Hickman argued for the mandatory implementation of a 
standardized incident report form detailing what happened, where it happened, when it 
happened, to whom did it happen, and most importantly, why it happened. Compiled 
information would be readily available and easily transmittable to rescue teams in the 
field through improved radio communications capabilities. Hickman also proposed a 
revamping of rescue training for the park’s ranger force. Rangers involved in visitor
160 Hickman, “Search and Rescue Plan.”
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protection operations would receive regular training in rock climbing techniques, seuba 
diving, and helitaek proeedures. The acquisition and maintenance of a readily available 
supply of the most up-to-date rock climbing and rescue equipment would also be a 
neeessity. Emphasizing the need to establish a rescue apparatus capable of enaeting even 
the most difficult climbing rescues, Hickman wrote, “Yosemite should have on hand 
equipment adequate to effeet an evaeuation (from above or below) the middle of.. .El 
Capitan.”'^' The plan served as a clear indication to park administrators that an internally 
managed set of specific rescue procedures would be needed to aeeommodate rapidly 
changing patterns of recreation in the park.
A narrowly averted disaster a month later confirmed the need for the implementation 
of Hickman’s plan and set the stage for the official incorporation of Camp 4 climbers into 
the park’s protection apparatus. After two years and a number of false starts, Warren 
Harding, accompanied by a young Galen Rowell, finally succeeded in ascending past the 
massive overhanging arch donning the otherwise blank two thousand foot south face of 
Half Dome. After six days of painftilly slow climbing, the pair managed to ascend about 
two hundred feet up the slabs above the arch, with Harding leading desperate, holdless 
pitches using “bat hooks,” an aid climbing device of his own design that could be placed 
temporarily in hastily hand-drilled holes too superfieial for bolts. That evening, the 
elimbers hung in a shallow “pothole” from bolts in “bat tents,” another Harding 
innovation which would, in principle, keep the climbers warm and dry even high on a big 
wall in November. From this uncomfortable stance, the pair watehed with guarded
Ibid., 4-7.
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apprehension as clouds streamed into the Little Yosemite Valley below. Rowell 
described what followed:
midnight: awakened by raindrops.. .four a.m.: snowing.. .dawn: everything is 
white.. .our vertieal wall is plastered with a layer of snow.. .as the temperature warms 
we witness a graphie demonstration of how the potholes were formed: they are the 
focal points for the drainage on the upper wall.. .both of us are soaked to the skin.. .we 
puneture holes in the floor of the Bat tents to let out water.. .we shiver and pray for 
sun.'^ ^
For three days Harding and Rowell hung in this tight spot, too cold to move, with 
their ropes and gear frozen in a tangled mass as a series of storms sent torrents of icy 
water rushing through their eramped pothole. On the third day Harding managed to reaeh 
Pete Thompson at ranger headquarters through a sporadically functioning two-way radio, 
which in Harding’s telling “went dead almost immediately after we had transmitted our 
Mayday eall.”'^  ^ That night the climbers listened to a helieopter making passes over the 
wall but remained hunkered down and shivering, believing that a rescue could not be 
performed at night. But soon after, as Rowell recalled, “we hear a strange squawking.. .a 
light is coming down the wall.. .an angel with a radio, down jacket, and headlamp. ..a 
ranger?...ehopper pilot?...no. Royal Robbins.. .guardian angel brings hot soup, dry jaekets, 
gloves, and a lifeline to the s u m m i t . T h o u g h  hypothermic and slightly frostbitten, 
Harding and Rowell managed to jumar to the summit up Robbins’s rope where they were 
soon “ensconced in sleeping bags, sipping brandy in the m o o n l i g h t . H a d  it not been
Galen Rowell, “The South Face o f Half Dome,” Twerzcaw Alpine Journal 17, no. 2, issue 45 
(1971): 266-274.
Chris Jones, “Warren Harding Speaks,” in Ordeal by Piton, Roper, ed., 195.
Rowell, “The South Face o f Half Dome,” 270.
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for the preparedness of Pete Thompson and the ranger force, the availability of a fire 
response helicopter from Sequoia-King Canyon National Park, and the presence of Royal 
Robbins, perhaps the most capable big wall rescuer in the United States, the two elimbers 
would likely have not survived the ordeal.
In 1968, rescue teams enacted fifty three major search and rescue operations in 
Yosemite, amounting to nearly thirty percent of the approximately three hundred total 
incidents over the previous twenty y e a r s . G i v e n  the complexity of many of these 
rescues, the park’s ranger force could no longer rely solely on its own resourcefulness; 
nor could administrators count on the Sierra Club to maintain its commitment to rescue in 
this era of democratized recreation in which most accident victims had no relation 
whatsoever to the club. Moreover, the National Park Service - increasingly under fire 
from old allies in this period - could no longer impose its will in management decisions 
as it had in the days of Mather and Albright. In the adversarial climate of the late 1960s, 
administrators had neither the authority to restrict dangerous activities, or the ability to 
keep up with rapid changes in the culture and practice of rock climbing and other 
wilderness-oriented activities. Facing mounting accidents, administrators began 
exploring alternative courses of action, the most significant being the establishment of an 
internal rescue force staffed with the most capable rock climbers in Yosemite, even if 
these climbing bums-tumed-rescuers had been loitering in Camp 4 in defiance of park 
authorities year after year for months at a time.
Roper, Camp 4, 209.
Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 272-274.
YOSAR, tally o f total rescues from 1948 to August 7, 1967, undated. YOSAR office files.
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The incorporation of independent climbers into the park’s protection division 
indicated more than administrative concern over the technical deficiency of the ranger 
force; it represented a profound shift in the ordering of national park constituencies in the 
age of environmentalism. The Sierra Club, increasingly at odds with the Park Service 
over wilderness designations and development plans, remained conspicuously absent 
from the new arrangements being forged in Camp 4. The club’s growing emphasis on 
broader environmental issues, its distance from changes in Yosemite’s climbing culture, 
and the quiet disappearance of its volunteer rescue force in the late 1960s made room for 
unaffiliated climbers, backpackers, and other visitors to define for themselves how 
recreation should be managed in the park. In the wake of the controversial Mission 66 
and the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Sierra Club, like the Wilderness Society in the interwar 
years, concerned itself with determining what activities should be excluded from a 
national park setting. In contrast, independent climbers and other user groups assumed a 
more active role in defining what recreational behaviors should be included as 
appropriate means to experience wilderness in parks. This pragmatic, visitor-oriented 
view of wilderness as recreational space proved comprehensible to the park-going public 
and conformed to the NFS’s historical mission to provide for the enjoyment of visitors. 
The professionalization of search and rescue through the 1970s became the tool by which 
the National Park Service could accommodate these changing cultural perceptions of 
recreation and wilderness in Yosemite.
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CHAPTER 3
CAMP 4 AND SAR CULTURE 
In November of 1970, Assistant Valley District Ranger Pete Thompson, the park’s 
first “rescue specialist,” prepared a set of policy guidelines for the incorporation of 
independent rock climbers into Yosemite’s visitor protection division. In Thompson’s 
proposal, a group of twenty climbers would have permission to live full time in four 
designated campsites in Camp 4 (and one in Camp 12). The climbers would receive on- 
call wages as emergency hires -  much like the park’s fire response team - on the 
condition that they remain available to perform search and rescue operations when 
needed. Under persistent pressure from Thompson, administrators agreed to formalize 
the arrangement in December of 1970. In the following spring crews erected a circle of 
tent cabins in the northwest comer of the campground where the climbing bums-tumed- 
rescue staff would live for most of the year.’ *^ In subsequent decades, the “rescue site” 
became the epicenter of the rock climbing universe and the point of origin for a number 
of technical procedures and administrative policies that revolutionized modem wildemess 
search and rescue in the national parks.
For years park rangers had called on climbers to assist with technical rescues on and 
around Yosemite’s cliffs, but the official hiring of Camp 4 climbing bums in 1970
Pete Thompson, Assistant Valley District Ranger to Valley District Ranger, “Guidelines: Rescue 
personnel fee waiver system and related phenomena,” December 28, 1970, YOSAR office files.
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represented a signifieant cooperative effort that bound these frequently antagonistic 
constituencies under an official edict to provide for the safety of visitors. Over the course 
of the 1970s and 1980s, incidents of disorderly (often criminal) behavior of climbers 
employed as rescuers persisted as an administrative nightmare for rangers, maintenance 
workers, law enforcement, and concessionaires. In spite of frequent clashes with 
authorities, these rogue park employees became erucial figures in the park’s protection 
apparatus, successfully performing thousands of search, rescue, and recovery operations. 
Rescue site climbers became integral to Yosemite Search and Rescue (YOSAR) -  an 
internal rescue apparatus comprised of rangers, medics, climbers, and helicopter 
operators - innovated a number of rescue technologies, vastly improved the investigatory 
capabilities of the protection division, and devised wholly new methods of pulling 
stranded rock climbers from the vertical walls of the Valley. Over the course of the 
1970s, rescue site climbers became not only the technical experts in condueting climbing- 
related rescues but also cultural liaisons between the centralized authority of the Park 
Service and a younger generation of individualistic Baby Boomers seeking to both 
preserve nature in the park and experience it as wildemess.
Until 1970, park offieials did little to challenge the climbers’ ascendancy in Camp 4. 
At a time when the National Park Service was renovating many of the park’s drive-in 
campgrounds, setting up numbered campsites and aetively discouraging the free-for-all 
auto camping practices of the prewar era. Camp 4 remained a haphazard collection of 
ragged tents and communal picnic tables where rock climbers and other “hard-to-classify 
and vaguely undesirable” visitors could park their cars anywhere and remain for as long 
as they wished. A few attempts by park authorities to instigate seven day camping limits
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went unheeded and easily transgressed by resident climbers who simply left the park for a 
day or secreted into the woods to escape patrolling rangers. Climbers actually gained a 
measure of celebrity status among rangers who, though were often forced to break up 
parties and investigate shoplifting incidents and visitor complaints, largely avoided 
disciplining the unruly Camp 4 crowd. In one instance recounted by Chris Jones, an irate 
camper, after being berated by an intoxicated Warren Harding, summoned a ranger who, 
upon confronting the offending party, smiled and gushed, “Why, you’re Warren Harding, 
I’ve never met you.” The two shook hands and Harding staggered back to the campfire 
where “the party continued into the small hours.
Camp 4’s quaint anti-authoritarianism little prepared the park’s ranger force for the 
widespread cultural upheaval that spilled over into Yosemite in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. As an iconic symbol of wildemess and a counterpoint to the Cold War military- 
industrial complex, Yosemite became a flash point for the anti-establishment fervor 
gripping the nation’s youth culture in this period. Legions of young people congregating 
in San Francisco for the “Summer of Love” invariably made their way to Yosemite where 
they vented their frustration with “the establishment” by rebelling against the patriarchal 
airs of the National Park Service and flaunting the authority of the starched-suited ranger 
force. Dmg use became rampant, even among rock climbers who codified the hedonism 
of the changing times in their choice of names for new climbing routes. In guidebooks, 
this new generation of climbers inscribed hallucinogenic references such as “Tangerine 
Trip,” “Psychedelic Wall,” and “Magic Mushroom” to the now world famous granite 
walls surrounding the Valley. By the early 1970s, the individualistic counterculture, a
Chris Jones, Climbing in North America, second edition (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1997), 261.
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mainstream pop phenomenon since the mid-1960s, had not only filtered into the beat 
intellectualism of the Camp 4 scene, it had also left its mark on the distinctive cultural 
geography of the “Incomparable Valley.”' '^’
In light of the changing cultural composition of visitors, administrators worried that 
their “traditional.. .soft-sell law enforcement policy” had become ineffective in 
maintaining order in the park. In June of 1970, Valley District Ranger James Olsen 
expressed concern that the old system of issuing warnings to offenders before citing them 
indicated “an attitude of weakness to the younger age group frequenting the park at an 
accelerated rate.” As a solution, Olsen suggested a number of changes to law 
enforcement protocol with an emphasis on strict vehicle inspections. He instructed 
rangers to refuse entrance to visitors whose automobiles failed to meet any one of a 
number of obscure requirements in the California Vehicle Code. A visitor could be 
turned back if their vehicle lacked fenders or an appropriate muffler; they could be cited 
if their license plate was not illuminated or their brakes were not adequate, if the vehicle 
had no windshield wipers, or lacked a rear-view mirror on the left side. Visitors could 
even be denied entrance if their car’s center of gravity had been raised or modified “so as 
to unsafely affect its operation or stability.” Olsen also stipulated that hitchhikers were to 
be cited and transported out of the park immediately. Rangers were given the authority to 
cite “out-of-bounds” campers, hikers with unleashed pets, or anyone operating motorized
Stanford Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University o f  Utah Press, 
1991), 130-131; Joseph Taylor III., “Mapping Adventure: A Historical Geography o f Yosemite Climbing 
Landscapes,” Jownja/ o f  Historical Geography 32 (January, 2006): 190-219.
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vehicles on trails. Any failure to comply with these regulations could, and often did, 
result in arrest.'^*
Olsen’s plan to step up law enforcement, while an understandable response to rapid 
increases in crime and overcrowding, had the effect of further aggravating the large 
groups of “hippies” gathering in the park who felt that these measures were directed at 
them specifically. On July 4, 1970, tensions erupted as horse-mounted rangers 
confronted a contingent of approximately six hundred young people who had been 
defiantly camping out and conducting loud, drug infused parties in Stoneman Meadows 
over the holiday weekend. Ill-prepared for a full-scale riot, the over-anxious horse patrol 
charged haphazardly into the crowd. Chaos ensued. Rioters hunkered down behind 
bulwarks constructed from fallen trees and pelted rangers with rocks, bottles, camping 
equipment, and anything else they could find. Rangers were forced to retreat. The 
confrontation then devolved into a tense standoff which lasted for the next two days until 
reinforcements arrived from the Mariposa County Sheriffs Department. Over two 
hundred rioters were arrested in the melee, shattering any illusions that the narrow 
corridor of the Yosemite Valley was or ever could be a true sanctuary from the stresses of 
modernity. As Alfred Runte observes, “even the national parks.. .were not invulnerable 
to urban tensions and social problems.” '^ ^
While Camp 4’s climbing bums had little to do with the Fourth of July riots, park 
officials associated their disheveled appearances, vagrant lifestyles, and casual disregard 
for authority with the countercultural tendencies at the root of this blemish on the
James A. Olsen to District Rangers, June 17, 1970, Yosemite Central Files, Law Enforcement. 
Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wildemess (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1990),
202 .
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administrative history of the park. In an effort to provide stmcture in camping 
accommodations and avoid a repeat of Stoneman Meadows, administrators stepped up 
their “renovation” of Camp 4, a project that had been initiated in fits and starts since a 
flood closed the campground temporarily in the winter of 1969. By the fall of 1970, in 
addition to closing the upper forested part of the campground (the climbers’ favorite 
section) and enforcing length-of-stay limits, park authorities established designated sites 
complete with fire pits and chained down picnic tables, a parking lot, and most 
importantly a fee collection booth. At three dollars a night, the camping fee proved to be 
a strain on resident climbing bums, many of whom had been scraping by in the Valley on 
little or no income for several months out of each year. Even more galling to climbers, 
administrators renamed the campground “Sunnyside,” apparently as a means to erase any 
lingering associations with the Camp 4 climbing bum lifestyle. Royal Robbins famously 
mourned these changes as the end of “laissez faire camping” while another climber 
responded with the simple lament of “freedom lost.”*^  ^ Galen Rowell regarded this 
moment as the closing of a significant era of exploration in the history of climbing. With 
the renovations occurring in Camp 4, Rowell expressed a lament that “the creaking door 
suddenly closed on the Golden Age of Yosemite.”*^"^
This sense of loss seemed counter-intuitive. By 1970, Yvon Chouinard and other 
adamant defenders of the cliquish, laissez faire Yosemite climbing scene of the 1950s and 
1960s had transformed their small-scale entrepreneurial efforts - through which they sold
David Louter, “Application for the Placement of Camp 4 on the National Register o f Historic 
Places,” October 15, 2001, Camp 4 Nomination Documents, Yosemite National Park Library.
Galen Rowell, “An Elegy for Yosemite,” Climbing 1 (May/June 1971); 11-15, 26.; Also see Steve 
Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f  a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994), 211-212.
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homemade gear to each other in order to afford climbing trips - into globally recognized 
names in the manufacture and sales of some of the best climbing equipment on the 
market. By 1970, Chouinard and Tom Frost had turned their garage-operated Chouinard 
Equipment Inc. into the most respeeted brand in the burgeoning climbing industry. Royal 
Robbins even endorsed a brand of climbing boots by the late 1960s. He also published a 
rock climbing manual, Basic Rockcraft, in 1971 and had begun operating his own 
climbing school near Lake Tahoe through which he hoped to educate neophyte climbers 
to appropriate standards of style and risk in climbing.
This participation in the marketplace, which climbers professed to reject, made sense 
when considering Robbins’s efforts to communieate the Yosemite style to new climbers. 
In this era of fragmented markets and disconnected recreational constituencies, the 
commercial marketplace became the most effective means to pass on the technological 
hierarchies, philosophies, and social values of Yosemite climbing to an increasingly 
affluent, mobile, and environmentally-enlightened middle class population seeking new 
means to experience nature in their public lands. For many elite Yosemite elimbers, the 
popularization of their sport seemed inevitable, and only by meshing their corporate 
ideologies with the messages of the burgeoning environmental movement did they 
believe they could maintain a semblance of the adventure and risk they associated with 
the early years of Yosemite’s rock climbing.
Yosemite’s climbing bums-tumed-businessmen little comprehended the enthusiasm 
with which American consumers in the age of environmentalism embraced the elitist 
environmental standards built into the climbing lifestyle. In the context of the social
Royal Robbins, Basic Rockcraft (Glendale: La Siesta Press, 1971).
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upheaval, rampant individualism, and unprecedented affluence of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, middle class Americans found much to support in the seemingly contradictory 
promises of what enviromnental historians have labeled “quality-of-life 
environmentalism.” Inspired by bestselling books including Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring and Stewart Udall’s The Quiet Crisis, concerned citizens organized into local and 
nationwide environmental groups in record numbers to speak out against the destruetive 
consequences of industrial progress. At the same time environmentally-aware Amerieans 
emphatically embraced the technological conveniences, financial security, and high 
standard of living industrialization had made possible. Quality-of-life environmentalists 
desired the benefits of modernity without the destructive environmental consequenees. 
These consumer-environmentalists did not reject modernity but instead proposed a new 
modem experience in which the individual’s opportunity to engage with wild nature 
through recreation remained a fimdamental right.
Keeping with this paradoxical marriage of social responsibility and individual 
gratification, Americans, especially active Baby Boomers with the money to invest in the 
specialized products and the time to learn the rudimentary techniques, regarded the 
wildemess experience to be had by rock climbing, backpacking, or other outdoor pursuits 
as an integral criterion of improved quality of life. The expanding constituency of these 
mcksack-toting park supporters in the 1970s regarded themselves as morally entitled to 
the intensely personalized experience with wild nature celebrated in the wildemess
Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 134-138; Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: 
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movement, and in the commereial activities of Yosemite rock climbers. The tensions 
developing between the notion of individual freedom to experience wildemess and an 
often blatantly elitist sense of social responsibility to eonform to communally policed 
standards of appropriate wildemess appreeiation played out in high relief among the dust, 
boulders, and communal picnic tables of Camp 4.
Contrary to the nostalgia of older elimbers, Yosemite roek climbing underwent a 
renaissance in subsequent deeades as a generation of younger climbers including Jim 
Bridwell, John Long, Ron Kauk, John Bachar, Peter Croft, Lynn Hill, and others put 
down roots in the newly refurbished Surmyside campground. These “yogurt-eating 
health food faddists,” as Royal Robbins labeled them, pushed the boundaries of Valley 
climbing to levels of diffieulty and risk that the “crew cut climbers of the 1950s” eould 
scarcely have imagined. “The terror barriers are down,” Robbins declared in 1970, “the 
big walls not so fearsome.” Not only were the new Yosemite regulars scampering up 
terrifyingly difficult free climbs all over the park, sometimes even without the security of 
ropes, hundreds of unknown climbers from all over the world were completing suceessful, 
lighting-fast ascents of big wall routes that only five years earlier had been the most 
difficult rock climbs ever completed. The buzz that surrounded the Yosemite elimbing 
seene in this period also attraeted thousands of younger neophyte climbers who created 
new recreational expectations for Yosemite and new coneems for veteran Camp 4 
elimbers, the ranger force, and park administrators.’^^
Not surprisingly, the surge in climbing activities brought about a corresponding spike 
in serious accidents. Through cooperative reseues, the NFS hoped to develop a
Royal Robbins, “Yosemite Notes,” Summit 16 (November 1970): 33-34.
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relationship with the climbing community that would facilitate open charmels of 
communication over appropriate standards of risk and safety in climbing. In this sense, 
administrators believed, the creation of the rescue site, in addition to filling a gap in the 
technical capabilities of the ranger force, could also serve as a vital link between park 
authorities and a growing constituency of regular and visiting Yosemite climbers. Still, 
relations remained strained between park rangers and rock climbers, many of whom 
resented the Park Service’s ongoing renovation of Camp 4. In a November 1970 column 
for Summit, a popular California-based climbing periodical. Royal Robbins announced to 
readers the details of the Park Service’s plans to allow twenty climbers to live for free on 
the rescue site. Robbins’s pretense of neutrality did little to mask his underlying sarcasm: 
“This seems a marvelous solution to indigent climber’s problem of camping fees in the 
Valley,” he wrote, “at least for the lucky twenty.” '^ *
While Robbins largely resigned himself to the reality that the “halcyon days” of 
Yosemite rock climbing had run their course, the American Alpine Club (AAC), in an 
attempt to represent a broader constituency of recreational climbers, offered a harsher 
critique of the newly formalized camping arrangements in Camp 4. In a letter to NPS 
Deputy Director Harthon Bill, AAC secretary James McCarthy argued that the service’s 
efforts to “allow the maximum usage by the largest number of the public” by enforcing 
length-of-stay limits in Camp 4 limited opportunities for climbers who often required 
more than seven days to prepare for and complete the Valley’s famous big wall climbs. 
Yosemite, McCarthy noted, had “become something of an international mecca for 
climbers.” Climbers from around the world were zeroing in on the famous Valley which
Robbins, “Yosemite Notes,” 33.
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McCarthy called “a unique area for which the most natural use is climbing.” Unlike the 
Sierra Club, which in the late 1960s increasingly shied away from advocating recreation 
of any sort (indeed the term had become something of a bad word in preservationist 
circles), the AAC had no qualms about advancing a strict recreational hierarchy in which 
rock climbers and other visitors engaging in wilderness-oriented activities deserved 
preferential treatment over the majority of tourists who stayed only for a short time and 
rarely distanced themselves from the roads, hotels, restaurants, and shops lining the 
Valley floor. “I am sure that I don’t have to spell it out for you,” McCarthy wrote to Bill, 
“that to adequately use and acclimatize to the conditions of the Park, it is necessary for 
climbers to spend extended periods of time there.”
In McCarthy’s view, the rescue site did little to mitigate a “series of conflicts between 
climbers and the Park Service” which he perceived as stemming from new camping 
limits and fee collections in the new Sunnyside camp. As a solution to this “sticky 
wicket,” McCarthy proposed organizing a separate climbers’ camp to be administered by 
the Park Service but developed, maintained, and operated by the AAC. “Such an 
arrangement would solve a great many problems,” he explained. “The Superintendent of 
the Park would be released from the burden of constantly policing the campgrounds 
where climbers tend to congregate.” McCarthy further suggested that an “unobtrusive” 
climbers’ campground, closed to the non-climbing public, would be “a great boon to 
American climbers as well as to those foreign climbers who have been attracted to 
Yosemite.” The AAC, assuming a role as the representative body for an increasingly 
disjointed constituency of climbers, sent veteran mountaineer Raffi Bedayn to Yosemite
™ James P. McCarthy to Harthon Bill, June 24, 1971, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1970-1975, L3423-L48.
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to meet with administrators regarding this proposal to provided alternative camping 
arrangements for rock climbers in Camp 4.’*’’
Pete Thompson welcomed the meeting with Bedayn, who had in the 1930s 
participated in a number of groundbreaking climbs in Yosemite and the high Sierra with 
Dave Brower, Richard Leonard, and other Sierra Club rock pioneers. Yet Thompson also 
expressed frustration with McCarthy’s characterization of the strained relationship 
between the NPS and rock climbers in this period. Instead, he insisted that “we are 
enjoying the best climber-Park Service relationship that has ever been.” While agreeing 
that special arrangements should be made for rock climbers not employed on the rescue 
site, Thompson felt that the AAC would not be an appropriate mediator between 
recreational climbers and park officials: “The AAC, an old, very conservative 
organization with but 900 or so members, is not in the best position to knowledgably 
represent 5000 or so long-haired and hip rock climbers,” he concluded.'*’ Thompson’s 
response was indicative of the re-organization of park constituencies in this period. With 
the Sierra Club reluctant to outwardly support its traditional recreational constituents, the 
Wildemess Society and other conservation groups largely preoccupied with natural 
resource protection, and the gentrified AAC increasingly out of touch with the new 
generation of wildemess enthusiasts, the fi-agmented constituency of rock climbers 
passing through Yosemite in this period had little organized representation in forging a 
working relationship with the Park Service.’*^
''"Ibid.
181 Pete Thompson to Superintendent, July 27,1971, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 
1970-1975, L3423-L48.
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Thompson’s tireless campaigning to assert the success of the rescue site, more so than 
any other factor, ultimately gave climbers a voice in park politics. Defiantly referring to 
the renovated Sunnyside as “Camp 4” in correspondence to park authorities, Thompson 
recommended a second overhaul of the camp to render it more suitable for independent 
rock climbers, even those not employed as rescuers. He suggested constructing showers, 
secure lockers, a climber registration booth, and living quarters for “rescue rangers” who 
would anchor the campground and serve as liaisons between climbers and NPS 
administrators. This official “climber’s camp” would be administered as a walk-in only 
site and the number of campsites would be halved. (The current fifty-two sites had 
become “an ecological disaster,” according to Thompson). Thompson also recommended 
lowering the camping fee for climbers and establishing an identification system for 
rescue site hires, who he referred to as “Camp 4 residents.”’*^
Thompson’s efforts proved influential in swaying park administrators anxious to 
explore new avenues of support for park management plans, especially in light of the 
increasingly adversarial position of the Sierra Club and other preservationist groups. For 
the National Park Service, an accommodating stance on rock climbing and other 
wilderness-oriented activities seemed a pragmatic solution to the ever-present problem of 
maintaining the park “in a purely natural state yet available for those who wish to take the 
time and vigor to visit the wonders.” Park Service officials in Washington and the 
majority of visitors through this period for the most part agreed with administrators’
For a critique o f the ineffectiveness o f the AAC in representing climbers from a climber’s point of  
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support for wilderness-oriented forms of recreation, including rock climbing, which did 
not necessitate the large-scale infrastructural development that preservationists in this 
period so adamantly rejected. As a means to accommodate rock climbers, in the spring 
of 1972, administrators agreed to reserve a portion of Camp 4 as a walk-in climbers’ 
campground. Park officials reduced the fee from three dollars a night to fifty cents and 
allowed climbers with plans to undertake multi-day ascents on the big walls of the Valley 
to apply for permission to remain in Camp 4 beyond the seven day limit. Superintendent 
Lyim Thompson, in his annual report for 1972, confidently declared that “this experiment 
worked very well and will be continued.”'*'’
Even as the culture of Camp 4 persisted as a thorn in the side of NPS administrators, 
park officials gradually become more supportive of climbing as an appropriate form of 
recreation in Yosemite. A post-Wildemess Act policy statement described climbing as 
among those activities that could be “accommodated without material alteration or 
disturbance of environmental characteristics or the introduction of undue artificiality into 
a natural environment.” In 1969, the Yosemite Park and Curry Company (YPCC) cited 
the NPS’s recreation policy as rationale for establishing a Yosemite Mountaineering 
School and Guide Service in the park. Emphasizing Yosemite’s history as the birthplace 
of modem American rock climbing techniques, the YPCC argued that a mountaineering 
school would facilitate the communication of the “Yosemite style” to new climbers while 
providing “an opportunity for the park visitor to learn basic backcountry safety 
techniques as well as a chance to enjoy the high mountain environment under the
Lynn H. Thompson, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1972,” January 12,1973, 1, 6, Yosemite 
National Park Library.
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guidance of a trained mountaineer.”’*^  In subsequent years, the ubiquitous “Go Climb a 
Rock” t-shirt worn by participants in the Yosemite mountaineering school indicated that 
the NPS not only tolerated climbing, it also actively promoted the sport as a legitimate 
form of wildemess recreation in the park.
The co-evolution of rock climbing and rescue as integral components of the 
wildemess experience in Yosemite was not without controversy. In the fall of 1970, 
Warren Harding, Camp 4’s resident renegade, once again brought national attention to 
rock climbing in the Yosemite Valley with his audacious ascent of the blank, 
overhanging “Wall of Early Moming Light” on the southeast face of El Capitan.
Preparing for twelve days on the wall, Harding and his partner Dean Caldwell ended up 
bivouacking through a series of storms and nailing bolt ladders up long sections of blank 
granite, reaching the summit after an incredible twenty seven consecutive days. As with 
the earlier ascent of the Nose, the climb gamered attention from tourists, the Park Service, 
and the national media. Attempting to put a stop to the mounting spectacle (though 
inadvertently aggravating it) Park Service officials organized a daring rescue involving a 
contingent of Camp 4 climbers and an Army helicopter. Pete Thompson described his 
reasoning for initiating the rescue, even though it was not clear that Harding and 
Caldwell felt they were in need of assistance: “They had been up for many days longer 
than anyone had ever been on a wall before, their rations should have been critically short, 
and they reported that their feet were numb, their gear got wet when it rained, and that
Yosemite Park and Curry Co., “A Prospectus for Yosemite Mountaineering School and Guide 
Service,” March 16, 1969, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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they were suffering from open sores brought on through lying in wet bags during the first 
big storm. They were ten days overdue and had 1600 feet to go!”’*^
Park officials on the ground had difficulty discerning communications from the 
climbers. Harding had been dropping notes in film canisters indicating that they were 
fine and did not need to be rescued, however, Caldwell had responded to rangers shouting 
through a bullhorn that a rappel to the ground would be impossible and that “we know 
that our asses are in a sling.” Thompson questioned whether this vague reference meant 
that the climbers were indeed in serious trouble or that Caldwell “was merely referring to 
his belay seat.” Thompson concluded that the men were “in unknown psychological 
condition” and, given that forecasters were predicting yet another winter storm, the most 
logical course of action would be to initiate a rescue.’*^
Concerned that weather conditions would prohibit a helicopter from shuttling supplies 
to the summit, Thompson mobilized climbers in Camp 4 to haul supplies to the summit 
on foot. (Climbers were also recruited by film crews to carry news equipment to the 
summit; a task for which they were paid handsomely). In the afternoon of November II, 
after all rescue equipment had been assembled, a would-be rescuer rappelled down to the 
ledge where Harding and Caldwell were bivouacked. To the delight of the news media, 
Harding angrily refused the rescue and determined that he and Caldwell would continue 
climbing the next moming. On the twelfth, the dire weather predietions proved false; the 
sky eleared and “snowplumes blew from the peaks to the east while a great debate raged
Pete Thompson, “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” November 22, 1970, YOSE SAR files, 1970. 
Ibid.
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on the summit,” as Thompson later recalled. Seven days later, the climbers finally 
emerged onto the summit to meet the paparazzi.’**
A photograph of Harding’s grizzled, devilish face coming over the lip on the twenty 
seventh day made a striking image in the national media. The San Francisco Chronicle 
called the climb “a heroic achievement in these days when there is precious little 
adventure to be found anywhere.”’*^  Harding and Caldwell later made the rounds of late 
night talk shows, appearing on the “Merv Griffith Show” and various sports programs 
including an interview with Howard Cosell on the ABC network’s “Wide World of 
Sports.”’ ”^ While Harding and Caldwell were hailed as heroes in the press, the 
conspicuous rescue fiasco revealed the delicate position visitor protection occupied in an 
emerging culture that associated self-reliance and risk with the national park experience. 
Rescue was both a desperately needed component of park management and a potential 
impediment to the national park experience for ambitious park users seeking an 
individualized adventure. Technical rescues could also be distractions for tourists 
seeking quiet contemplation in a natural setting. In subsequent decades, search and 
rescue served as the gauge by which the boundaries of the wildemess experience could be 
drawn and administered by the Park Service.
Further complicating the issue, a number of climbers in Camp 4 objected to Harding’s 
and Caldwell’s eopious use of permanent expansion bolts as an affront to the strict
Ibid.
Quoted in Warren Harding, Downward Bound: A Mad Guide to Rock Climbing (Edgewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1975), 133.
For descriptions o f the ascent see, Harding, “Reflections o f  a Broken Down Climber,” Ascent 1, no. 
5 (July 1971): 32-35.; Royal Robbins, “The El Capitan Climb,” Summit 16 (December 1970): 30-31.
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technological imperative embedded in the Yosemite style. For Royal Robbins, Yvon 
Chouinard, and others, Yosemite’s walls provided an interaction with nature that could be 
all too easily compromised by an over-reliance on technology.’ ’^ If bolts were acceptable 
in all situations, anyone could force their way up any climb with no regard for the 
climbable contours of the rock. This group of climbers, who an embittered Harding later 
labeled “the Valley Christians,” viewed rock climbing in Yosemite as an activity to be 
conducted in solitude through muscular activity and an intellectual appreciation for the 
non-human elements of the landscape: in essence, climbing was to be a wildemess 
experience, accessible only to those with the requisite skills to function within the set of 
strict (yet arbitrary) technological parameters that elite climbers had been devising 
around the picnic tables of Camp 4 for years.
Harding was quick to pounce on the blatant elitism underlying such pronouncements. 
Resurrecting an often-repeated argument of the early Park Service, Harding wrote, 
“Theoretically, the use and preservation of our mountain areas would seem to depend on 
the vote of the masses. How, then, can we expect the support of the average citizen in 
conservation if he is told the mountains are too good for him, that they should be reserved 
for a minority of self-styled “good-guys?”’^  ^ By arguing over the role of technology in 
climbing and the democratization of their sport in the familiar terms of conservation, 
Harding, Robbins, Chouinard, and others exhibited the fundamental connection between 
recreation and popular conceptions of wildemess that persisted into the modem national
Harding, “Reflections o f a Broken Down Climber,” 35; Royal Robbins, “The El Capitan Climb,” 
31.; Allen Steck and Galen Rowell, “Interview with Royal Robbins,” in The Vertical World o f  Yosemite, 
Galen Rowell, ed. (Berkeley: Wildemess Press, 1979), 196-199.
Robbins, Basic Rockcraft, 65.; Yvon Chouinard, “Coonyard Mouths Off,” Ascent 1, no. 6 (June 
1927): 50-52.
Harding, “Reflections o f a Broken-Down Climber,” 34.
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parks movement. Rather than existing as oppositional motives - preservation as an 
altruistic philosophy on a higher plane than use, and recreation as a profane embodiment 
of a corrupting consumer influence -  for administrators, rock climbers, and other park 
enthusiasts, recreation remained the only practical means by which the value of 
preservation could be comprehended. Defining the terms of use - specifically the 
behaviors, philosophies, and technologies constituting appropriate recreation - became 
the focus of rock climbers, wildemess enthusiasts, and national park administrators in this 
period of rising environmental consciousness and skyrocketing participation in 
wildemess-oriented outdoor activities.
As a vehicle for the promotion of an environmentally responsible recreational ethic, 
Chouinard Equipment Inc. embodied an elitist moral economy in the commercial outdoor 
recreation industry. Chouinard and Frost’s 1972 Chouinard Equipment Catalogue 
promoted an elitist formula of physical skill and technological restraint in the outdoor 
experience as prerequisite for participation in rock climbing. In the catalogue, Chouinard 
and Frost struggled to balance the enabling and despoiling potentials of new innovations 
in climbing technology. They recognized both the liberating qualities of technology and 
the ease in which new equipment could be misapplied. In the introduction Chouinard 
expressed the values to be gained by limiting reliance on technology in the climbing 
experience. “The fewer gadgets between the climber and the climb, the greater is the 
chance to attain the desired communication with oneself -  and nature,” he wrote. While 
clearly expressing an aversion to technology as a hindrance to the climbing experience, 
the catalogue was ultimately an advertisement for “gadgets” needed to climb rocks. For 
Chouinard and Frost, the solution to this apparent contradiction lay not in the
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abandonment of technology altogether but through the promotion of new, highly 
specialized equipment that enhanced the physicality of the climbing experience while 
leaving no permanent markings on the rock.’ '^’
Deliberately minimalist in design and oriented towards the most skilled climbers, 
“clean climbing” technology enabled an even closer contact to the climbing landscape. 
Royal Robbins, in a 1967 article for Summit, advocated the use of “nuts,” a British 
innovation from the mid 1960s originally consisting of a typical machine nut attached to a 
sling. As alternatives to pitons, which had to be forcefully pounded into cracks in the 
rock with a hammer, Chouinard’s stoppers and hexentrics, his own iimovation of the 
crude British nuts, could be eased with the fingers into cracks and other contours of the 
rock face without damaging the rock. Although this new equipment could stop falls as 
effectively as pitons, clean climbing technology required a significantly more advanced 
knowledge of the intricate features of the rock.’^^  Climber Doug Robinson, in an essay in 
the 1972 catalogue made it clear that the use of nuts relegated climbing to an activity for 
an elite few: “Pitons have been a great equalizer in American climbing,” he asserted. “By 
liberally using them it was possible to get in over one’s head, and by more liberally using 
them, to get out again. But every climb is not for every climber; the ultimate climbs are 
not democratic.” With its elitist connotations, Robinson’s essay reiterated the social 
hierarchy of Yosemite climbing as an integral aspect of the moral economy developing 
within the specialty outdoor recreation industry.
Yvon Chouinard and Tom Frost, Chouinard Equipment Catalogue (Ventura: Chouinard Equipment, 
Inc., 1972), 3.
195 1’ Royal Robbins, “Nuts to You!” Summit 13, no. 4 (May 1967): 2-7.
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From the Search and Rescue Officer to the Chief Ranger to the Director of the 
Western Region, NPS officials supported the environmental aspects of clean climbing 
and began encouraging climbers to discontinue the use of crack-destroying pitons in favor 
of less-invasive nuts and hexentrics. This communication between the commercial 
climbing industry and the NPS highlighted the shifting constituencies within the national 
parks movement in this period. These efforts also continued beyond the cliquish dialogue 
of climbing. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, backpacking emerged as the most 
popular means to experience wildemess in Yosemite and other national parks. This 
widespread appeal of wildemess recreation signaled to long-time backpackers, leaders in 
the conservation movement, and NPS officials that park goers might “love the wildemess 
to death.” Growing numbers of backcountry hikers were creating havoc in Yosemite and 
other popular destinations; backpackers polluted campsites with trash and human waste; 
they scavenged for firewood in fragile alpine regions where trees were scarce; they 
trampled vegetation; and in many cases they marred the psychic impact of the wildemess 
experience for each other by their mere presence.
In response, administrators in Yosemite implemented a wildemess management plan 
in 1972 which included a mandatory backcountry permit process. Whereas in the 
relatively small climbing community, standards and ethics could be communicated rather 
effectively through advertising and peer pressure, backpacking attracted a far larger 
constituency that did not follow such ethics as uniformly. While limiting the individual 
freedom of wildemess recreation by requiring backcountry users to camp in designated
Doug Robinson, “Tbe Wbole Natural Art o f Protection,” in Cbouinard and Frost, Chouinard 
Equipment Catalogue, 12, 25.
Roderick Nasb, Wildemess and the American Mind.
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sites, avoid campfires, and show permits to patrolling rangers, regulatory policies also 
allowed the NPS to avoid what environmental critic Garret Hardin had called “the 
tragedy of the commons.” If every individual exercised their fi*eedom to maximize their 
personal gain, Hardin argued, they would invariably lessen the utility of the environment 
for all others including themselves since every environment has limits.’ *^ The notion of a 
human “carrying capacity” informed wildemess management policies in the national 
parks and elsewhere through this period, serving as one administrative means to bridge 
the contentious preservation/ use divide in park politics.
Search and rescue functioned as the linchpin holding this together. Given the 
increasing popularity of wildemess-oriented activities and the unprecedented volume of 
complicated and dangerous rescues this trend encouraged, emergency response 
capabilities became ever more critical. In fact, the institutionalization of search and 
rescue became essential to the NPS’s review of potential wildemess areas in the parks as 
stipulated by the 1964 Wildemess Act. The authors of a report for the National Parks 
Centennial Commission in 1973 contended that managing the parks as wildemess would 
present “a completely new set of philosophical problems and arguments on access which 
compound the basic problems of administration.” Basing their analysis on recreation and 
the assumption that “parks are for people,” even considering the wildemess bill’s 
emphasis on limited access and ecological protection, the drafters determined that the 
most problematic administrative issue raised by the implementation of the act would be 
visitor safety and the organization of a search and rescue infrastmcture. The commission
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy o f the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243-1248.
Theodore Catton, National Park, City Playground: Mount Rainier in the Twentieth Century 
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006); John Alan Wagar, The Carrying Capacity o f  Wild Lands 
fo r  Recreation (PhD. diss.: University o f Michigan, 1961), 4.
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observed that “There are those who feel that the Wildemess user goes into the 
backcountry at his own risk and that his safety need not be a concem of the Service nor 
the public at large.” However, as the drafters ultimately concluded, “In our society, the 
safety of a person cannot be ignored. Legally, since the national parks are federal 
property, the National Park Service carmot abdicate its responsibility to protect the 
public.” Accommodation through rescue became the administrative framework through 
which the NPS interpreted new wildemess legislation.^’’’’
The commission argued that the new generation of wildemess users visiting the 
national parks would have to be educated in regards to the safety requirements of 
backcountry travel and other forms of wildemess recreation. However, even with safety 
controls, certification programs, and guide services, the commission found that “a 
manpower rescue system will have to be available to rescue those who have not retumed 
from wildemess areas when scheduled to do so.” ”^’ As a response to the perceived 
dangers of allowing visitors to venture into undeveloped terrain, the creation of a rescue 
force seemed the most pragmatic means for administrators to accommodate wildemess 
recreation. Guide services, registration policies, and education programs did not 
guarantee the safe, responsible behavior of wildemess users; in fact, reliance on such 
policies caused even greater concems by removing safety standards from the exclusive 
control of the NPS and placing it on independent, often untmstworthy visitors. The 
formalization of YOSAR over the course of the 1970s exposed this apprehension and
National Parks Centennial Commission, Preserving a Heritage: Final Report to the President and 
Congress o f  the National Parks Centennial Commission (Washington D.C.: National Park Service, 1973), 
118-121.
Ibid., 120.
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provided the foundation for an accommodating policy towards rock climbing and other 
potentially dangerous forms of wildemess recreation.
Park officials could not conceivably accommodate wildemess recreation, nor could 
they endorse independent climbing and the operation of the mountaineering school 
without the quick-response capabilities of the rescue site hires. In 1972, YOSAR 
responded to 102 documented incidents, a high proportion of which would likely have 
resulted in the death of the victim had the park’s protection division not maintained a 
cadre of physically capable expert climbers in Camp 4. Rescue site hires were, of course, 
most effective in performing climbing rescues which comprised anywhere from fifteen to 
twenty five percent of the total emergencies annually. On September 22, 1972, a team of 
twenty two park rangers and climbers performed an evacuation from the face of El 
Capitan that park Superintendent Lyim Thompson described as “the most spectacular and 
hazardous rescue ever attempted. That moming at sunrise, 600 feet below the rim on 
the Nose route, climber Neal Olsen dislodged an enormous granite boulder which toppled 
backwards, cmshing his right leg badly. Ranger coordinated from above as five rescue 
site climbers rappelled to the ledge where Olsen lay anchored to the wall. Unable to raise 
the injured climber due to the massive overhangs between his position and the summit, 
the rescue team scrambled to obtain enough climbing rope to lower Olsen the daunting 
1,800 feet down to the Valley floor.
Lloyd Price and rescue site hire John Dill began the task of knotting together more 
than 7,000 feet of yachting rope that had been flown in that moming by helicopter fi*om 
San Diego. (An arson fire had recently destroyed the rescue cache where YOSAR had
^  Lynn Thompson, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1972,” 5.
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kept most of its long ropes.) After protecting the exposed knots with water bottles which 
had to be cut and then duct-taped in place along the rope, Dill and Price lowered two 
lengths of 3,000 foot rope to the ledge. Rescue site “guru,” and the best climber in Camp 
4 at that time, Jim Bridwell, accompanied Olsen’s litter as the remaining climbers at the 
accident site lowered them “very delicately.. .through a simple braking system” until they 
reached the ground approximately and hour and a half later. As the longest single rope 
lowering ever completed, the rescue received considerable attention in the media. 
Thompson described the operation as “entirely professional, and carried out with 
expediency despite the fact that it was a step into the u n k n o w n . T h e  climbers 
involved later received a unit award for excellence of service from the Department of 
Interior.^®'' Following this unprecedented rescue, few administrators in positions of 
power questioned the value of maintaining the rescue site in Camp 4, even as the anti­
authoritarian tendencies embedded in the culture of Camp 4 created a persistent human 
resources nightmare for park authorities.
While Thompson had cast the rescue team as “Camp 4 residents,” presumably as a 
way to give legitimacy to the rescue site, these full-time climbers continued to pride 
themselves as “climbing bums” and subverted NFS authority whenever the opportunity 
presented itself. In one instance, Jim Bridwell and a handful of rescue site climbers 
secreted into an unlocked maintenance shed near Camp 4 where, on a Mission 
Impossible-stylQ undertaking, they made off with an extension cord. They then 
“purloined the Park electricity,” running the extension chord from the camp restroom to
Pete Thompson, “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” September 22, 1971, YOSE SAR files, 1971.
Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National 
Parks, revised edition (Lanham: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2005), 305, 306.
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Bridwell’s tent on the rescue site where they “hosted an almost continuous party, playing 
Jimi Hendrix, Bob Dylan, the Rolling Stones.
Bridwell, the ringleader of the rescue site through the 1970s, had arrived in Yosemite 
in 1964 as a wide-eyed seventeen year-old lacking experience or even a pair of proper 
climbing shoes. By 1970, after being taken under the wing of physically gifted climbers 
Layton Kor and Frank Sacherer, Bridwell gained a reputation as the strongest free 
climber in the Valley. Glen Denny described Bridwell’s unusual training regime for 
which he “designed specialized exercise machines that raised climbing performance to 
new heights... His campsite became an outdoor gym,” as Denny recalled. '^^  ^ More than a 
decade younger than Robbins, Chouinard, and other golden age climbers, Bridwell 
bridged the generation gap in Camp 4. He became a mentor for younger climbers in the 
Valley through the early 1970s. Meeting the tanned and toned Bridwell for the first time 
in 1970, a teenaged John Long, who in the next decade made his own significant mark in 
Yosemite climbing, rattled off a list of myths he had picked up around the picnic tables of 
Camp 4: “He told me he'd heard I did sets of a hundred pull-ups, tore three phone books 
in half at once and pulled a stop sign out of cement to throw at a car that wouldn't pick 
me up hitchhiking,” Bridwell recalled.^®^
Such rumors of mythic feats reinforced Bridwell’s stature in Camp 4. With his wild 
curling hair and drooping mustache reminiscent of Dennis Hopper in Easy Rider,
Bridwell set himself apart from the clean-shaven, uniformed rangers who relied on his
Jim Bridwell, “Birds Eye View,” Alpinist 18 (2007).
^  Glen Denny, Yosemite in the Sixties (Ventura: Patagonia and T. Alder Books, 2007), 54.
207 Ibid.
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expertise in hundreds of search, rescue, and recovery operations during his tenure in 
Camp 4. As the central figure of the rescue site - which at that time housed the best 
climbers in Yosemite -  the bell-bottom-clad Bridwell exuded a smug independence that 
was representative of both the rescue site climbers and the parade of Camp 4 transients 
passing through Yosemite in this period. At first, administrators maintained a favorable 
opinion of the rescue site and its “non-traditional” human element. This budding 
relationship with climbers represented a concerted effort on the part of administrators to 
adjust to the changing times and refashion the Park Service with a more contemporary 
image. In 1972, Superintendent Lynn Thompson heralded this effort by announcing that 
the park had hired its first “summer ranger with shoulder length hair.” "^^  Similarly, in an 
attempt to build rapport with climbers in Camp 4, ranger Mead Hargis submitted a letter 
to the editor for a 1973 issue of Summit offering, in the vernacular of the day, to “rap” 
with anyone concerned with camping arrangements in Camp 4 or any other “climbing- 
related happenings in Yosemite.” "^^
These attempts to reach out to the Camp 4 counterculture did little to inspire climbers 
to conform to the strict standards of behavior park authorities expected. In February of 
1974, in response to “a myriad of concerns” from campers, maintenance workers, 
concessionaires, law enforcement officials, and the newly established natural resources 
division. Valley District Ranger James Brady issued a memorandum to all “Camp 4 
users” that park authorities would begin clamping down on vagrancy and misbehavior in 
the walk-in camp. Brady cited a number of problems including out-of bounds camping.
^  Lynn Thompson, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1972,” 3.
^  Mead Hargis, letter to the editor in Summit (December 1973): 33.
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littering, and the doubling up of campsites: “Most distressing was the lack of camping 
manners and environmental sensitivity,” he wrote. “Dirty unattended camps, which 
continually blocked the site for other visitors, misuse of the adjacent service station 
facilities, scarfing in the lodge cafeteria, ‘rip-offs’ within the camp itself, hassles over 
quiet hours, and disorderly conduct complaints were all part of the ‘Camp 4’ scene during 
the past few summers,” according to Brady. As a solution to these persistent problems, 
he proposed, once again, that mandatory camping registration, nightly fees, designated 
sites, and length-of-stay requirements (seven days in the summer and fourteen in the off­
season) would be strictly enforced.^*®
It was also apparent to Brady that the rescue site had become the centerpiece of the 
entire “Camp 4 scene.” Jim Bridwell, Eric Beck, John Long, and other rescue climbers 
had indeed became cultural figureheads for visiting climbers seeking to participate in the 
now world famous Yosemite climbing bum lifestyle. Beck, one of the most notoriously 
impoverished climbers since the mid-1960s, celebrated the transcendent upending of 
class-lines the climbing bum lifestyle represented: “At either end of the social spectrum 
there lies a leisure class,” he remarked. Beck, like most climbers in Camp 4, little 
understood the realities of less voluntary forms of poverty.^** John Long best 
encapsulated the romanticism of Camp 4, writing, “Yosemite is the homeless and the 
brave, gray granite monoliths and Jeffrey Pines, lush meadows and farting tour busses, a 
dime-bag of bunk weed and a twelve pack of Lucky Lager, 10,000 campfires and twice
James Brady to Suimyside “Camp 4” users, re: “Management of Sunnyside Campground,” Febmary 
25, 1974, YOSAR office files.; Brady also published an editorial in Summit repeating many of his concerns 
to the larger elimbing community. James Brady, “Open Letter to Yosemite Climbers,” Summit, 20 (March 
1974): 1.
Jones, Climbing in North America, 330.
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as many tourists.” For rangers, “Camp 4 was the biggest Babylon of rogues in California, 
full of ‘no-counts, grifters, dare-devils, and punks,’” Long wrote, “But had you pasted the 
same punks up on El Capitan, they were dreamers and heroes and even the rangers 
couldn’t argue the fact.” ’^^  Such attitudes generated concern among short-handed 
administrators who had grown increasingly dependent on the manpower and technical 
capabilities of the Camp 4 rescue team.
In comparison to their relative infrequency through the 1960s, serious climbing 
accidents became epidemic by 1973. Out of total of eighty seven search, rescue, or 
recovery operations that year, more than two dozen involved rock climbing or required 
rock climbing techniques to carry out. Of these incidents, an unprecedented eleven had 
resulted in death.^'^ The majority of these tragedies stemmed from carelessness on the 
part of inexperienced rock scramblers or novice technical climbers who ventured onto 
terrain for which they were unprepared. In one instance, a group of four teenagers were 
ascending difficult slabs above Sunnyside Bench when their leader slipped and fell. He 
plunged, “twisting in mid air,” as witnesses later reported, one to two hundred feet down 
to the talus slope below. When rescuers arrived, they found that the victim had suffered 
multiple fractures and massive internal trauma. With the severity of these injuries, the 
rescue team was unable to save the young man’s life. Pete Thompson called the incident 
“a ridiculous death” upon discovering that the group apparently “had a clothesline along, 
but they were not even using that!”^'‘^
212 John Long, “Back Then,” Rock and Ice 46 (November/December 1991): 16.
John Long, letter to the editor in Summit (December 1973): 32.
Pete Thompson and Ralph A. Robinson, “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” July 16, 1973, 
YOSE SAR files, 1973.
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Even “respectable and fairly experienced” climbers were not immune to poor 
judgment. In an article for Summit in June of 1973, Thompson described, in detail, four 
climbing deaths that had occurred within a span of only a few weeks. In one instance a 
climber had drowned while attempting to cross a swollen Bridalveil Creek after 
completing a nearby climb. Two climbers died from falls after failing to set proper 
rappel anchors. A fourth died on a foolish solo climb of the Steck-Salathe route on 
Sentinel Rock when he relied on a fragile 3/8 inch rope tied into his primary line to stop a 
fall. He fell, and the knot “burned through” the rope, sending the nineteen year old 
plummeting over one thousand feet to his death on the ledges at the base of the cliff. In 
light of these mishaps, Thompson implored climbers to be “good mountaineers.. .who 
know their limitations, and the technical, designed, limitations of their equipment.” 
Despite warning signs, he had little confidence that such accidents would taper off.
“When will these absurd, outrageous, and mind boggling wastes of lives cease?” he asked. 
Directly addressing the cost of continuing to accommodate climbing and other dangerous 
activities, Thompson answered his own question: “Obviously, never. Their frequency 
may just be a function of numbers. Camp IV this spring is full of inexperienced, ill 
prepared, or rankly unqualified, overly ego-involved people with huge aspirations. By 
anyone’s measuring stick, these past few weeks have been the grimmest in Yosemite’s 
rock climbing history.”^ T h o m p so n ’s previous optimism and his perception of the 
rescue site as the saving grace of wilderness recreation in Yosemite became tempered by 
a recognition that the popularity of climbing and other dangerous activities threatened to 
overwhelm even the advanced capabilities of YOSAR.
Pete Thompson, “Tragedies in Yosemite Valley,” Summit 19 (June 1973): 1-2.
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Yet administrators expressed no intention to actively restrict rock climbing or any 
other potentially hazardous, wilderness-oriented activities. Partly in response to pressure 
from user groups, yet also due to the fact that these activities were widely considered to 
be historieally appropriate uses of the park, administrators maintained a positive approaeh 
towards rising participation in rock climbing, backpacking, and other activities. In 
eorrespondenee to the associate director of the National Park Service in 1970, 
Superintendent Lawrenee Hadley celebrated the park’s elimbing possibilities, writing, 
“The great walls are perhaps without equal anywhere for the several types of challenges 
offered.”^ L a te r  that year Valley District Ranger Olsen stated that administrators would 
be “heartily in favor o f’ a proposal by the British Broadcasting Corporation to televise a 
climb of El Capitan by live satellite to Europe. In 1974, in a controversial move 
purportedly related to the Park Service’s eoncessions contract with MCA, administrators 
allowed a Hollywood film erew to tape a television drama, titled “Sierra,” within the park. 
Advertised as a story of rangers dealing with “the eonfliet between trying to preserve the 
natural beauty of the wilderness and aecommodating the flood of tourists wanting to 
utilize the resources of the park,” the short-lived series glamorized the altruism of rescue 
rangers and romanticized the feats of elimbers.^*^ YOSAR functioned as a psychie 
safeguard allowing administrators to maintain this aceommodating approaeh towards 
rock climbing, despite the troubling increase in aeeidents and the fragile eonsensus 
between park rangers and Camp 4 rescue site climbers.
Superintendent, Yosemite to Associate Director Jensen, re: “Yosemite Rock Climbing,” January 8, 
1970, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1970-1975, L3423-L48.
Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 312-313.
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1974, in an effort to professionalize the rescue site climbers and mold them into 
functional representatives of the Park Serviee, ranger Mead Hargis and Anthony 
Anderson, the first full-time search and rescue officer in the park, eompiled a set of 
requirements for the hiring of rescue site employees. In light of the disconcerting number 
of serious accidents and deaths in the previous year, Hargis recognized that the Camp 4 
site served a vital funetion in providing for visitor safety. For one, a high turnover rate in 
the ranger force made it diffieult for distriet rangers to maintain an adequately trained 
reseue foree. Also, rangers trained in search and rescue techniques were often burdened 
with other duties that limited their ability to respond to emergencies. In order to address 
rescue site climbers’ problematie disregard for authority, Hargis stressed that “when 
vietims, reseuers, and rangers lives are at stake,” no member of park’s protection division 
should “participate because of monetary considerations, ego whims, political or social 
cliques.” '^* With this hiring plan, rangers and park administrators hoped to eultivate a 
more professional SAR culture in Camp 4 that would temper the countercultural 
tendencies of the Yosemite elimbing scene.
Hargis and Anderson determined that the most eritieal qualification for an effective 
member of the rescue site should be their capacity to “avoid conflicts” and “deal with 
National Park Serviee policies and personnel.” Of eourse, rescue site climbers were also 
to demonstrate good judgment, advanced elimbing skills, and a “desire to learn rescue 
techniques.” Rescuers would be required to posses knowledge of Yosemite’s complex 
terrain, first aid experience, a willingness to attend regular training sessions, and the 
ability to “keep and orderly, neat, and clean campsite.” Rescue site climbers were also to
Mead Hargis to Search and Rescue Officer and Valley District Ranger, re: “Rescue Team,” March 
20, 1974, YOSAR office files.
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“obey all Park rules and regulations” and be capable, as representatives of the NPS, of 
setting “an example of good eamp maimers.”^’^
Yet while the YOSAR team eontinued to improve upon SAR techniques through the 
1970s and early 1980s, the rescue site climbers remained a constant personnel headache 
for administrators. In January of 1977, Joe Windsor, the chief of campground 
maintenance, proposed closing Camp 4 and the rescue site for the winter to facilitate 
“better and more efficient management.” Windsor expressed frustration that the rescue 
site climbers had failed to assume any responsibilities for maintaining order in the 
sprawling camp. In fact, Windsor observed that the rescue site climbers seemed to be 
“leading the vandalism and misuse of the area facilities.”^^*’
Windsor had reason to complain. In addition to dealing with disappearing electric 
cables, filthy campsites, and blatant, pervasive drug use, his maintenance staff faced a 
host of other minor but persistent problems in Camp 4. Shelves in the bathroom were 
being ripped off and used as firewood; fire pits were being dismantled and moved to 
other areas in the eamp; someone had been cutting the chain-anchors on picnic tables and 
moving them around the campground and into the rescue site; the rescue site sign had 
been “chipped away on its top and side...as though somebody spent their idle time 
banging away on the post;” eampsite posts had been pulled out of the ground and turned 
upside down so that the numbers could not be seen; and the collapsible stanchions placed 
at the entrance to the parking lot to prevent unauthorized vehicles from entering had been
Anthony Anderson to Valley and Mather District Rangers through the Acting Chief Ranger, re: 
“Rescue sites in Camp 4 and Tuolumne Meadows,” May 30, 1974, YOSAR office files.
^  Joe Windsor to Chief Ranger, re: “Sunnyside Campground management,” January 6, 1977, YOSAR 
office files.
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destroyed and then stolen/^ ^ Windsor recommended that if the rescue site hires eould 
not “follow established rules, regulations, and policies that the present courtesies 
extended to this group be discontinued.”^^ ^
In response to such complaints, Superintendent Leslie Amberger requested that the 
Chief Ranger and other protection staff “tidy up and ‘regularize’ the management of the 
climbers’ sites at Sunnyside Campground.” Chief Ranger Charles Wendt then wrote to 
Tim Setnicka, Anthony Anderson’s replacement as the search and rescue officer, 
charging him to clean up the “general disarray and mess” surrounding the rescue site. If 
these problems could not be resolved, Wendt voiced concern that “the whole eoneept of 
the elimbing site and its value of liaison between the climbing community and the 
National Park Service is at stake.” Considering the necessity of the reseue site in 
ensuring visitor protection, such a possibility remained for Wendt, “a position which I do 
not want to take.”^^  ^ Valley Distriet Ranger James Brady agreed and called on shift 
supervisors to “police and enforce the regulations” in order to “see that climbers do a 
better job all year round.” Administrators ultimately determined that the rescue site could 
not be disbanded; instead, individual perpetrators would be singled out, dismissed from 
the climbers’ camp, and replaced by any number of qualified Yosemite roek climbers 
hoping to be employed through YOSAR.^^^
Joe Windsor, re: “Sunnyside Campground,” January 3, 1977, YOSAR office files.
^  Windsor to Chief Ranger, re: “Sunnyside Campground management.”
^  Charles Wendt to Search and Rescue Officer, re: “climbing site,” February 11, 1977, YOSAR office 
files.
^  Valley District Ranger to Shift Supervisors, undated, YOSAR office files.
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Such a policy proved easier said than done. As the global epicenter of a burgeoning 
rock climbing culture by the mid-1970s, Camp 4 had sprawled well beyond its already 
impossible-to-regulate boundaries. In the busiest times, this nomadic “shantytown” 
spilled over into the parking lot of the nearby Yosemite Lodge where “crusty, dust- 
covered” climbers milled around, frightening “tidy Bermuda clad tourists.” The 
sprawling encampment had become what one journalist described as “a refugee camp for 
survivalists.” During the long days from early spring until late fall, countless dilapidated 
tents, dispersed at random throughout the camp with no regard for designated sites, 
fluttered in the breeze; spare climbing gear lay in haphazard piles throughout the 
campground; and food containers and laundry hung on crisscrossing lines through the 
trees, weaving “a colorful thread through the dreary camp.” By dusk, the resident 
climbers, draped with pitons, carabiners, and other tools of the trade, returned in 
“clanking hordes” from the vertical walls of the Valley. Once settled in and relieved of 
their heavy equipment, climbers separated into cliques, transforming the slum into 
raucous '"‘'Animal House al-fresco.” “Camp 4 is a very romantic, anarchistic kind of 
place,” one climber explained, “at night everyone sits around the fire telling stories and 
getting high.” Rangers, law enforcement, and other authorities could do little to restrain 
the sprawling encampment. “The climbers aren’t going to leave,” Camp 4 regular Phil 
Bard observed, “this place is too important to them.”^^ ^
Indeed, to the frustration of administrators responsible for overseeing the 
formalization of rescue procedures in this period, replacements for troublesome rescue 
site hires were invariably drawn from the same pool of Camp 4 miscreants. In spite of
^  All quotes from Ryan Garcia, “Danger in High Places,” Focus (April 1981): 33-36.
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administrators’ drafting of a series of management proposals designed to “change the 
overall atmosphere and acceptance of responsibility by site members,” personnel 
problems continued well into the 1980s?^^ True to their word, park authorities were 
quick to discharge any rescue site climbers who exhibited signs of unprofessionalism.
Site veteran Russ Walling recalled a number of dismissals including one climber who 
was sent packing after showing graphic pictures of “some very expired humans” to 
reporters for Playboy Magazine. Another climber lost his rescue site privileges after 
overdosing on PCP and nearly dying before an ambulance evacuated him from Camp 4. 
And it was “Paradise Lost for yet another Site member” after authorities discovered that 
he had posed for pictures “in mock frozen form” alongside two deceased climbers whose 
bodies had been recovered from the face of El Capitan.^^^
Law enforcement officials were called in on numerous occasions to handle complaints 
from visitors, concessionaires, and rangers over the criminal behavior of some rescue site 
employees. Rescue site climbers in this period were arrested for a myriad of offenses 
including illegal camping, slashing tires, public intoxication, and even the cultivation of 
marijuana in the dense, boulder-strewn forest behind Camp In one instance a well- 
known rescue site climber, who had previously been disciplined for public drunkenness, 
was detained and charged with sexual harassment after numerous reports surfaced that he 
had been harassing a female ranger over an extended period of time. The incident report 
described the perpetrator’s actions in the Mountain Room Bar at the Yosemite Lodge -
YOSAR, “Rescue Site Guidelines -  Draft 9/1/82,” September 1, 1982, YOSAR office files.
Walling, “Death Valley Days,” 50-51.
^  “Hugh” to Bob Howard, SAR Officer, re: “Standards o f SAR Site Personnel,” January 3, 1988, 
YOSAR office files.
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including staring at the woman while licking his lips and making inappropriate gestures 
involving a cactus plant - as behavior “contrary to the image that has been established by 
the Chief Ranger for members of his division.”^^ ^
While the culture of the Camp 4 rescue site remained problematic for NPS 
administrators, rarely did misbehavior, criminal or otherwise, interfere with the rescue 
climbers’ stipulated responsibility to respond quickly and efficiently to accidents in the 
park, particularly those involving other climbers. An incident on May 23, 1977 
demonstrated to rescue site hires that, at the potential cost of their own lives and the lives 
of others, the anarchistic, anti-establishment lifestyle of Camp 4 could not be allowed to 
interfere with what had become a professional responsibility. At three in the morning, 
rangers assembled a rescue team in Camp 4 to respond to two climbers calling for help 
fi'om an easy climb near Upper Yosemite Falls. Jack Dorn, an experienced rescue site 
climber (and among those who allegedly profited from the Dope Lake scheme), followed 
the team up the well-worn Upper Yosemite Falls trail. In a moment of inattention, 
possibly because he had been “listening to tunes on his portable tape cassette” or because 
he “had partied too long” or “climbed too hard,” Dorn missed a turn on the trail and 
stumbled over a cliff, falling six hundred feet to his death on the rocks below. Much like 
Jim Madsen’s death nearly a decade earlier, the suddenness of Dorn’s accident shocked 
Yosemite’s visitor protection staff. His death produced an atmosphere of consensus 
among rangers and rescue climbers who agreed that a strict formalization of the 
procedures YOSAR had innovated over the previous decade would be needed to maintain 
a high standard of performance, especially as the number of emergencies requiring
Susan Clark, “Supplemental Criminal Incident Report,” October 21,1987, YOSAR office files.; 
Bill Blake to “Files,” August 30, 1987, YOSAR office files.
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organized rescue continued to mount. In subsequent years, the countercultural cliques of 
Camp 4 blended with the administrative pragmatism of the NPS to create a distinct SAR 
culture in Yosemite that revolutionized rescue in the parks.
Three years after Jack Dorn’s accident. Search and Rescue Officer Tim Setnicka 
completed Wilderness Search and Rescue, a detailed and often entertaining account of 
the techniques, technologies, and procedures YOSAR had developed or adapted over the 
previous decade. The work represented the culmination of the cultural and technical 
evolution of visitor protection in Yosemite, becoming the “SAR bible” for mountain 
rescue outfits around the nation for years to come.^ *^^  With the release of Wilderness 
Search and Rescue, YOSAR came of age; it became a professional organization, 
coordinated through a web of cooperative arrangements with not only Camp 4 rock 
climbers but also local law enforcement, medical technicians, helicopter pilots, and 
military personnel. YOSAR’s full time staff of SAR experts and climbers including Pete 
Thompson, Butch Farabee, Tim Setnicka, and former rescue site hire John Dill had both 
the practiced expertise and the technological capabilities to respond to emergencies in 
Yosemite’s diversity of terrains with a speed and efficiency unparalleled in any national 
park. By the early 1980s, YOSAR’s depth of talent, technological sophistication, and 
adaptability rivaled even the staid rescue outfits that had been operating in the European 
Alps since the late nineteenth century.
In Wilderness Search and Rescue, Setnicka presented SAR as “a problem of 
transportation” with the primary goal being “eliminating the victim’s isolation.
^  Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 341.
Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 34.
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Though grounded in a highly complex system of technical equipment and the specialized 
knowledge of how to use it, Setnicka stressed that effective wilderness search and rescue 
derived from the basic survival techniques that had governed travel in mountainous 
regions since the beginning of human history. “This direct, modular approach,” he wrote, 
“is a step back from the rush toward a vast quantity of technological wizardry that often 
floods our lives with complicated systems for attaining rather simple goals.”^^ ^
Setnicka’s approach struck a balance between technology and wilderness use that 
characterized cultural perceptions of appropriate recreation through this period. For the 
Park Service, Setnicka’s technological imperative rationalized the blending of 
preservation and use in administrative policy; his modular approach posited a pragmatic 
means, as historian Leo Marx would argue, to seamlessly incorporate the “machine” of 
modem technological search and rescue into Yosemite’s “garden” wilderness as 
efficiently and inconspicuously as possible.^^^
Setnicka’s “soft path” for conducting SAR operations emphasized planning at the 
local level. He maintained that search and rescue procedures should be directed by the 
individuals most familiar with the terrain, weather conditions, and types of accidents 
particular to the specified locale. In Yosemite, this meant that rangers and rock climbers 
would continue to be the most qualified to determine how, when, and with what 
technologies the park’s search and rescue apparatus should respond to any given 
emergency. Though Setnicka insisted that SAR procedures should remain as simple as 
possible, the YOSAR team had at its disposal the most sophisticated arsenal of rescue
^^Ibid., viii.
Leo Marx, The Machine in the Gar den: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), 23.
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technologies ever assembled under one mountain search and rescue outfit. By the late 
1970s, YOSAR was either equipped with or had access to a staggering array of rigging 
systems, climbing devices, field medical equipment, communications systems, tracking 
technologies, high-powered spotlights, transportation devices, swift water rescue gear, 
and other emergency response paraphernalia. As emergencies became more prevalent, 
Yosemite’s localized outfit could call on an expanding regional network of military 
installations and volunteer rescue groups to provide additional resources for visitor 
protection needs in the park. This coordinated effort, which Setnicka explained as “a 
highly regionalized response to growing local problems,” became the hallmark of modem 
wildemess search and rescue in the national parks.
Helicopters brought the most significant changes to Yosemite’s search and rescue 
network. From the mid-1960s until 2004, the NPS maintained a working relationship 
with a rescue outfit at Lemoore Naval Air Station about thirty miles south of Fresno. 
Through the 1960s, the Navy employed a handful of UH-34 “Seahorse” crafts which had 
considerable difficulty operating at high elevations. These small airships were typically 
too dangerous for use in high mountain rescues. However, in 1970, Lemoore transitioned 
to the HH-IN “Huey” which could operate at altitudes up to 15,000 feet. In subsequent 
years, YOSAR developed personal relationships with a number of Lemoore pilots, most 
of whom veterans of the Vietnam conflict. The Lemoore “Rescue Angels” participated in 
at least 950 SAR operations throughout the Sierra Nevada range including hundreds of
^  Setnicka, Wildemess Search and Rescue, 29.
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missions in Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Parks before the Navy 
terminated the helicopter response unit in 2004/^^
Lemoore’s airships could be used to search vast areas for lost hikers, covering more 
ground at a much faster rate than searchers on foot or horseback. Helicopters could 
extract an injured person from an isolated location and transport him or her to a medical 
facility, often within minutes. Chopper pilots could rapidly shuttle additional rescuers 
and supplies to remote locales to supplement the efforts of ground crews. Helicopters 
also became critical tools in performing difficult climbing rescues. In the mid-1970s, 
rescue pilots at Lemoore devised a helicopter rescue technique known as “cliff evolution” 
which allowed YOSAR an efficient but risky option for pulling critically injured climbers 
from high on Yosemite’s big walls. The technique involved lowering a rescuer from the 
helicopter as the pilot hovered in a fixed position, often dangerously close to the cliff face. 
Dangling below, the rescuer would work to secure the victim to his or her own harness 
after which the pilot would transport both the victim and the rescuer, still suspended 
beneath the craft, to a safe landing zone.^^^
Lemoore crews employed this technique for the first time in May of 1978 after a 
climber suffered severe head trauma in a fall from a difficult big wall route on Quarter 
Dome near Half Dome. YOSAR immediately called in Lemoore pilots John Sullivan and 
Don Swain to assist in the evacuation. The rescue crew, which included YOSAR 
permanent staff, park rangers, rescue site climbers, and the Lemoore pilots, concluded 
that a standard cliff rescue, in which a team of climbers would be lowered from the
Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., Off the Wall: Death in Yosemite 
(Flagstaff; Puma Press, 2007), 322.
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 396.
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summit to immobilize then raise the injured climber, would take too long since darkness 
threatened to delay the evacuation until the next morning. So, Butch Farabee, Yosemite’s 
search and rescue officer at the time, gave the Lemoore crew permission to attempt the 
difficult cliff evolution before nightfall.
Within minutes Sullivan and Swain found a position from which they could hover 
while Crew Chief Benny Revels prepared to be lowered three hundred feet from the 
helicopter to the injured climber. Revels backed out of the craft and immediately began 
spinning in space as another crewman carefully lowered him into position. Meanwhile, 
Sullivan eased the whirling rotary blades to within six feet of the granite wall, where he 
maintained his hover while Revels struggled to secure the semi-conscious victim.
Setnicka described the anxious moments that followed: “Sullivan could feel the sweat 
running down the inside of his flight suite. After twenty minutes of hovering, he felt his 
arms and back tense up fi'om the tension of constantly working the controls.” Revels had 
difficulties of his own. After several moments of “twisting around” trying to reach the 
rock, he finally managed to clip the injured climber’s harness to his own and cut the 
ropes attaching them to the wall. “The victim was barely conscious and kept sporadically 
fighting him,” Setnicka wrote, “Continuous bleeding all over Revel’s hands made it 
difficult to determine what his injuries were.” Finally, rescuer and victim swung free 
from the wall; Sullivan deftly anticipated the redirection of weight and five minutes later. 
Revels and the injured climber settled down in Ahwahnee Meadows. An ambulance 
rushed the victim to a local clinic where doctors prepared him to be transported to a 
hospital outside the park for “immediate surgery to relive the pressure on his brain.” The
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entire mission took less than an hour and if not for the speed and proficiency of the 
Lemoore crew the victim would not have survived/^^
Despite the obvious utility of helicopters, Setnicka stressed that it would be a mistake 
to consider air evacuations a panacea for all search and rescue operations. Helicopters 
were to be considered one of many components of an overall SAR plan; without a “Plan 
B,” he argued, an effective rescue outfit would be severely limited in its ability to deal 
with intangibles and effectively carry-out “each phase of the rescue operation.” 
Helicopters were fallible technologies, subject to mechanical breakdowns or pilot error 
and ineffective in poor weather conditions or darkness. During a body recovery on June 
15, 1975, for instance, a Lemoore Huey stalled while lifting off. The chopper pitched left 
and the rotary blades chopped into a live oak tree before the skids hit and the entire craft 
rolled down a rocky slope. The crew managed to escape, but soon after, the wreckage 
burst into flames, charring the victim’s remains and burning the $1.2 million airship to a 
pile of twisted metal and ash.^^* Considering this event, Setnicka concluded: “We 
therefore want to stay helicopter independent in SAR planning and thinking, in spite of 
the seductiveness of constant reliance on helo support.”^^ ^
Setnicka further argued that basic backcountry skills and rock climbing techniques 
remained the foundational components of SAR operations in Yosemite. His elaboration 
on a modular SAR structure established the model used in subsequent decades by rescue 
organizations in wildemess destinations around the globe. “By relying on conventional
Ibid., 397-396.
238
239
Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 317; Ghiglieri and Farabee, Death in Yosemite, 340-343. 
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 401.
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equipment,” contributing editor Kenneth Andrasko wrote, “the Yosemite SAR crew has a 
vast manpower pool available in the climbers that frequent the Valley. Training of 
support personnel is minimized, and roles become fairly interchangeable.” '^^ ® This 
structured approach allowed YOSAR to adapt technologies and procedures to what John 
Dill called a “matrix” of emergency scenarios. '^^* By coordinating missions based on the 
judgment and skill of the individuals most attuned to wildemess travel, YOSAR could 
adjust techniques to the particular combinations of terrain, season, weather, medical 
necessity, and type of emergency that each search, rescue, or recovery operation involved. 
Yet, even as administrators gradually resolved the cultural conflicts that marred the 
professionalization of YOSAR through the 1970s, a host of new administrative concems 
related to the high costs of rescue, the legal liability of the NPS, and the philosophical 
function of search and rescue changed the way in which visitors to Yosemite engaged in 
their respective wildemess experiences.
^  Andrasko, “Editor’s note,” in Setnicka, Wildemess Search and Rescue, vi.
The concept o f a SAR “matrix” comes from a conversation with John Dill, March 2007.
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CHAPTER 4 
WHO PAYS?
On July 19, 1978, Susan Cunningham, eight months pregnant with her first child, 
reported to rangers that her husband David Cunningham had failed to return from a three 
day solo backpack trip along the Illiouette Creek drainage in the southwest comer of the 
park. The couple had been camped at Bridalveil Campground when Cunningham 
decided to embark on his spontaneous excursion. Before departing from Glacier Point, 
Cunningham informed his wife that he would meet her three days later at Housekeeping 
Camp - he never arrived. On the aftemoon of the nineteenth, as Butch Farabee and 
Michael Ghiglieri detail, Susan Cunningham’s “imagination painted mishap after 
potential mishap that may have left her husband stranded somewhere off-trail and injured, 
perhaps trapped, and now desperately in need of rescue.” '^'^  Cunningham worriedly 
explained to ranger Craig Stewart that on July 15 she had driven her husband to the 
trailhead and watched him depart down the Illiouette Trail at approximately 9:00 a.m. 
Ranger Stewart determined that since David Cunningham was more than twenty four 
hours overdue, a search was warranted. The next moming, rangers Mead Hargis and Pete 
Hart conducted a two-hour helicopter search of the area. Finding no clues, YOSAR
Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., Off the Wall: Death in Yosemite 
(Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2007), 445.
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initiated what would become the most extensive, frustrating, and expensive search 
operation conducted to date in Yosemite. '^*®
Searches for lost or overdue hikers have historically cost the National Park Service 
more money, time, and effort than any other SAR o p e ra tio n sW h ile  big wall climbing 
rescues typically involved extreme levels of technical difficulty and risk, backcountry 
searches frequently required hundreds of searchers, complex investigative work, and 
thousands of hours of billable time for rescue workers and contract helicopters. As such, 
large-scale searches, in addition to climbing rescues, have been instrumental in initiating 
administrative dialogue over the organization, planning, and especially the funding of 
SAR procedures in Yosemite. The search for David Cunningham, though unusual in its 
outcome, highlighted the administrative challenges the Park Service faced in continuing 
to maintain a technologically proficient, professional search and rescue apparatus 
provided free of charge to the visiting public.
YOSAR operators began their full scale search for Cunningham on the moming of 
July 21. For six hours, rangers combed the Illiouette Creek drainage by helicopter, 
finding nothing. YOSAR also dispatched a horse patrol to search the area and interview 
“all persons encountered along the trails Cunningham would have walked on.” Again, no 
leads surfaced. That same moming, contract pilots choppered a pair of professional 
trackers to the remote area on the north side of Red Peak where they followed a single 
hiker’s boot trail along a creek bed until it ended at the Merced River. Later,
Tim Setnicka, “Yosemite Seareh and Rescue Ineident Report,” August 1978, YOSE SAR files,
1978
Ghiglieri and Farabee cite numerous examples o f expensive searches oecurring after the 
Cunningham incident ineluding a 1981 seareh for Timothy John Barnes which cost $178,501 and a 2005 
search for Michael Fieery which cost the Park Service an astounding $452,000. Ghiglieri and Farabee, 
Death in Yosemite, 467.
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investigators determined that the boot track did not match the star-shaped pattern of 
Cunningham’s size ten-and-a-half Lowa Scouts. Thus, while rangers considered the find 
“a good clue” (in fact it remained the only clue anyone uncovered that day), it led 
nowhere. On the twenty fourth, search parties convened to conduct additional searches 
of the area. Searchers followed boot tracks and traversed creek drainages looking for any 
signs of Cunningham’s passing but found none. '^^^
On the twenty eighth, John Dill began contacting by telephone all the backcountry 
permit holders that had been hiking in the area on the dates when David Cunningham 
went missing. Interestingly, a few permit holders had seen someone fitting that 
description, but these sightings seemed to have all occurred in the immediate vicinity of 
the trailhead. Apparently Cunningham did not make it very far. Armed with this new 
information. Butch Farabee, as mission coordinator, determined that the search should be 
reconvened. On July 30, Farabee requested the assistance of the Sierra Madre Search and 
Rescue team from Southern California and the Explorers SAR group from the San 
Francisco Bay area. The following day, twenty additional searchers arrived in Yosemite 
firom these organizations, joining teams of rangers, climbers, law enforcement, and local 
volunteers to again traverse the entire southwestern quadrant of the park. Searchers 
uncovered some provocative clues. In one instance, a search party discovered an 
abandoned tent that had purportedly been in the same position for several days. Inside 
they found nothing but a single playing card, a Joker. The tent did not match the
245 Ibid.
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description of the tent Cunningham had been carrying but the find sparked excitement 
and wild speculation among searchers?'^®
The case finally broke on the aftemoon of August 1. On that day, a friend of 
Cunningham’s received a postcard mailed from Bangor, Maine. The card was penned in 
what appeared to be David Cunningham’s handwriting. That aftemoon, John Dill spoke 
with Cunningham’s father who confirmed that his son indeed had contacted him by 
telephone earlier that moming. It was clear, as one rescuer declared, “our pigeon had 
flown the coop.” Dill and Farabee called off the massive search that night and YOSAR 
investigators immediately began the task of piecing together the unusual chain of events 
that spurred this “most elusive mission.” '^^ ^
From an interview with Susan Cunningham on August 12, Tim Setnicka concluded 
that David had staged his backpacking trip in order to leave his wife. Susan explained 
that they had been dealing with marital problems in the months leading up to the 
Yosemite trip and that David probably “had leaving on his mind prior to taking the 
backpacking trip.” The next day, Setnicka reached David Cunningham by telephone. 
After being read his Miranda rights, David agreed to recount his actions leading up to and 
during his flight from marital commitment. He explained that not long after leaving the 
Glacier Point parking lot he began feeling ill and decided to retum to the Valley. He 
hiked back by the Pohono Trail on July 16 and stayed one night in Camp 4, without 
attempting to contact his wife or anyone else. The next moming he purchased a thirty- 
day “anywhere in the U.S.” Greyhound bus ticket and spent two weeks traveling “from
Setnicka, “Incident Report;” Information also from the attached report filed by Explorer Search and 
Rescue (ESAR), “Mission # 50,” August 1978.
^^ESAR, “Mission #50.”
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Merced to Sacramento to Reno to Omaha to Minneapolis to Green Bay to Chicago to 
New York to Boston to Acadia National Park to Bangor, Maine to Great Smokey 
Mountains National Park and [back] to Maine where he got sick and decided to retum 
home.” Not until meeting with friends in Santa Barbara on August 2, Cunningham 
claimed, did he leam that park officials had been conducting a massive search operation 
for him. He told Setnicka that he knew that park officials routinely conducted searches 
but felt, as he stated, “I thought my wife would know why I left... We did talk about how 
unstable our relationship was.” '^*^  Setnicka analyzed Cunningham’s behavior, 
emphasizing the unprecedented cost it incurred:
The cost to the National Park Service.. .was over $20,000.00 with thousands of paid 
hours spent on the operation. Over 75 sorties were flown into the backcountry with the 
Park helicopter. Hundreds of hours were spent walking around and flying in the 
helicopter by all rescue personnel. Every government employee is required to be 
compensated for this extra hazard by a 25% increase in their hourly wage... Hundreds 
of hours were also spent walking and riding by horse in the search areas which includes 
steep snow fields, wild rivers and sheer, steep rock faces and spending nights in the 
wildemess. Safety is the prime consideration for searches by the operations leader and 
some areas could only be searched by technical climbers or by helicopter... The 
physical hazards that his actions exposed the searchers to were totally unnecessary and 
Cunningham created these conditions with no legitimate purpose. '^^^
In September of 1978, The United States District Court charged Cunningham with the 
only violation park authorities could use to recover the costs incurred during the 
unnecessary search: namely, his creation of a “hazardous condition” for rescuers. The 
federal code stated specifically that an individual could be charged and found guilty if 
prosecutors could prove that he or she “create[d] a hazardous or physically offensive
^  Setnicka, “Incident Report,” August 1978. 
^'Ibid.
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condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor, to wit: cause[d] a 
hazardous search and rescue operation to be undertaken without just cause or reason.”^^® 
Unfortunately for park authorities, the maximum penalty for a guilty verdict under this 
violation was a disappointing fee of only five hundred dollars, hardly enough to make up 
for the $21,379 that the NPS had incurred over the course of the search. Through this 
period of continually mounting SAR incidents, the legal precedents determining the 
National Park Service’s ability - or inability - to collect search and rescue costs became 
an increasingly paramount concern for administrators responsible for coordinating visitor 
protection operations in Yosemite.
In this period, searches for lost backpackers, helicopter rescues of climbers stranded 
on big walls, recoveries of the bodies of accident victims, and other SAR operations 
became progressively more expensive, costing the National Park Service (and hence tax 
payers) upwards of $400,000 annually by the late 1980s.^^* In response, many local 
media outlets, rescuers, federal agencies, and environmentalists argued that since most 
accidents resulted from poor judgment on the part of inexperienced (or incompetent) 
visitors, the high cost of rescue should not be the sole responsibility of the Park Service 
but should be covered partially by victims upon assessment of their individual negligence. 
Some wilderness advocates even suggested the dissolution of professional rescue 
altogether, arguing that the promise of free rescue sanitized the psychological effect of an 
appropriate, self-sufficient wilderness experience, giving visitors a false sense of security
^  Donald W. Pitts, “United States o f America v. David Andrew Cunningham,” Complaint heard 
before the United States District Court for the Eastern District o f California, August 1, 1978, this document 
as well as a copy o f a later summons is filed with Setnicka’s incident report.
Western Regional Office, “Search and Rescue Summary -  Western Region,” 1985, YOSAR office 
files.; Jim Reilly to All Concerned, re: “1984 SAR Statistics,” February 3, 1985. YOSAR office files.
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and encouraging irresponsible recreational habits. While park officials could not 
logically, or legally, disband YOSAR and continue to support potentially hazardous 
forms of recreation, debates over the high cost of search and rescue highlighted the 
philosophical, technological, and administrative imperatives shaping cultural perceptions 
of wilderness recreation in the national parks.
Prior to the 1960s, the cost of search and rescue remained insignificant. SAR 
operations were few and far between and most could be carried out without the need for 
expenditures beyond ordinary ranger payroll. A 1926 addendum to the Organic Act had 
established the National Park Service’s authority to perform search and rescue services, 
stipulating that “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to aide and assist visitors 
within the national parks...in emergencies.” The legislation also indicated that the service 
would absorb the costs of food and supplies accrued in search and rescue operations, a 
policy that remained in effect through the 1970s.^^  ^ As the number of complex 
emergencies increased through this period, forcing administrators to implement extensive 
training programs, incorporate helicopters and other new technologies, and begin 
employing highly experienced specialists to perform SAR missions, costs spiked 
considerably. As early as 1966, Park Service officials began expressing concern over 
mounting SAR costs, particularly those related to the use of helicopters. In cases where 
helicopter costs were high, NPS Director George Hartzog concluded: “Considering the 
sensitive nature of judgment regarding payment of costs by persons rescued,” the Park 
Service would continue footing the bill for visitor proteetion. Hartzog’s system-wide 
policy statement urged the following:
Quoted in Krystal Jackson, Expenses o f  Search and Rescue Service in the National Parks: An 
Overview and Examination o f  issues o f  Charging Visitors (master’s thesis: Central Washington University, 
2000), 44.
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In emergent seareh situations, ground control forces may be deployed and assisted by 
aircraft. In rescue operations where prompt action is necessary to save a life or avoid 
more serious injury, available helicopters as well as any other means at the 
Superintendent’s disposal will be utilized. All expenditures necessary to effect the 
above will be absorbed by the M&P appropriation.^^^
The M&P appropriation, a regional fund covering emergency maintenance costs or 
fire related expenses, remained a limited financial resource. As such, the director 
stipulated that park superintendents “encourage all reasonable methods for cutting costs.” 
Edward Hummel, the regional director for the western region conveyed this request to the 
superintendents in Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Parks, recommending 
that park administrators encourage “voluntary payment” of SAR costs by relatives or 
friends of victims as a means to reduce the financial burden of visitor protection.^^"  ^ In 
April of 1967, Yosemite Superintendent John Davis issued a memorandum of agreement. 
Davis described the hourly flight rate of ninety dollars specified in the park’s newly 
minted contract with a private helicopter service as a “substantial sum.” The 
Superintendent indicated that in the previous year, search and rescue forces logged 
approximately thirty five hours of flight time, constituting a “very costly function” of 
management. Davis rightly predicted that “with yearly increases in park visitation, the 
number to be rescued will likewise increase.”^^ ^
Edward Kenner, Acting Assistant Director to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Charges for 
helicopter use in search and rescue,” September 9, 1966, YOSAR office files.
Edward Hummel, Regional Director, Western Region to Superintendents, Yosemite and Sequoia 
and Kings Canyon, re: “Helicopter Search and Rescue,” September 13, 1966, YOSAR office files.
John Davis, Superintendent, Yosemite to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Funds -  
helicopter rescue and evacuation,” April 27, 1967, YOSAR office files.
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With no legal means to enforce collection of SAR costs, regardless of the victim’s 
culpability, Davis suggested that park authorities inform rescuees, their families, or their 
guide services that they “would be expected to assume the cost of the helicopter 
services.” Of course, if the rescuee, their family, or their outing sponsor refused, the 
National Park Service would be forced to pay the cost. Such a policy had obvious 
problems. For one, administrators would likely face legal consequences if they failed to 
inform the parties involved that they were not legally required to assume costs. Second, 
that a rescuee or guide service would reward the park’s rescue force with voluntarily 
repayment remained an unlikely possibility. Even insurance companies typically refused 
to cover costs since the National Park Service had no clear legal authority to abdicate 
financial responsibilityN evertheless, Director Hummel supported Davis’s policy of 
voluntary collections and authorized the superintendent to pursue this cost-cutting 
measure, however ineffective it proved to be.^^’
In 1972, the problems of funding helicopter rescues in Yosemite became acute. The 
previous year, the costs for conducting SAR missions reached more than $20,000, far 
exceeding the maximum of $6,500 that administrators had been able to draw from the 
M&P appropriation since 1966. To make things worse, the regional contingency funds 
for 1971 had been entirely used up before YOSAR officials were able to seek 
reimbursement of that year’s search and rescue expenses. “The ‘pot of gold’ dried up,” 
Chief Ranger Jack Morehead explained to his protection staff, “we were told by Region
^  Ibid; Davis cites an instance in which an insurance company was considering reimbursing 
helicopter costs o f 1,500 dollars on a rescue from Mount Whitney. Such cases proved to be a rarity and it 
is unclear whether Sequoia Kings Canyon officials were able to collect on this particular incident.
R.B. Moore, Assistant Regional Director, Operations, Western Region to Superintendents, Sequoia 
and Kings Canyon, Yosemite, re: “Funding of helicopter rescue missions,” May 4, 1967, YOSAR office 
files.
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that no contingency funds were available.” The entire $20,000, a heretofore 
unprecedented annual SAR bill, had to be cut from already financially burdened seasonal 
services within the park. “This hurts!” Morehead exclaimed. He furthered cautioned 
rangers that he “had no idea” whether any contingency funds would be available for the 
current year, SAR costs for which already showed signs of exceeding the previous year’s. 
“With the extra money being spent on the Yellowstone Centennial and the Tetons World 
Conference of National Parks,” Morehead wrote, “I personally doubt if our chances for 
receiving any rescue money are very good.”^^ *
For Morehead, costs could only be reduced by streamlining emergency response 
procedures and limiting YOSAR’s reliance on expensive helicopters. The chief ranger 
determined that on at least six of the thirteen total missions that year involving a 
helicopter, ground crews could have adequately carried out the operation. These 
instances involved evacuations of victims with minor injuries or illnesses including 
constipation, the flu, and relatively insignificant cuts. Also, two helicopter searches were 
conducted “for persons when the specific location or description was not known.” While 
acknowledging that rangers did not always have the time or the manpower to fully 
evaluate a situation before taking action - as in the numerous cases that season of boy 
scouts reportedly suffering from appendicitis in the backcountry - Morehead encouraged 
rangers to “research every call for a helicopter as thoroughly as possible” and clear any 
requests for air support through Pete Thompson or the chief ranger’s office. As costs 
continued to mount, it became clear to Morehead and other park authorities that since
Jack Morehead, Chief Ranger to All Permanent Rangers and Seasonals responsible for search and 
rescue missions, re: “Helicopters,” August 25,1972, YOSAR office files.
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search and rescue remained an indispensable administrative funetion, means of 
recovering costs from victims would have to be thoroughly considered and perhaps 
implemented, particularly if the Park Service or the Department of Interior could not be 
relied upon to reimburse SAR expenses/^^
The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1972 eased some of 
Morehead’s eoncem by giving the NPS authority to use Department of Interior funds to 
“cover the unbudgeted costs of emergency and other unforeseen law enforcement 
situations in the National Park system.” Yet, in effect, the act only formalized the 
regional contingency fund that had already been informally tapped for this purpose for at 
least the past decade; it was not clear to anyone in Yosemite or the regional office that 
additional funds would be made available or that the numerous annual system-wide 
demands for the funding of road improvements, fire fighting, unanticipated law 
enforcement incidents, and other “emergency” projects would not drain the appropriation 
before rescue costs could be covered.^^*’
In preparation for future crises, Morehead and Pete Thompson began exploring a 
number of alternative possibilities for the collection of search and rescue costs. John 
Taylor, secretary of the American Alpine Club, suggested implementing a rescue 
insuranee program in which individuals could purchase policies either through 
mountaineering organizations or while registering for roek climbs or backcountry 
permits.^^’ Taylor cited correspondence from AAC member David Bidwell, who had
259 Ibid.
^  Quoted in Jackson, “Expenses o f Search and Rescue,” 74; For more on emergency appropriations 
related to fire suppression and fire fighting costs see Hal K. Rothman, Blazing Heritage: A History o f  
Wildland Fire in the National Parks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90-92.
John Taylor to Pete Thompson, undated, YOSAR office files.
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been living in Switzerland for several years, indicating that in Europe, mountaineers 
could purchase accident insurance from nationwide institutions for fifty to sixty five 
dollars per year. Such policies, Bidwell explained, usually covered nearly one hundred 
percent of search, rescue, and recovery c o s t s . T h om p so n  expressed interest in 
pursuing such a policy but concluded that due to the particular structure of the NPS, 
accident insurance would probably not be feasible. “If a private organization somehow 
had the rescue responsibility in the parks the insurance approach would work,” 
Thompson wrote to Taylor, “but.. .to put such a scheme into effect now would mean two 
very large waivers, both presumably from Congress. As a simpleminded mountaineer I 
shudder at the prospect of wrestling with that one!”^^ ^
In February of 1974, a group of park superintendents, chief rangers, and National 
Park Service officials met at the Albright Ranger Training Facility in Grand Canyon 
National Park to discuss mounting search and rescue challenges in the nation’s parks. 
The problem of increasing costs occupied center stage in debates. The “task force” 
ultimately determined what Jack Morehead had learned two years earlier, that regional 
funds set aside for all emergency situations were not reliable in covering SAR costs. 
There were simply too many hands in the pot. As a solution, the committee 
recommended setting up a separate regional account, similar to fire suppression and 
certain law enforcement funds, to support “our highest priority management 
responsibility -  saving human life.” Addressing Morehead’s dilemma, the task force 
concluded: “Area supervisors and park managers should not be placed in a position of
^  David Bidwell to John Taylor, October 19, 1972, YOSAR office files.
Pete Thompson to John Taylor, July 1, 1973, YOSAR office files.
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having to make the decision to exert an all-out effort during a potential life-saving 
activity, knowing that when they do so, they are faced with the possibility of having to 
operate their area below standard later in the fiscal year.”^^"*
Even with a separate SAR account, costs escalated at an alarming rate. By July of 
1974, SAR expenses for that fiscal year had exceeded $100,000 for 121 missions 
including more that $69,000 for the use of helicopters from Lemoore Naval Air Station. 
YOSAR operators became understandably worried that their newly activated funds would 
quickly dry up. In response, SAR Officer Anthony Anderson suggested that simple air 
evacuations involving the park’s contract helicopter should be billed to the evacuee. 
Anderson reasoned that since the contract helicopter was “essentially a commercial 
ambulance service,” victims could be charged for its use as they would be in any urban 
medical emergency when a ground ambulance was required. Maintaining a distinction 
between simple evacuations and technical SAR activities, Anderson wrote: “Though 
Yosemite National Park traditionally has paid for SAR expense, there is no reason why if 
should also pay for the ambulance service.” He calculated that of the 65.2 hours of 
contract helicopter use that fiscal year, only 14.3 hours (equaling $1,856 out of total of 
$8,476) were accrued in “technical support.” Anderson pointed out that Sequoia-Kings 
Canyon National Park had been successful in collecting approximately fifty percent of its 
air evacuation fees over the past year and argued that “perhaps this should be a Regional 
decision for all parks utilizing contract helicopters.” ®^^
J.W. Wade, “Search and Rescue Task Force Meeting,” February, 1974, YOSAR office files.
^  Anthony Anderson to Chief Ranger, re: “Payment for use o f contract helicopter service by park 
visitors,” July 18,1974, YOSAR office files.
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Anderson’s primary concern revolved around the issue of individual responsibility in 
the backcountry. Since most SAR expenses were incurred due to the poor judgment or 
inexperience of the victim, many rescuers and administrators began to question the value 
of free rescue. Frustrated with the contradictions embedded in the emerging culture of 
wilderness recreation, Anderson wrote, “The philosophy of today tends toward the 
resentment of the bureaucracy and the ‘Big Brother’ attitude. Along with this should be 
the acceptance of consequences of the individual’s decisions and actions, which include 
paying for a helicopter when it is needed.” He concluded that in many instances the park 
helicopter had been used to evacuate victims who either suffered from minor injuries 
which probably did not necessitate an air evacuation or who were “not really sick or 
injured.” Referring to a group of handicapped boy scouts that had encountered problems 
while camping in the backcountry, he further indicated that “the charge might discourage 
some visitors from over extending themselves, especially if they have physical 
disabilities.” ®^® Anderson suggested that before YOSAR dispatched a helicopter, the 
victim or the person reporting the accident should be required to sign an agreement 
indicating their obligation to pay for the evacuation. Chief Ranger Charles Wendt agreed 
with Anderson’s conclusions, writing to the park superintendent that “the deterrent effect 
of this program is something that we cannot express in dollars and cents... We hope this 
will place more responsibility on the individual citizen. ” ®^^ This concern, that the 
promise of free rescue inspired wilderness users to take greater risks without adequate
^  Ibid.
Charles W. Wendt to Superintendent, re: “Payment for ambulance use o f helicopter,” July 22,1974, 
YOSAR office files.
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preparation, became the crux of subsequent debates over the philosophical implications 
of free search and rescue in Yosemite.
Yet the questionable legality of charging victims for air evacuations rendered this 
program short-lived. “There is one basic test that must be applied to all proposals to 
establish a reimbursable operation and credit collections to an appropriation,” cautioned a 
legal advisor for the western regional office, “You must be prepared to cite the legal 
authority for such action.” As it stood, neither Yosemite nor the NPS had any clear legal 
grounds to demand repayment, regardless of the victim’s culpability in causing his or her 
own emergency. In response to YOSAR’s decision, the regional office concluded that 
“the desirability of a reimbursable activity, no matter how compelling, cannot negate the 
fact that reimbursement authority has not been granted.” ®^* As of February 6, 1975, 
Yosemite’s Assistant Superintendent discontinued the practice, stating, “In the future I 
don’t think we should bill any users until we have developed a Park policy on the matter 
and had it approved by the Field Solicitor.” ®^^
To date, the park had billed at least thirteen evacuees and collected approximately 
$900 out of total $2,626 charged. These instances ran the gamut of SAR scenarios. In 
one case a scout on a handicapped boy scout outing broke his shoulder and ruptured his 
spleen while scrambling over rocks; other rescuees suffered injuries ranging fi-om a 
twisted back to a dislocated shoulder to a broken big toe; two teenagers experienced 
ruptured appendixes in the backcountry; and one backpacker had to be evacuated after
Associate Regional Director, Administration, WR to Superintendent, Yosemite National Park, re: 
“Reimbursable Accounts,” January 31, 1975, YOSAR office files; Also see attached tally of helicopter 
evacuations, including the amount billed, the amount collected, and injuries sustained for each instance.
^  Assistant Superintendent to Chief Ranger, re: “Helicopter Services,” February 6,1975, YOSAR 
office files.
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loosing his vision due to “possible botulism or anaphylactic shock.” In response to the 
uncertain legal ramifications of pursuing collections from these victims, Superintendent 
Amberger issued a request to the regional office to cancel an outstanding balance of 
$1,500. “It has been administratively determined that the bills were made in error,” his 
memorandum read, “They were emergency evacuations for injured park visitors and were 
erroneously billed into a reimbursable account.” ’^®
The debacle over charging for helicopter evacuations prompted the Regional Office 
to immediately prepare a policy statement outlining the NFS’s legal responsibility for the 
performance and funding of search and rescue operations. The document clearly detailed 
the extent of the NPS obligation:
The National Park Service has a moral and a legal responsibility for the welfare of 
visitors... The National Park Service will assume the responsibility for determining the 
whereabouts of visitors who are reported to be lost and for rendering assistance, if 
required, for their return to a point of safety. Any visitor who becomes injured to the 
extent that transportation is required will be provided such transportation by the 
National Park Service. Emergency Transportation will be provided only from the point 
of injury to the nearest facility where professional medical services are available... No 
charges will be assessed for such transportation and no efforts will be made to collect 
any costs incidental to such transportation.^^*
The determination that the National Park Service would continue to pay for helicopter 
transportation did not end debates over the high cost of rescue. In fact, the decision 
vaulted the issue into the public arena, sparking heated arguments among wilderness 
supporters, national media outlets, and local taxpayers over the moral and financial
Superintendent, Yosemite to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Cancellation o f Bills for 
Collection,” undated, YOSAR office files.
United States Department o f the Interior, National Park Service, Western Region, “Western Region 
Policy Statement: Search and Rescue and Emergency Transportation,” September 26, 1975, YOSAR office 
files.
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implications of maintaining a professional search and rescue infrastructure in Yosemite 
and other popular wilderness destinations. In an era of rising conservatism in which 
environmentalism, wilderness, and the spending of federal dollars faced renewed attacks, 
rescue costs became central to debates of NPS policy. Citing a 1976 rescue of six 
elimbers who had been stranded in winter weather on the summit of Half Dome after they 
“ignored warnings of possible storms,” an editor for the Fresno Bee questioned the NPS 
policy of using tax dollars to pay for rescues in which the “rescued were victims of their 
own stupidity or carelessness.” The Half Dome rescue cost the park nearly $10,000, an 
amount that ultimately came from public coffers. “These are hard lumps for the average 
taxpayer to swallow,” the author concluded. While federal, state, and local rescue 
organizations including the Coast Guard, the Humane Society, and other public service 
agencies had historically assumed the costs for emergency response in urban or maritime 
environments, the mounting frequeney of expensive rescues in the mountains of 
California and the media coverage they received inspired a sense of urgency among 
taxpayers. Interestingly, mounting SAR costs produced an unlikely political consensus. 
Reports of expensive rescues fhistrated not only conservatives but also many wilderness 
enthusiasts who felt that through free rescue the NPS encouraged inexperieneed tourists 
to engage in irresponsible behaviors in the backcountry.^^^
A number of prominent wilderness advocacy groups expressed concern that by 
providing a rescue service, the Park Service actually compromised the wilderness 
experience sought by the most active and experienced visitors. In March of 1976, the 
University of Oregon Outdoor Program hosted a conference titled “Wilderness and
Verne H. Cole, “Commentary, Search and Rescue,” The Fresno Bee (February 26, 1976): A19.
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Individual Freedom” to address a number of questions including: “Is individual freedom 
in the wilderness equivalent to minimization of management?” And, “What elements of 
a quality wilderness experience are essential freedoms?”^^  ^ The particular phrasing of 
these questions illustrated a pervasive tendency in 1970s environmental culture to 
associate individual freedom of expression with social responsibility through the 
preservation of wilderness, a perspective that further cemented the interrelatedness of 
recreation and preservation in the public imagination?’"* The conference attracted a 
surprising number of prominent wilderness advocates including world-renowned climber 
Willy Unsoeld, Sierra Club lobbyist Brock Evans, the revered “arch-druid” of 
conservation David Brower, and even Edward Abbey, the petulant critic who in 1968 had 
challenged the NPS to “Let them take risks, for Godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt, 
stranded, drowned, eaten by bears, buried alive under avalanches -  that is the right and 
privilege of any free American.” For Abbey, the psychological effect of entering an 
undeveloped area with the knowledge that rescue would be all but impossible if a mishap 
occurred defined the ideal wilderness experience.^’®
Given Abbey’s influence, the conference attendees agreed that the promise of free 
rescue in wilderness areas should be scaled back. “Past governmental policies and 
practices of providing Search and Rescue operations have decreased the authenticity of 
the wilderness experienee by discouraging self-reliance,” the conference’s statement on
Darvel T. Lloyd, AAC Conservation Committee, “Wilderness and Individual Freedoms 
Conference,” March 9, 1976, YOSAR office files.
Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 7.
Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 55-
56.
155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rescue policy declared, adding: “Such policies have also increased use impact by 
encouraging the inexperienced to attempt performances beyond their ability.” The 
conference committee recommended that the NPS and other government agencies “cease 
to maintain” caches of rescue technologies and cancel appropriations for the funding of 
SAR operations and the wages of emergency hire rescue personnel. Search and rescue 
missions should be conducted only by volunteers, the committee argued, with the purpose 
of placing the “financial responsibility” of rescue on the wilderness user and not on 
government agencies, taxpayers, or other park users. As an attack on the democratization 
of wilderness recreation, the “individual freedom” to engage in wilderness-oriented 
activities, as outlined by the conference attendees, remained accessible only to an elite 
few with the physical capabilities, the specific philosophical proclivities, and the 
technical know-how to assume the high level of risk implicit in this particular conception 
of an appropriate wilderness experience. This seemingly contradictory notion of the 
meaning of individual freedom actually made sense since the idea of wilderness, while 
dependent on the support of the masses, was ultimately conceived of and advertised by an 
elite group of outdoor enthusiasts, including Edward Abbey and his cohorts, who fought 
hard to protect their claim to appropriate recreation.” ®
Interestingly, administrators generally agreed that free rescue contributed to 
irresponsible recreational habits, though their concerns were far more pragmatic and 
political than philosophical. Moreover, the Park Service had neither the authority nor the 
inclination to judge preemptively the relative self-reliance and responsibility of individual 
wilderness users. Park officials did not wish to scale back access in order to avoid rescue
Lloyd, “Wilderness and Individual Freedoms Conference,” March 9, 1976.
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costs; instead administrators sought means to recover costs after the fact by establishing, 
through legal channels, the negligence of rescuees. In 1976, YOSAR carried out 124 
SAR missions, more than double the total operations from only seven years earlier, and at 
a cost to the NPS in excess of $100,000. Already faced with a drastically insufficient 
annual SAR budget of $70,000 (still up from only $6,500 just ten years before), Yosemite 
Superintendent Amberger predicted that “the end is not in sight.” In his estimation, costs 
would continue to rise and the park’s response eapabilities would invariably require 
“special legal attention,” specifically, a legislated means to reeover costs from negligent 
victims. “The National Park Service is burdened with the one-sided responsibility of not 
being able to regulate climbers or wilderness users who are incompetent from pursuing 
park aetivities,” Amberger wrote: “However, we must be totally responsible for rescuing 
or looking for them when they get in over their heads.” The Superintendent suggested a 
system-wide policy change authorizing the NPS to collect rescue costs from “any person 
who negligently plaees himself [or herself] in such a position as to request assistanee, 
rescue, or any other type of help.”” ’
In Amberger’s view, the recommendations of the Wilderness and Individual 
Freedoms conference seemed unrealistic, over-simplified, and ultimately self-defeating. 
Scaling back the park’s rescue infrastmcture would mean one of two things from an 
administrative perspective: Either the National Park Serviee would be foreed to require 
wildemess users to sign a legally questionable waiver stating that administrators would 
not perform a rescue if an aecident occurred or, more likely, wildemess activities would 
have to be restrieted to everyone, even the most experienced and environmentally
Leslie P. Amberger to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Special Regulation -  Yosemite 
National Park,” June 30, 1977, YOSAR office files.
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enlightened wildemess enthusiasts. Both options would be highly problematic since rock 
climbing and other forms of wildemess recreation were widely regarded as historically 
appropriate uses of the park and were in fact codified as such in NPS policy; to forcibly 
regulate these aetivities would not only defeat the mandated purpose of the National Park 
Service to provide for the enjoyment of the parks it would also create a public relations 
nightmare for park officials. Neither the Park Service nor even the most adamant 
supporters of limited aceess to wildemess areas would support an outright prohibition on 
recreation in Yosemite’s backcountry.^’*
Tim Setnicka, in an editorial for the popular climbing periodical O ff Belay, wamed 
that if inexperienced and negligent wildemess users continued to drain the park’s 
financial resources, the NPS would have no choice but to enforce more regulations, more 
restrictions, and more closures of popular climbing routes and remote backeountry areas. 
“Mountain and wildemess activities are among the freest forms of park use,” Setnicka 
observed. Yet in this purported freedom lay the problem: The Park Service had no means 
to restrict access based on the inexperience of individual wildemess users yet 
administrators had a responsibility to rescue any visitor “in direct danger of destroying 
himself or the environment.” Setnicka referenced several costly rescues that year 
involving poor judgment or inexperienee. In a number of cases hikers and climbers had 
to be rescued after failing to bring adequate food or clothing even though bad weather 
was imminent. In one instance, a pair of climbers became stranded and hypothermic on 
their descent route near the Royal Arches after allowing their rappel ropes to be “blown 
away” in a storm. One persistent climber even had to be rescued from El Capitan twice
'ibid.
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in the same month. Rangers concluded that in both scenarios the man probably could 
have helped himself instead of calling for a rescue. Setnicka stressed that park officials 
should not “attempt to babysit a person’s movement.” However, if wildemess users put 
themselves or others in danger, ‘’'they will be responsible for new restrictions which will 
unjustly affect all wildemess users.” ”^
Solutions remained unclear. Setnicka vaguely proposed that climbers and other 
wildemess users willingly assume “moral and financial responsibility” for their actions or 
face charges of negligence in the courts.^ *** Chris Jones, in his authoritative Climbing in 
North America, spoke to the climbing community directly, writing: “When a public 
agency becomes responsible for our safety and pulls us off the crags, we must expect 
them to become increasingly concemed about what we climb. The precedents are clear. 
Either we bring our affairs into order by taking a greater responsibility for rescues, or the 
government will want to regulate us.”” * Galen Rowell, the notable Yosemite climber 
and adventure photographer, offered a partieularly insightful analysis of the problem: “At 
stake is the most basic of wildemess values: the right to risk life and limb in the wilds,” 
he wrote. To protect this quality of the wildemess experience, Rowell suggested that 
perhaps “it is better to sacrifiée some of the appearance of wildemess in order to regain 
self-sufficiency.” He argued that by placing SAR caches fully stocked with ropes, 
stretehers, radios, oxygen tanks, and other technologies of rescue in remote locations, 
wildemess users eould eonceivably help themselves or each other before calling in 
helicopters, which were not only expensive but also “noisy machines that intmded into
Tim Setnicka, “Mountain Insanity,” Off Belay 37 (February 1978): 6-8.
^  Ibid., 8
Chris Jones, Climbing in North America, second edition (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1997), 354.
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everyone’s experienee.” *^’ Rescue, as a technological safeguard, had beeome both 
facilitator of and anathema to the wildemess experienee depending on which conception 
of an appropriate wildemess experience the NPS adopted.
Indeed, whether or not the National Park Service should charge victims for rescues, 
or even provide a rescue serviee at all, became the policy hot potato by which 
administrators and park constituents debated the meaning of preservation and the role of 
technology in the national park experience. For Edward Abbey, the promise of free 
rescue eompromised the psyehological effect of an encounter with wild nature since it 
signified an over-reliance on the technologies of civilization at large. For Galen Rowell, 
the mdimentary technologies of rescue, including climbing gear and basie medical 
supplies, actually enhanced the wildemess experience by enabling wildemess users to 
push the boundaries of risk and self-reliance to greater lengths than would be possible if 
these conneetions to society were not available. Yet Rowell drew the line at allowing for 
the extensive use of helicopters to perform rescues since these “noisy machines” existed 
too far along the gradient of faeilitating technologies that he and other recreationists 
eonsidered appropriate in a wildemess setting. As administrators, Amberger and 
Setnicka faced the delicate task of adjusting park policy to accommodate these varying 
recreational discourses of nature. YOSAR’s stmggle to constmct a definitive plan for 
preparing for, coordinating, and funding SAR activities illustrated the ehallenges of 
balancing the freedom to experienee wildemess with the increasingly costly need to 
mitigate the grizzly consequences of this freedom.
^  Galen Rowell, “On Safety and Wildemess,” Sierra Magazine (November/ December 1977).
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For all the active campaigning of Amberger, Setnicka, and others to lower rescue 
costs and avoid regulating climbing and other wildemess activities, the decision-making 
power to recover SAR eosts ultimately lay with NPS officials in Washington. In March 
of 1978, Associate Director Daniel J. Tobin determined that Amberger’s proposal to 
eharge negligent victims for rescue costs would be “neither neeessary nor in keeping with 
the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service policies.” If search and 
rescue eosts threatened park operations, Tobin suggested that administrators pursue a 
number of eost-eutting measures including the aequisition of less expensive helicopter 
contracts through private companies rather than through military installations - an 
unlikely possibility, especially in Yosemite, since few private contractors possessed the 
requisite skills or technologies to perform complex climbing rescues. Tobin also 
recommended seeking reeovery through the federal “disorderly conduct” statute - though 
as park officials discovered in the aftermath of the Cunningham search, this violation 
carried a drastically inadequate penalty of only five hundred dollars. The Assistant 
Director concluded that if most SAR emergencies were indeed preventable, 
administrators should implement “an aggressive program in education and information to 
alert the visitors to these inherent dangers.”’*® While necessary, sueh a poliey opened up 
a whole new legal can of worms for park administrators.
Observers often considered visitor protection a legal responsibility of the NPS, yet 
policy only established the service’s authority to provide for the safety of visitors; it did
^  Daniel J. Tobin to Director, Western Regional Office, re: “Financial Responsibility, Search and 
Rescue,” March 29, 1978, YOSAR office files.
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not directly convey legal responsibility?*"* The Federal Tort Claims Act, passed by the 
United States Congress in 1946 as a check on the expanded power of the federal 
government, ultimately determined how the Park Service’s decision to act on this 
authority could be enforced as a legal mandate. The act stipulated that a defendant 
incurring a loss due to “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
government” eould sue the government and recover costs under the same standards of 
liability applicable to a private citizen. This meant that if park authorities negligently 
created an unsafe condition for visitors or failed to adequately respond to an emergency, 
the NPS could be held liable for damages. In 1948, a visitor to Yellowstone National 
Park, William Claypool, filed suit against the National Park Service after a bear attaehed 
him and his wife while they slept in the open in sleeping bags. That day, the defendants 
had twice asked rangers, who knew that a “problem bear” had recently been active in the 
area, if it would be safe to remain outside their tent. On both occasions, rangers advised 
the eouple that “hundreds of people sleep outside in Yellowstone every night and that the 
bears never attack without provocation.” The federal district court determined that under 
the Tort Claims Act, the Claypools were classified as “invitees” of the NPS, and since 
rangers were aware that “a new and extraordinary danger” existed, they had a legal duty 
to inform the couple of that danger.’*® The case set a clear precedent: the National Park 
Service had a legal responsibility to maintain not only search and rescue capabilities but 
also certain preemptive safety measures.
^  National Park Service (NPS), Yosemite National Park Search and Rescue Plan, revised May 14, 
1986, YOSAR office files.
Paul A. Svboda, “Protecting Visitors to National Recreation Areas Under the Tort Claims Act,” 
Columbia Law Review, 84 (November 1984), 1792-1812; James R. Levine, “The Federal Tort Claims Act: 
A Proposal for Institutional Reform,” Columbia Law Review, 100 (October 2000), 1538-1571.
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To avoid burdening the government with excessive legal costs (which would 
ultimately come from taxes and other public funds) and deter frivolous lawsuits, the Tort 
Claims Act also allowed for limitations on the Park Service’s responsibility to maintain a 
safe environment for park visitors or “invitees” as the federal courts regarded them after 
the Claypool decision. In order to prevent judicial “second guessing” of the legislative 
and administrative decisions of government bodies, the drafters of the act included a 
“discretionary function exception” which allowed agencies to determine the boundaries 
of their own liability through reasonable considerations of social, economic, and political 
policy.’*® In the national parks, if safety measures proved too costly or otherwise 
impractical from an administrative perspective, the NPS could choose not to implement 
them. Park authorities also had discretionary authority to determine whether or not a 
preemptive safety program including but not limited to the widespread construction of 
safety railings, the posting of warning signs in dangerous areas, or the commencement of 
mandatory visitor education programs would unduly compromise the “atmosphere” of the 
park for visitors. Exercising discretion in visitor protection proved to be a delicate task. 
Once administrators established programs for search and rescue or sets of preemptive 
safety measures, the NPS would be liable for maintaining the standards derived from 
such policies. As a legal analyst for the Division of Conservation and Wildlife explained, 
“Once the bureau has committed to providing.. .SAR services, it has in all probability lost 
the discretion not to provide the service.”’*’
^  Levine, “The Federal Tort Claims Act,” 1542-1547.
^  Deputy Associate Solicitor, Division o f Conservation and Wildlife to Director, National Park 
Service, re: “OIG Audit Report 96-1-806: National Park Service Emergency Medical and Search and 
Rescue Services,” May 11, 1999, YOSAR office files.
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Thus, by implementing aggressive accident prevention measures, administrators in 
Yosemite could conceivably become more susceptible to tort claims. This concern was 
most evident in administrators’ continued resistance to regulating or directly managing 
rock climbing activities in the park. A tragic accident in 1978 illustrated why the NPS 
maintained this surprisingly laissez faire approach to rock climbing, despite the high 
level of risk. On May 14, three experienced climbers in their twenties, Jeffery Graves, 
John Nygaard, and John Garton, decided to retreat from 1,500 feet up on the Nose route 
on El Capitan, presumably because they had run out of water. A number of witnesses on 
the ground and one on a nearby climb reported seeing the trio begin the process of 
rappelling off the route. While no one witnessed the moment in which all three broke 
free from their anchor, at least one climber heard the sound of “rip stop material brushing 
against rock” as the climbers fell. Another witness at the base of El Capitan looked up 
when he heard “what he thought to be stonefall.” Others described the sound of the 
climbers breaking loose from the rock as a “roar” or a “rumble;” all reported hearing “no 
cries” from the doomed climbers. Brent Nichelin had been standing at the base of the 
Nose photographing the victims and another pair of climbers when “he looked up through 
his camera’s 300mm [lens and] saw two people falling toward him.” Nichelin explained 
to rangers that he watched in horror as “the people fell vertically and brushed the wall 
several times as they fell.” Two climbers, Matthew Muchnick and Alan Nelson, heard 
the impact while sorting gear at the base of El Capitan. They walked over to investigate 
knowing “that something bad had happened.” The pair immediately went to rangers after 
discovering the three climbers “all piled up on top of each other.” Muchnick and Nelson 
reported to Ranger James Lee that three climbers had fallen from El Capitan and were
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“obviously dead.” John Dill, Butch Farabee, and a handful of YOSAR operators quickly 
roped off the site and began their investigation.
The process of piecing together the causes of this tragedy revealed both the 
sophistication of YOSAR’s investigatory capabilities and the NFS’s delicate liability in 
maintaining safety standards in the park. Rangers and YOSAR officers spent several 
hours taking pictures and collecting evidence at the accident scene. Strewn among the 
climbers’ bodies, horrifically mangled from the impact of the 1,500 foot fall, 
investigators found a number of objects including “cans and food articles, a knife, a cut 
perlon sling, a shattered Timex watch,” and most interestingly, “half of a metal Dolt 
hanger.” Originally designed and manufactured by William “Dolt” Fuerer, who 
accompanied Warren Harding on the first ascent of the Nose in 1958, hangers were 
crucial to the development of climbing as a safe, accessible form of recreation in the park. 
After placing an expansion bolt in a hand-drilled hole in the rock face, a climber would 
then attach the looped hanger to the bolt. A carabiner could then be attached to the 
hanger, keeping the climber safely anchored to the wall. Though bolt hangers were 
nearly invisible to untrained observers on the ground, by 1978, the rock faces of 
Yosemite were covered with such devices. After examining the evidence found at the 
scene, YOSAR investigators deduced that immediately before the fall, the three climbers 
had clipped themselves and all of their gear into one single bolt, breaking a cardinal rule 
of safe climbing to never rely on just one piece of protection as a primary anchor, 
especially if the lives of the entire party hinged on it. Still, bolt hangers were designed to 
withstand shock loads of thousands of pounds; and these particular bolts had been placed 
less than one year earlier, most likely by climber Tom Rohrer, who had been establishing
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dozens of “rappel routes,” or series of vertically aligned bolt stations, all over the park in 
the previous years. Even if the three climbers had indeed all clipped into only one bolt, it 
should not have failed. So, why did the “bombproof’ hanger, usually the strongest link in 
an anchor, break at this particular moment?’**
To answer this perplexing question, John Dill sent the broken hanger to a San 
Francisco bay area metallurgist, Gerald Fritzke, who had read about the accident in the 
local newspaper and volunteered to examine the evidence. In an analysis published in 
O ff Belay magazine, Tim Setnicka explained that Fritzke had discovered preexisting 
cracks in the broken hanger: “Tests confirmed that both legs of the bolt hanger had been 
cracked and weakened before the total failure occurred,” Setnicka wrote: “Next with the 
aid of a computer, Fritzke estimated that the cracked hanger could have broken with a 
downward force of only 500 lbs.!” Setnicka suggested that the reasons for the weakened 
hanger remained unknown. However, in a follow-up report Fritzke recognized that the 
hanger had been treated, post-production, with a bonding alloy, a process that Tom 
Rohrer had been known to use and which he assumed would increase the strength and 
durability of the bolt. In fact, as Fritzke surmised, the chemical reaction produced by this 
bonding process could cause the chromemoly steel from which the hanger was forged to 
weaken and perhaps even crack. Interestingly, this worrisome conclusion remained 
unproven and YOSAR never felt confident publishing the findings. While no further 
accidents could be shown to have resulted from Rohrer’s modifications of bolt hangers.
Charles R. Farabee, Jr., “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” May 1978, YOSE SAR files, 1978; 
C.L. Andress, “Supplementary Case Incident Record,” May 1978, YOSE SAR files, 1978; Tim Setnicka, 
“A ‘Bombproof Anchor," Off Belay 40 (August 1978): 15-16.
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the incident underscored the extent of the NFS’s discretionary authority to assume few 
direct controls of climbing safety in the park?*^
In correspondence to YOSAR officials, family members of the deceased climbers 
began to ask questions regarding the NFS’s responsibilities in maintaining a safe 
climbing environment in Yosemite. John Carton’s brother wrote to John Dill inquiring 
about the history of the cracked hanger, demanding to know, “what is being done to 
prevent such an accident from occurring in the future?”’ ®^ In a carefully crafted response. 
Dill explained the limits of the NFS’s discretion in this regard: “In contrast to the 
maintenance of our hiking trails,” Dill wrote, “the National F ark Service is not involved, 
that is we don’t design, maintain, sanction, or endorse any climbing or rappelling route.” 
He further explained that “the term ‘maintenance’” in regards to rock climbing “is 
probably a misnomer, not being a part of the technical jargon of climbing.” Completely 
independent of NFS controls, individual climbers. Dill specified, assumed responsibility 
for making decisions to replace bolts and other fixed gear, or to warn other climbers of 
possible dangers: “Commonly, a climber may simply replace a questionable bolt, piton, 
etc., if he finds one as he happens to climb or rappel by. No one can or will guarantee 
that a newly placed bolt or piton is absolutely safe.” For these reasons Dill maintained 
that individual climbers had to prepare for intangibles on their own by taking safety 
seriously and always using backup anchors.” '
^  Setnicka, “A ‘Bombproof Anchor,” 16; Conversation with John Dill, March 2007; Ghiglieri and 
Farabee, Death in Yosemite, 302.
Mark A. Garton to John Dill, December 18, 1978, YOSAR office files.
John T. Dill to Mark A. Garton, undated, YOSAR office files.
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John Nygaard’s mother also began questioning why the NPS had not taken 
responsibility for inspecting and repairing defective fixed climbing gear. In a letter to 
Chief Ranger Bill Wendt, Mrs. Nygaard insisted that had the bolts been checked, her 
son’s accident would not have happened. “This will not bring them back,” she wrote,
“the hurt is there and it seems to hurt more to know they could have been here today had 
the equipment been in good condition.”^^  ^ Her phrasing suggested an attempt to establish 
the legal liability of the National Park Service in her son’s accident. Chief Ranger Bill 
Wendt responded by emphasizing each individual climber’s responsibility to take into 
account the fallibility of fixed gear. “Since it is so difficult to know the structural 
integrity of a bolt,” he argued, “the only safe policy assumes that any bolt may fail and 
requires that additional gear be ready to take over instantly.” Indeed, the NPS had no 
reasonable capabilities to guarantee a safe climbing environment. Wendt’s placement of 
culpability on the individual climbers reflected administrators’ unwillingness, and 
inability, to affect more direct preventative safety policies, especially since such actions 
could open up the NPS to tort claims. In his letter to Mrs. Nygaard, Wendt clearly stated 
the NPS’s discretionary position in this regard;
In the field, climbing equipment is not checked in any formal or official sense. The 
National Park Service does not place equipment on the cliffs for the public to use..., 
nor does it advertise or sanction any of the climbing or rappeling routes in Yosemite 
National Park. These routes are developed solely by the climbing community, as they 
are elsewhere. Climbers themselves place the anchors on climbs and rappel routes. An 
anchor is “checked,” or should be, each time a climber comes to it. If he finds an 
anchor of dubious quality (a subjective judgment all too frequently), he may or may not 
replace it. The next climber has the same choice. His knowledge of equipment and 
safe practices comes from his own experience, conversations with friends, instructors, 
magazine articles and books.^^^
^  Mrs. O.V. Nygaard to Mr. Bill Wendt, January 22, 1979, YOSAR office files.
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Tim Setnicka elaborated on this need for professional SAR operations to encourage 
individual responsibility on the part of wilderness users rather than establish convoluted 
safety inspection programs or other difficult-to-manage precautionary measures. “The 
best SAR event never occurs,” he wrote, “it is only heard as a story in the inn after an 
epic on the walls or whitewater standing waves that eventually turned out fine without 
injury... The optimal SAR team activity is sitting around the rescue cache playing 
checkers.” Setnicka proposed a fifth requirement of effective search and rescue to 
precede the four he presented in Wilderness Search and Rescue. In addition to the team’s 
responsibility to “locate, reach, treat, and evacuate” the victim, professional SAR 
operators - who in addition to being technically savvy rescuers were also to be highly 
educated experts in safe, enjoyable wilderness recreation -  should be adept at what 
Setnicka called “Preventative Search and Rescue” or PSAR. Basing his analysis on his 
experiences in Yosemite, Setnicka argued that “the use of PSAR to prevent and minimize 
as many potentially dangerous situations as possible through education and training 
should be one of the main objectives of SAR work.”^^"^  Rescuers in Yosemite had been 
contributing analyses of rock climbing and other mountaineering-related accidents to the 
AAC’s Accidents in North American Mountaineering (ANAM) since the late 1940s. Yet 
while ANAM had become a widely read and highly respected educational resource for 
serious wilderness enthusiasts, few casual visitors to the national parks had read or even 
heard of the publication. Beginning in 1980, John Dill, in cooperation with a publishing
Charles W. Wendt to Mrs. O.V. Nygaard, undated, YOSAR otFice tiles.; This position was never 
codified in policy but became the generally accepted practice over time as the NPS struggled to formulate a 
more detailed climbing management policy. Due to legal issues and anticipated public relations disputes, 
such a policy has yet to be officially approved in Yosemite.
^  Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 627.
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agent in San Francisco, began compiling reviews of accidents in Yosemite in a bi-annual 
report to be easily available to all park visitors. However, due to time constraints and a 
lack of funding, YOSAR discontinued the publication after only three issues.^^^ Tim 
Setnicka recognized the scope of this communication problem in his description of the 
average accident victim in Yosemite. Citing wilderness survival researchers Rick 
La Valle and Gene Fear, Setnicka offered a telling portrait of the typical next-generation 
wilderness enthusiast visiting Yosemite and other parks in this period:
The average SAR victim is a composite outdoorsperson, a combination of part climber, 
fisherman, hunter, skier, camper, hiker all blended into one. He or she usually does not 
practice any one sport particularly well, but joins in a multitude of activities to varying 
degrees. Most wilderness users reside in densely populated areas, travel relatively far 
for seasonal recreation, and have a reasonable amount of time and money to spend on 
these pursuits. Usually too much emphasis is placed in material equipment advances 
and the latest mechanical devices.^^^
Search and rescue, as an accommodative policy, also functioned as a front-line 
administrative tool to preserve nature in the park, though only in accordance with the 
recreational expectations of this particular demographic.
In an era in which travel in undeveloped areas involved engaging with wild nature 
without changing it - an ethic the Sierra Club called “going light” or “walking softly in 
the wilderness” - few wilderness users had the skills to survive independently if an 
unexpected event cut short their desired wilderness experience. As historian James 
Morton Turner explains, over the course of the twentieth century, the importance of
John Dill, Climbing Accidents at Yosemite: 1979 Summary (San Jose; Granite Press, 1979). 
Editions also exist for 1980 and 1981 when the report was discontinued. Copies are available in the 
Yosemite National Park Library.
^  Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 629.
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“woodcraft” or survival skills involving hunting, gathering wood for fires, and building 
shelters gave way to an ethic of detached contemplation in which the tools of wilderness 
travel became increasingly specialized commercial products, available at often 
exorbitantly high prices at specialty retailers?^’ Taking into account this increasingly 
popular conception of wilderness as recreational space, the 1985 search and rescue plan 
for Yosemite included a number of preventative SAR duties including “counseling the 
victim, correcting sign inadequacies, changing district information/ registration 
procedures, and conducting interpretive P-SAR programs.”^^ * Still, these policies had 
limitations and were often too little too late in educating over-ambitious wilderness users 
who ventured into dangerous terrain.
Indeed, while the analyses offered by Dill, Wendt, and Setnicka were reasonable and 
correct from an administrative perspective, the sheer numbers of recreational wilderness 
users the NPS willingly accommodated could not be counted on to always follow safety 
recommendations. The popular culture of wilderness recreation, which valued a 
sensation of isolation and personalized risk in a natural setting without being completely 
cut of from a sophisticated tourist infrastructure, positioned SAR among the most 
necessary and pragmatic administrative duties of the modem NPS. Yet visitor protection 
remained a reactive administrative responsibility to be performed after the fact as a 
search, rescue, or recovery. The NPS’s discretionary liability for ensuring visitor safety 
also remained reactive. Rock climbers or other wilderness users who partook in 
dangerous activities assumed the immediate risk of that activity on their own. Protected
James Morton Turner, “From Woodcraft to ‘Leave no Trace:’ Wilderness, Consumerism, and 
Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America,” Environmental History 7, no.3 (2002): 462-484.
^  NPS, Yosemite National Park Search and Rescue Plan, May 1986.
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by the discretionary function exception of the Tort Claims Act, administrators rightly 
determined that the NPS could not reasonably perform extensive preventative safety 
maintenance without inviting costly legal penalties if accidents persisted. Farabee and 
Ghiglieri offer a characteristic NPS explanation of this paradox by attacking a notion that 
“every possible location in the American West where someone might die accidentally 
should be labeled with warning signs.” Even if this were feasible, the authors argue, the 
issue of liability would remain. To extend visitor protection liability to such an 
unreasonable length would not only compromise the NPS’s assumed responsibility to not 
''change anything in wilderness,” such a policy would also remove the legal safeguards 
provided by the discretionary function exception of the Tort Claims Act and open up 
administrators to tort litigation since accidents and deaths would in all probability 
continue to occur.^^  ^ As Farabee’s and Ghiglieri’s analysis suggests, a conspicuously 
proactive safety infrastructure would be both impossible to maintain for the understaffed 
and under-funded NPS, and undesirable for the expanding cohort of environmentally 
enlightened but ill-prepared visitors seeking to experience the park “without handrails” in 
Joseph Sax’s terms. Though YOSAR required an ever higher percentage of the park’s 
limited annual budget in this period yet had little authority to directly prevent tragedies 
caused by the poor judgment of inexperienced victims, free SAR remained the most 
reliable and most cost effective means for the NPS to accommodate the expectations of 
the park’s most influential constituencies.
This realization did not deter attempts to cut costs. In the mid-1980s, search and 
rescue expenses in the national parks ratcheted up to previously unimagined numbers.
^  Ghilglieri and Farabee, Death in Yosemite, 575.
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Funding problems were especially acute in Yosemite where costs spiked from $155,443 
in 1983 to $294,955 only one year later, an alarming ninety percent increase. Numbers of 
rescues were also up considerably. YOSAR performed a record 168 missions in 1984, a 
full fifty seven percent increase from the 110 incidents in 1983. Even more distressing 
for administrators in Yosemite, the park’s total rescue bill for 1984 accounted for nearly 
seventy percent of the total SAR costs for the entire Western Region.^”® Much of this 
expense came from the use of helicopters from Lemoore Naval Air Station. While the 
“Lemoore Angels” rescue team remained necessary for “its winching capabilities and 
ability to access vertical walls,” Valley District Ranger Jim Reilly expressed confidence 
in YOSAR’s efforts to adapt the smaller contract helicopter, stationed at Crane Flat, to 
perform more specialized rescues. Crediting John Dill, Bob Reese, Steve Collum, Mead 
Hargis, and Mike Durr with developing new helicopter rescue capabilities including “the 
helicopter rappel program, the short haul program, and the rope throw equipment 
exchange program,” Reilly believed that YOSAR could increase the efficiency and speed 
of SAR missions while at the same time reducing costs. By 1987, YOSAR credited a 
marked expense reduction of approximately $50,000 for fourteen more rescues than in 
1986 to these adaptations to the park’s contract helicopter. Yet through the early 1990s, 
these reductions proved less than significant if not illusory as SAR costs leapt again to 
more than $420,000 by 1991, presumably due to increased numbers of “searches, 
helicopter evacuations, and wall rescues” in that year.^®'
Jim Reilly to All Concerned, re: “SAR Statistics,” February 3, 1985, YOSAR office files.; Western 
Regional Office, “Search and Rescue Summary -  Western Region,” 1985, YOSAR office files.
Search and Rescue Officer to Chief Ranger, re: “Significant Incident Report,” February 6, 1988, 
YOSAR office files.; YOSAR, “Search and Rescue Year-End Report -  Calendar Year 1991,” YOSAR 
office files.
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As SAR costs rose, NPS officials system-wide began reexamining the possibility of 
charging victims for simple helicopter evacuations. In a June 1981 decision prepared by 
the office of the Controller General of the United States, legal advisers unearthed an 
obscure amendment to the Department of Interior’s User Charge Statute which offered a 
way of “recouping the cost of Federal activities which provide a special benefit to the 
individual.” The decision established a legal precedent that would “allow the head of an 
agency to charge the beneficiary for the value of the service rendered and help agency 
activities to be self sustaining.” *^’^  Writing to the Regional Director of the western region 
that prior to this decision “National Park Service policy did not conform with National 
Park Service practice,” NPS Director Stanley Albright incorrectly assumed that 
ambulance services were already being charged to evacuees. In many parks including 
Grand Canyon and Sequoia-Kings Canyon this had indeed been the case; in these parks 
the Controller’s decision had little effect other than legitimizing administrators’ 
established practice. In Yosemite where the distinction between an air ambulance 
evacuation and a technical rescue remained vague, the superintendent’s office had 
stopped billing helicopter evacuees in 1974, determining that the policy was unfeasible, 
insensitive, and probably without legal grounds.^*^ ^
Administrators in Yosemite paid only passing attention to the Controller General’s 
decision, in part because the funds collected through the User Charge Statute would have
The Controller General o f the United States, re: “Emergency Transportation o f Injured Visitor at 
National Park,” June 3, 1981, YOSAR office files.
Stanley Albright to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Emergency Transportation Charge 
Policy,” September 24,1982, YOSAR office files; Robert J. Smith, Superintendent, Sequoia-Kings Canyon 
to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Emergency Transportation and Cost o f  Injured Victim,” 
September 28,1982, YOSAR office files; Richard W. Marko, Superintendent, Grand Canyon to Regional 
Director, Western Region, re: “Request for Assistance,” October 20,1982, YOSAR office files; Farabee, 
Death, Daring, and Disaster, 288.
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to be deposited into a service-wide treasury account and “would only be available 
through appropriations.” ®^'* Facing serious budget deficiencies, YOSAR officials hoped 
to use any monies that could conceivably be collected from evacuees or their insurance 
policies to pay for much needed training programs, rescue cache expansions, PSAR 
programs, and wages for emergency hires. In a November 1983 memo to Jim Reilly, 
Mike Durr argued that without these improvements YOSAR would be put in “a 
dangerously reactionary posture.” If additional funding could not be secured, Durr feared 
that YOSAR “will be forced deeper into the hole of unpreparedness.” ®^^ In fact, earlier 
that year Reilly had initiated a creative, under-the-table means to recover costs and 
deposit them directly into the park’s own emergency fund. Instead of billing rescuees, 
the park would “solicit donations from persons using the ambulance service and have the 
proceeds go to the [Yosemite] Mountain Safety Fund.” ®^^ Reilly prepared an 
ingenuously suggestive letter to be released to victims evacuated by helicopter along with 
a self addressed return envelope. The “donation” request read:
The ambulance service you received was provided by Yosemite National Park out of 
the operating funds provided by the National Park Service. In these times of shrinking 
budgets the Park Service is finding it increasingly difficult to provide funds for that 
service. We need your help. If you received this service in any of the outlying areas 
you would be billed a rate of approximately $85 for the call-out and $5 per mile 
thereafter. We ask your help in offsetting these costs by making a tax deductible 
donation to a non-profit rescue fund... Thank you for your contribution.^®^
304 Jim Reilly to All concerned, re: “Ambulance Service Fees,” January 6, 1983, YOSAR office files.
Mike Durr, Search and Rescue Officer to Chief Ranger, re: “Additional Search and Rescue Funding 
for FY 84,” November 10,1983, YOSAR office files.
^  Jim Reilly to All Concerned, January 6, 1983.
' See 
office files.
attachment to Jim Reilly to Ranger Staff, re: “Ambulance Service,” January 4, 1983, YOSAR
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The donation program enabled YOSAR and the park’s medical clinic to afford 
desperately needed supplies while avoiding the time-consuming burden of collections and 
the sensitive legality of demanding repayment.
Such a policy did not go unchallenged. The Department of Interior caught wind of 
this practice in 1994 during a system-wide audit of SAR and emergency medical services 
(EMS) practices. Still, auditors were less concerned with how the national parks 
recovered funds than what administrators did with collected monies and for which 
services individual parks chose to bill victims. In the final survey report. Assistant 
Inspector General Judy Harrison found that approximately $4.5 million in SAR and EMS 
charges system-wide were not recovered in 1993 and that collections of $757,800 “were 
inappropriately retained by park units.” The problem, according to Harrison, was that 
while the Controller General had legitimized collections, the NPS had “not established 
uniform procedures that ensure[d] the recovery of all appropriate costs associated with 
providing emergency assistance to park visitors.” ®^*
Still, the audit did not specifically define which expenses could be charged to the 
victim and which could not. Policy had historically allowed parks to charge for medical 
care received in park clinics and some ground ambulance services, yet the line between 
EMS and SAR expenses remained unclear. Moreover, while Death Valley National 
Monument, Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Park, and a number of smaller NPS- 
managed parks had been depositing most of their recovered funds into “the proper U.S. 
Treasury account;” Yosemite and Grand Canyon in particular had been recycling these 
funds back into the parks’ individual operating budgets in order to pay for new equipment.
^  Judy Harrison, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, “Final Survey Report on Emergency Medical 
and Search and Rescue Service, National Park Service,” June 10,1996, YOSAR office files.
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training programs, and other miscellaneous costs not adequately covered under 
emergency appropriations. The Inspector General recommended in the initial report that 
the NPS establish a uniform, system-wide policy for billing victims and for depositing 
recovered funds into the designated treasury account.^ ®®
The Park Service responded in defense of its historical practice of not charging for 
SAR events. The NPS Ranger Activities Office argued that the legality of cost recovery 
only covered “special benefits to recipients beyond those accruing to the general public.” 
To extend this definition to park visitors who became lost, stranded, injured, or killed 
would “stretch reason” and compromise the mission of the modem NPS to provide 
opportunities for wilderness recreation in the parks. Charging for SAR events beyond 
simple medical services could also negate the protection from tort liability provided by 
the discretionary function exception in the Tort Claims Act.^ *® A joint statement agreed 
upon by the 369 administrative units under NPS management stated: “If the NPS charges 
a visitor a fee for SAR, then the government is receiving payment for a specific service to 
be rendered and the activity is no longer a discretionary action. Charging fees will 
certainly increase tort liability along with increasing the number of SARs by giving 
people the false perceptions that rescue is automatic because they paid a fee.” Moreover, 
if the NPS charged for rescues, accident victims may be reluctant to request a rescue in a 
timely manner. If this occurred, costs for SAR could become even higher while instances
^  Ibid; The audit report found that Yosemite had not collected on SAR service o f approximately 
$113,000 in 1993, though Harrison did not specify how the Inspector General determined the legal viability 
of collection on these bills. Harrison also calculated that Yosemite had successfixlly collected 
approximately $285,100 in medical costs between 1991 and 1994, all but about 7.5% o f which was retained 
by either YOSAR or the park’s medical clinic, or deposited in a general park operating fund.
Chief, Ranger Activities Division to Acting Inspector General for Audits, re: “Comments on Draft 
Survey Report on Emergency Medical and Search and Rescue Services, National Park Service,” October 
13, 1995, YOSAR office files.
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of serious injury or death would also likely rise. These arguments stalled Department of 
Interior attempts to order parks to demand repayment for SAR operations and 
universalize procedures.^" In 1996, the Inspector General determined that “given that 
this is a sensitive area,” a final policy decision would await NPS “guidance on whether to 
charge fees for search and rescue services.” '^^
NPS legal advisors and SAR operators took this opportunity to defend each individual 
park’s discretion to provide free rescue - even with the high cost and potential to 
encourage irresponsible recreational habits - as an integral component of national park 
policy. In May of 1999, the Deputy Associate Solicitors for the Division of Conservation 
and Wildlife and the Division of General Law released an exhaustive study of case law 
outlining the delicate protection afforded to NPS SAR services under the discretionary 
function exemption in the Tort Claims Act. Short of either constructing extensive safety 
accommodations into backcountry areas or discontinuing EMS/SAR services altogether 
and closing these areas, the report concluded that individual administrators should be 
permitted to determine the limits of their liability to perform SAR functions based on 
considerations indigenous to each respective park. Such a policy, the authors explained, 
“would help ensure the consistency recommended by the Inspector General. At the same 
time, allowing each park to select the model that best fits its needs provides the flexibility 
necessary for an effective EMS/SAR program.”^
“SAR and EMS IG Comments,” attachment to “Comments on Draft Survey Report on Emergency 
Medical and Search and Rescue Services.”
Harrison, “National Park Service Response and Office o f Inspector General Reply,” attachment to 
Harrison, “Final Survey Report,” 10.
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These recommendations enabled administrators in Yosemite to adapt YOSAR to the 
malleable constructions of nature and changing expectations of visitors into the twenty- 
first century. As Farabee and Ghiglieri explain:
Most of the nearly four million people each year who drive or fly out of their way to 
visit Yosemite do so not because they have been assured that it has been made as safe 
as (or safer than) their local neighborhood park. Instead, they come to experience an 
inspirational and unique chunk of wild scenery... Some people come here specifically 
to push their own limits and to test themselves -  to go up to “the edge.” Although a few 
visitors may want to see the Park completely “danger-proofed,” most of us know it is 
instead our job to safeguard ourselves by respecting its hazards.
Even with the assumption of risk implicit in modem ideas of wilderness recreation, a 
technologically sophisticated search and rescue apparatus continued to be necessary in 
Yosemite and other parks. Accidents persisted and few visitors to the national parks 
could be expected to posses the diversity of skills necessary to help themselves when they 
made mistakes, and even fewer park goers desired a wilderness experience entirely 
disconnected from the safeguards of technological society. Visitor protection thus 
remained a critical administrative responsibility; and while NPS policy determined that 
administrators could feasibly charge rescuees as recipients of “special benefits.. .beyond 
those received by the general public,” to do so would compromise the legal protections 
and autonomy the NPS possessed in facilitating the faux wilderness experience desired 
by the most active visitors to the national parks.^'^
Memorandum, Deputy Associate Solicitor, Division o f Conservation and Wildlife and Deputy 
Associate Solicitor, Division o f General Law to Director, National Park Service, May 11,1999, YOSAR 
office files.
Farabee and Ghigieri, Death in Yosemite, 577.
Memorandum, Deputy Associate Solicitor to Director, NPS, May 11, 1999.; Also see Mike Gautier, 
et al.. Report to Congress: Analysis o f  Cost Recovery fo r  High Altitude Rescues on Mt. McKinley, Denali
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In the NPS’s initial reply to the Inspector General’s 1995 audit, the authors had 
concluded that, in fact, rescuees did not receive a special benefit from the federal 
government because the “SAR/EMS function is totally humanitarian in character, having 
nothing to do with.. .commercialism.” *^® Yet NPS analysts, in espousing this 
characteristic ambivalence to the role of consumer culture in informing nearly every 
aspect of resource protection policy in the national parks, did not grasp the entire 
significance of their determination to not charge victims for rescues. Indeed, the decision 
represented far more than an altruistic effort to save lives, cut costs, protect the NPS from 
tort claims, and avoid sluggish bureaucratic procedures; free search and rescue also 
enabled the Park Service to manage vast undeveloped portions of the parks for wilderness 
recreation. Only if the NPS continued to grant individual SAR units flexibility and 
independence in their decision making capabilities could Yosemite and other iconic parks 
remain free to limit conspicuous tourism development and yet still provide reasonably 
safe conditions for the types of recreation preferred by park users in an age of heightened 
ecological awareness. While no NPS policy decisions could ever be entirely free from 
commercial influence, YOSAR’s wilderness handrails offered a pragmatic reconciliation 
of the illusory preservation/use dichotomy that had long divided environmentalists, park 
administrators, politicians, and nature lovers in the twentieth century movement to 
preserve nature in Yosemite and the national parks.
National Park and Preserve, Alaska (Washington D.C.: National Park Service, 2001), i, ii, 2, 6-8.; and 
Jackson, Expenses o f  Search and Rescue Services in the National Parks, 134-136.
Ranger Activities Division to Acting Inspector General for Audits, re: “Comments on Draft Survey 
Report,” October 13, 1995.
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CONCLUSION
To limit analysis of the national parks to a question of whether or not the National 
Park Service advanced an appropriately ecological standard of preservation in the parks, 
as environmental historians have traditionally done, is to gloss over the complex political, 
cultural, and administrative imperatives shaping far more interesting debates over the 
meaning of nature in post-industrial American society. The history of search and rescue 
in Yosemite, as an administrative response to new ways of reconciling nature, technology, 
and tourism in the age of environmentalism, provides a link to these often misunderstood 
stories. The evolution of SAR, from a loosely defined, heroic duty of park rangers in the 
early twentieth century to a technologically sophisticated, professional responsibility of a 
specialized rescue force by the 1970s, also moves historical analysis of the national parks 
beyond the much traveled terrain of automobiles and wilderness in the modem national 
parks movement. The administrative decisions leading to the creation of YOSAR in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s revealed the complicated ways in which consumers of 
wilderness recreation reconciled nature, technology, and tourism once they left their cars 
behind. Visitor protection became the most tangible administrative tool by which the 
National Park Service could build positive relationships with an influential minority of 
rock climbers and other wilderness users without compromising its long-standing 
obligation to maintain the parks as democratic spaces set aside for the enjoyment of a
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diverse constituency of nature lovers, even those unfamiliar with the potential dangers of 
risk-oriented, self-reliant wilderness recreation.
The professionalization of search and rescue in Yosemite reflected the changing 
recreational preferences of touring Americans in the twentieth century. Beginning in 
1916, Steven Mather and Horace Albright, the first directors of the National Park Service, 
began working to transform the great parks of the American West from distant symbols 
of monumental nature to sought-after tourist sites accessible to a broad demographic of 
increasingly mobile middle class Americans. As more and more visitors vied for access 
to the scenic qualities of the parks, a growing number of ambitious nature enthusiasts 
began venturing out beyond the roads and other urban facilities that the NPS had 
constructed to accommodate surging visitation. In Yosemite through the interwar years, 
members of the Sierra Club began experimenting with rock climbing, backcountry 
camping, ski-mountaineering, and other wilderness-oriented activities that emphasized 
physical interaction with vast stretches of undeveloped terrain and a sensation of isolation 
fi'om the increasingly congested, urban atmosphere of the Valley. As these potentially 
dangerous forms of wilderness recreation became more popular through the 1930s and 
especially in the postwar years, the Park Service was forced to pay closer attention to its 
stipulated responsibility to provide for the safety o f visitors. The gradual implementation 
of a formal search and rescue apparatus became the most pragmatic means for the NPS to 
accommodate these new recreational demands while balancing them against auto-touring 
and other more traditional park uses.
The decades following World War II brought unprecedented changes to American 
society and to the culture of tourism in the national parks. As millions of newly affluent
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middle class Americans moved westward to the sprawling urban centers of California, 
the Sunbelt, and the Pacifie Northwest, Yosemite and the great parks of the American 
West became more accessible to more people than at any time in their history. With the 
galvanization of the environmental movement following the Sierra Club’s fight to save 
Dinosaur National Monument in the mid 1950s and the passing of the Wilderness Act in 
1964, national park visitors brought with them an increasingly heightened, though often 
inconsistent, awareness of ecology and the social values of wilderness preservation. This 
new emphasis did not lessen the commercial appeal of the parks but only engendered 
more diverse and sophisticated recreational preferences among touring Americans. 
Specialty outdoor retailers including Patagonia, Recreational Equipment Incorporated,
Ski Hut, North Face, Eddie Bauer, and countless others sprouted up across the nation to 
meet the needs of this growing number of wilderness lovers seeking access to the vast 
undeveloped portions of their public lands. As iconic nature preserves, Yosemite and the 
wilderness parks of the West attracted unprecedented legions of hikers, backpackers, rock 
climbers, cross-country skiers, fishermen, rafters, and other consumers of strenuous 
outdoor sports. Seeking solitude, self-reliance, and risk through immersion in wild nature, 
the millions of neophyte wilderness enthusiasts flocking to the parks in this period 
instilled the National Park Service with an urgent awareness of the need to develop a 
capable, professional visitor protection infrastructure.
The administrative decisions leading to the creation of YOSAR in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s reflected this need to ensure visitor safety; yet the process also underscored 
the complex cultural, legal, and political imperatives the NPS faced in determining how 
nature would be preserved in Yosemite and who would be permitted to experience it. In
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an era in which ecology began to inform land management philosophies, and popular 
environmental culture increasingly valued experiencing “nature for its own sake,” the 
NPS understandably prioritized recreational activities that required a landscape free from 
obvious signs of human agency. To avoid the very real possibility that increased 
numbers of backpackers, rock climbers, and other park users would “love the wilderness 
to death,” the Park Service implemented a backcountry permit process while also 
promoting the often repeated mantras of “going light,” or “walking softly in the 
wilderness,” and later, “leave no trace.” Such policies encouraged visitors to engage with 
nature in the park without changing it, an ethic that further increased the importance of 
the outdoor recreation industry and the technologies it provided to park goers. The 
culture of wilderness recreation evolved contingent to these innovations in technology 
and other developments in the commercial marketplace.
As Joseph Sax pointed out, wilderness activities also carried a stigma of elitism.
Many park supporters viewed backpacking, ski mountaineering, and rock climbing in 
particular as accessible only to the most physically fit, self-reliant, and ideologically 
inclined park users. As an institution founded on democratic principles and the notion 
that the wilderness experience in the nation’s parks should be accessible to a broad 
demographic, the National Park Service had neither the will nor the capability to limit 
participation in wilderness recreation based on the relative physical fitness or experience 
level of individual visitors. At the same time, intense political pressure, represented most 
clearly by the passing of the Wilderness Act in 1964 and the changing preferences of the 
park-going public in the age of environmentalism, had precluded the modem NFS from 
pursuing Mission 66-style expansions to its long-standing automobile-based tourist
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infrastructure. For administrators in Yosemite, democratizing wilderness recreation 
hinged most concretely on the active maintenance of safety standards. Yet proactive 
safety measures including additional roads, backcountry huts, conspicuous warning signs, 
and metal railings at remote overlooks could also compromise the sensation of self- 
reliance and individualized risk that wilderness enthusiasts considered integral to the 
national park experience. The NPS’s institutionalization of a technologically proficient, 
and predominantly reactive, search and rescue service provided free of charge by the 
federal government remained critical to managing Yosemite as a wilderness park without 
alienating less experienced constituencies.
Though the presence of a free rescue service in Yosemite rendered the wilderness 
experience accessible to a broader constituency, participants in wilderness-oriented 
activities remained independently responsible for practicing good judgment, as 
exemplified by the tragic death of three climbers on El Capitan in May of 1978. By 
assuming the financial burden of rescue and establishing discretionary limits on its visitor 
protection capabilities, the National Park Service could protect itself from tort claims 
filed by accident victims. Despite the very real risk of bodily harm or violent death an 
adventure into the vertical landscapes of Yosemite held, the NPS established few 
restrictions limiting the autonomy of rock climbers, backpackers, hikers, fishermen, 
skiers, and other user groups to push the boundaries of risk in their respective wilderness 
encounters. The psychic assurance that YOSAR inspired, even with no guarantees, gave 
even the most ill-prepared visitors the confidence to imagine that they could engage with 
nature in Yosemite on its own terms. Administrators’ decision to provide free SAR 
rather than restrict dangerous activities or expand development projects to accommodate
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automobile-based tourism blurred the lines between preservation and use in national park 
policy and empowered the generation of wilderness enthusiasts converging on Yosemite 
beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Both the NPS and the majority of visitors embraced the wilderness experience this 
SAR infrastructure facilitated not as a transcendent escape from modernity, but as a 
recreational supplement to a postmodern lifestyle of leisure. Rock climbing, backpacking, 
and other wilderness activities became desirable additions to the changing scope of 
leisure in American culture. As a product of rising affluence and the emergence of 
quality of life environmentalism in the early 1970s, the much sought-after wilderness 
experience satisfied a popular impulse to come in contact with a simulacrum of wild 
nature through recreation. Yet, as in nearly every aspect of middle class environmental 
culture at this time, consumers of wilderness recreation desired the effect of the 
wilderness experience without the negative consequences the experience could bring. 
Search and rescue enabled this new generation of outdoor enthusiasts to not only have 
their cake and eat it too; or in this ease, to preserve their wilderness and experience it too; 
but also to be rescued from it in the event of an accident.
Rescue specialist Kenneth Andrasko, in his editorial introduction to Tim Setnicka’s 
Wilderness Search and Rescue, described the basic assumption by which visitor 
protection services in the national parks framed their operational imperatives: “Salvation 
from death is a mainstay of the American Dream of the good life and perpetual youth,” 
he wrote. “Since the mountains are no longer miserable or frightening but instead a place 
for relaxing and a source of spiritual and physical rejuvenation, the possibility of rescue 
from them is pretty much taken for granted. The Wilderness is considered a place for
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recreation, not trial.” '^  ^ In Andrasko’s pragmatic framework, search and rescue 
performed a vital function in facilitating the wilderness experience in national parks. 
Though a few extraordinarily dedicated individuals still desired to “perform superhuman 
feats of will” in places where “travelers perish when they make mistakes,” Andrasko 
acknowledged what many romantic wilderness celebrants were loathe to admit yet most 
visitors knew intuitively: that the presence of a professional search and rescue service 
was in most cases a pre-ordained requirement of a safe, enjoyable wilderness experience. 
“Rescue is a strong affirmation of the bonds of society,” Andrasko stated in his 
unwaveringly frank analysis of the postmodern wilderness experience, “it just takes the 
form of something that needs to be done.” *^*
As a professional rescuer, Andrasko understood that the idea of wilderness derived 
directly from the culture of tourism that many preservationists sought to reject. The 
ambivalence that Andrasko took as a given pervaded the preservationist tradition in the 
national parks movement. Even the most stridently anti-populist advocates of the 
wilderness ideal ultimately communicated their messages in recreational terms through 
the familiar channels of consumer capitalism. In his 1968 bestseller Desert Solitaire, 
Edward Abbey went so far as to demand that the National Park Service encourage 
visitors to “get lost, sunburnt, stranded, drowned, eaten by bears, [and] buried alive under 
avalanches,” since as he argued, “that is the right and privilege of any free American.” 
Perhaps unintentionally, but not surprisingly. Abbey’s compelling polemic against 
“industrial tourism” struck a sympathetic chord with a new generation of wilderness
Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note,” in Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: 
Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), iii.
Ibid., iv.
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enthusiasts who rushed to encounter the parks first hand. Embracing Abbey’s distaste for 
the “indolent millions bom on wheels and suckled on gasoline,” the growing number of 
rucksack-toting wilderness lovers making their way to the parks in the 1970s sought what 
Abbey called a “self propelled” wilderness experience either on foot, on skis, by mule, by 
paddle, or hand-over-hand tied-in to climbing ropes. This influential user group did not 
support a truly punitive wilderness ideal in which humans and their technologies were 
excluded from preserved nature, but instead sought to assert a recreational hierarchy and 
a freedom to risk life and limb in nature that seemed threatened by the Park Service’s 
traditional mission to accommodate mass-tourism.^*®
In Yosemite, rock climbers, more so than any other user group, embodied this 
ambivalent tension between consumerism and wilderness in the modem national parks 
movement. The cohort of “climbing bums” carving a simple existence out of the dust, 
pines, and boulders of Camp 4 through the 1960s and early 1970s simultaneously 
facilitated and resisted the transformation of their sport into a mainstream recreational 
pursuit. The environmental ethie of “clean climbing” that Yvon Chouinard embraced as 
the foundation of his business philosophy in the 1972 Chouinard Equipment Catalogue 
had a dual effect on the culture of wildemess recreation. In one sense the catalogue, with 
its dramatic photos of wild mountains and message of environmental sensitivity, tapped 
into the romance of the wildemess experience that had captivated American tourists since 
the late nineteenth century. Yet clean climbing also carried a set of elitist environmental
Edward Abbey, Dessert Solitaire: A Season in the Wildemess (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 48-
56.
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standards that Chouinard hoped would limit an influx of neophytes, who he referred to as 
“average Joes,” into the rock climbing brotherhood/^®
While administrators in Yosemite embraced the environmental message of elean 
climbing, the contention that climbing could not be democratic seemed to counteract the 
NPS’s mandate to provide for the enjoyment of the parks. To communicate the 
environmental and technological imperatives of Yosemite climbing to inexperienced 
visitors, administrators promoted the park as a world class climbing destination, opening 
a mountaineering school in the Valley in 1969 and highlighting the park’s vast climbing 
opportunities in promotional materials. While many elite climbers resented the NPS’s 
endorsement of their sport, such programs had the effect of indoctrinating new climbers 
into the philosophies that Choiunard and others had been promoting through their own 
connections to the commercial marketplace. In this way, administrators negotiated a 
fragile consensus with climbers over the transformation of their sport into a legitimate 
wildemess experience in the nation’s premier park.
Yet the generation of wildemess enthusiasts converging on Yosemite in this period 
could not be expected to fully educate themselves to the strict standards of safety and 
responsibility in equipment use that elite climbers had honed after years of practice. Not 
surprisingly, climbing accidents increased at an alarming rate through the 1970s and 
1980s, comprising anywhere from twelve to twenty five percent of the park’s 
approximately 150 annual SAR missions. The park’s ranger force struggled to keep pace 
with the sophisticated, and often dangerous, rescue techniques that rock climbing
Yvon Chouinard, “Coonyard Mouths Of f A s c e n t  1, no. 6 (June 1972): 50; For elitism in clean 
climbing also see Doug Robinson, “The Whole Natural Art o f Protection,” in Chouinard and Frost, 
Chouinard Equipment Catalogue (Ventura: Chouinard Equipment Inc., 1972), 12, 25.
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mishaps required. In order to avoid dealing with an inordinate number of serious injuries 
and violent deaths on Yosemite’s cliffs, park officials cultivated a working relationship 
with the highly skilled contingent of climbing bums residing in Camp 4 through this 
period. The creation of the rescue site in 1971 incorporated climbers into the park’s 
maturing rescue apparatus and contributed to the formation of a distinct SAR culture in 
Yosemite. For this select group of Camp 4 climbing bums, rock climbing and rescue 
transformed from recreation to a professional responsibility. The creation of an internal 
SAR force not only reflected the specialization of the NPS in this period, it also linked 
the perennially antagonistic counterculture of Yosemite rock climbing to the pragmatic 
administrative responsibilities of the Park Service.
The professionalization of SAR in Yosemite in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to 
underscoring the administrative challenges facing the modem NPS, also illuminated a 
long-standing debate within environmental culture over the role of technology in 
mediating the human relationship to nature. As the manufacturer of the best climbing 
gear in the world and a leader in the development of environmental ethics in business, 
Yvon Chouinard described this sliding scale as a “technological gradient” in which some 
technologies “enslaved.. .post-industrial man” while others “set him free” by providing 
opportunities to come in closer contact with wild nature.^^* Delineating appropriate 
“style” in the application of technology informed not only the culture of rock climbing 
and other wildemess-oriented activities, but also guided the technological imperative in 
effective SAR. “We must control technology, not be enslaved to it,” wamed Tim 
Setnicka in Wildemess Search and Rescue. “We should not let the helicopter separate us
Yvon Chouinard, Climbing Ice (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978), 185-188.
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from the basic technique of movement in the wildemess: climbing, staying physically fit, 
[and] preparing to survive the unanticipated bivouac.” Emphasizing Chouinard’s 
technological gradient as the determining factor in professional SAR, Setnicka continued: 
“The burden of style and ethics is always with us. Often the manner in which goals and 
objectives are reached is the distinction between a professional performer or organization 
and an ineffective one.”^^ ^
As the wildemess ideal continues to inform environmental culture and politics into 
the twenty-first century, the manner in which these intersections between technology, 
commercialism, and the human relationship to nature are negotiated in environmental 
discourse persists as an ongoing stmggle for rescuers, consumers of outdoor recreation, 
environmentalists, the National Park Service, and other interest groups. The boundaries 
dictating the appropriate role of technology in mediating this relationship to nature 
remain elusive and highly contingent to the ever-changing cultural preferences of outdoor 
enthusiasts, as indicated by environmental historian John Heron’s recent analysis of the 
role of cell phones and handheld Global Positioning Systems (GPS devices) in facilitating 
wildemess travel. “For every voice touting the safety advantages of hiking with cell 
phones,” Heron finds, “there is another that shouts cellular technology poses a danger to 
the health and sanctity of westem nature.”^^  ^ This discussion of safety as an indicator of 
a particular technology’s suitability to the wildemess experience underscores the vital 
significance of SAR to understanding the meaning of nature and the value of the national 
parks in American culture. As the wildemess handrails of Yosemite, the rangers, rock
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 630, 631.
John Heron, “The Call in the Wild: Nature, Technology, and Environmental Politics,” unpublished 
manuscript.
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climbers, medical technicians, law enforcement officials, and military personnel 
comprising the human element of YOSAR have played central roles in locating Leo 
Marx’s “middle landscape” in the evolving reconciliation of nature, technology, and 
tourism in the national parks movement.
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